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This thesis is an attempt to present a detailed and critical chrono-
logical account of Civil .War events in the Indian Territory during the 
eighteen month period which began on January 1, 18620 This period has 
never been given adequate research treatment~ in factj t he entire history 
0£ the Indian Territory during the war years has been covered only 
briefly and superficiallyo This is most regrettable ·r or two reasons. 
First, the significant military operations and events in the territory 
cannot be understood in their local and national context s o Second, ob-
jective understanding of the important post.»war period depends much on 
detailed research knowledge of the happenings of the war in the Indian 
country. 
The impact of the Civil Wa.r was keenly felt by the inhabitants of 
the Indian Territory, and the co1lllllitment was perhaps greater than in the 
East 9 for the entire population was involved in the struggleo Except for 
sporadic guerrilla activity j primary military operations ended in the 
territory early in comparison to the fighting in the Eastern theater of 
the ware The Federal forces, after a halting start, were successful in 
overcoming a major portion of .Confederate resistance in the Indian country 
during the summer of 1863~ nearly two years before the Confederate States 
capitulated. 
There were many factors external to the land of the Five Civilized 
Tribes that influenced the conduct of the war in their areao The po-
litical and military leaders of the North and the South~ located far from 
Indian Territory, were responsible for many of the occurrences during the 
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eighteen months of 1862-1863 covered by this study. The plans and de-
cisions made outside of the territory were as important as those made by 
collllll8.nders on the scene. These significant influences have been in-
corporated into this thesis. 
The author extends ap.preciation to the Library Staff of Oklahoma 
State University for their assistance in locating a large number of 
government documents essential in the writing of this thesis. He also 
thanks the staff of the Oklahoma Historical Society for their helpfulness 
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and the Library. 
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curate comments in their reading of this work, and their suggestions and 
critical analysis did much to improve it. Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer deserves 
much credit for his guidance and direction of this thesis. He was in-
strumental in establishing the subject, and he provided leads to refer-
ence material which added much to the continuity of the narrative. His 
criticism, exact and sagacious, enabled the author to overcome many 
writing difficulties and style obstacles which would have otherwise proved 
to be insurmountable. Without the sound advice, the positive encourage-
ment, and the stimulating critiques which Dr. Fischer gave tirelessly, 
this thesis would not have become an accomplished fact. 
Lastly, the author acknowledges the patience and understanding dis-
played by his wife, Belva, and his two children, SUzanne and lblndall, 
.during the months this thesis was in preparation. Their cheerful devotion 
provided the impetus needed to counteract the doldrums of composition 
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BEFORE FEDERAL ASCENDA?«:Y 
In the suJ11111e:r ot 1862 .• Federal mil1ta%".Y toro, moved eouth trom 
JCaneae and attempted to re-e1tabli1h the authozoitr ot the United Stat,, 
over a 1roup ot 11mima tonomou1 Indian nation10 Th••• Five Civ11111d 
Trib11--th1 Ch,rokttp Chootaw, Cr,ek0 Chioka1aw, and Seminole--had uni-
laterally tel'lllinated existing treaties the preceding year with the 
1ov1rnment in Washington in o.rder t~ align them11lve1 with the newly 
tormed Contede:rate States or Amerioa. Ci:rawn1tanoe1 played• role in 
thi1 abrupt t1l'lllination ot Indian allegienoe to the Federal governlllent, 
but the ottioial ot the United Stat,, by their inditterenoe toward th~ 
attairs ot the tribes, gave oonsiderable impetu to the developments 
whioh ooourred, The Indian Terzoito:ry was imply abandoned, and r,d,ral 
l1ader1 at all l1v1l1 did nothin1 toward providing the perplexed Indian, 
with in1t:t'\\otion1 tor the futur• or enaourageme t that thi1 expedient 
polioy would be altertdo 
Th• treatment ot the rive OiviliHd Tribes by whit, .A:111.erioan, had 
never been oonduoted with honor or dignity~ and all to:rm, ot 1ubt1rtu1e 
were employed when a negotiator wa1 dete:rnined to di1po11e11 a tribe ot 
it1 anoestral land, Thie pattal'n ot di honor had its foundation in the 
inability ot the tm1 r• Anglo-Saxons to understand the India", and a 
habit ot Am1rioan1 to treat red men as omethin le I than h~n. '\tiien 
the Civil WLr began, there were many ottioiala ot the Federal government 
who thought the Indians were not worth aav1n o Thi attitude wa1 not new. 
to~ it had been prevalent before the a1v1lie1d Southern Indian, were 
l 
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forcibly moved westward thirty years before the wa7:. began. 
In six Southern states and the Indian Territory, 1830 was a most 
significant year. The Five Civilized Tribes, after signing disadvanta-
geous resettlement treaties with the United States, started movements, 
some peacefully and some by force, from their homelands to a new and 
strange country west of Arkansaso This displacement of nearly 50,000 
people required twelve years to complete, and the sorrow, heartache, and 
abject misery which resulted will remain forever on the conscience of 
American society. 
The Indian Territory was officially establ~shed by the United States 
Congress in 1830 when it passed the Indian Removal Acto This statute, 
unlike most previous Indian legislation, openly proclaimed the theory of 
land exchange. Western public land, acquired through the Louisiana. 
Purchase, was to be exchanged for Indian tribal lands located in the 
Eastern states. The area set aside for this land trade was enormous. 
It stretched from the Red River to the northern boundary of Nebraska, 
from the western borders of Missouri and Arkansas to where the land was 
1 no longer habitable. The lawmakers, familiar with the "Great American 
Desert," realized that except for the eastern fringe, this territory of 
approximately 229,000 square miles was relatively worthlesso 
A large number of Indian treaties were signed after the Removal Act 
became law, and all of these contained major clauses concerning land ex-
change. Previous tr.eaties had been different in that they compressed 
tribal holdings, but they had never completely eliminated them. The idea 
1Joseph B. Thoburn and Muriel Wright, Oklahoma: A Hi.story of the 
State and Its P6op1e (4 vols°' New York: Lewis Historical Publishing'Coo, 1929),-Y: P• 12. Hereinafter cited as Thoburn and Wright, Oklahomas A 
Histog .2f. lli, State !!!2, Its Peopleo -
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of land trade with automatic liquidation of title was not contemplated on 
a large scale until after the United States had obtained the Louisiana 
Purchase. 
After the passage of the Removal Act, Federal officials were forced 
to take positive action in regard to the Indian tribes. Education and 
assimilation or pennanent tribal land reserves in the East were no longer 
acceptable by the public. as goalso Removal to the West was the solution 
deemed both practical and feasible o2 Some Indian leaders favored this 
approach. By moving away from the white man, customs and traditions 
would be continued, contact with alcohol and disease would be diminished, 
and the specter of land confiscation would be reduced.3 Unfortunately, 
other Indian leaders and most of the rank and file developed a "do-
nothing" attitude as a form of passive resistance, and this unrealistic 
approach proved to be most detrimental when the tribes were finally 
forced to go Westo 
The first treaty signed by the United States and a Southern civi~ 
lized tribe stipulating land exchange was with the Cherokees in 1817, 
and a similar treaty with the Choctaws was made three years latero Both 
agreements were made on a purely voluntary basis, and this freedom of 
choice precluded large scale participation by the members of either tripe. 
The significance of these treaties was the setting of the land exchange 
precedent, and the fact that the Doak9 s Stand Treaty with the Choctaw 
Nation allocated a large tract of land in the West for settlement which 
4 
included a substantial part of what was to be the future Indian Territoryo 
2F,dwin C. Mc Reynolds, Oklahoma (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1954), p. 111. Hereinafte·r cited as McReynolds, Oklahoma. 
)Ibid., p. 112. 
4.rhoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: ! History .2f. the State .!!!9_ .lli, People, 
pp. 111, 114. 
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Besides land exchange 9 another factor common to most American-
Indian treaties was the use of bribery and psychological pressure. In 
the case of the treaties with the Cherokee and Creek tribes·, white ne-
gotiators knowingly allowed tribal minorities, who realized the futility 
of resisting the ever increasing pressure for removal, to sign away land 
without the approval of tribal majorities. These illegal treaties 
created animosities and hatreds which caused intratribal vendettas that 
lasted for generations.5 But tempers eventually cooled to the degree 
that truces could be established within both tribes. True reconciliation 
was another matter, for the rival treaty factions could neither forgive 
nor forget, and when differences which spawned the Civil War opened old 
wounds, both the Cherokee and Creek nations split into factions which 
fought on opposite sides during the oonflict.6 
After the treaties were signed, the horrors of removal began. The 
lower one-third of the newly established Indian Territory was set aside 
for the Five Civilized Tribes. The leading instigator behind the final 
-U. '· eviction of the Southern tribes was the si h President, General Andrew 
Jackson. He correctly reasoned that the practical and short term remedy 
for the Indian problem was removal; the long term solution of assimila-
tion was not acceptable to his white countrymen.? 
The Choctaws signed another compulsory removal treaty in 1830~ and 
13,500 of these Indians undertook the arduous journey the following year. 
5McReynolds, Oklahoma, pp. 153-155. 
6Grant Foreman,! History~ Oklahoma (Norman: University of Okla-
homa Press, 1934), p. 29, hereinafter cited as Foreman,! History~ 
Oklahoma; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A History of the State and Its 
People, p. 261. - - - - -
7u.s., Congress, Annals of Congress, 8th Cong., 1st Sass. (Washing-
ton: Gales and Seaton, 1852),~po 33-34, 44o; McReynolds, Oklahoma, pp. 
72, 87-89,. 133; Foreman, A History of Oklahoma, p. 12; Thoburn and 
Wright, Oklahoma: ! History: of ~ state and ~ People, pp. 133, 145. 
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Hardship, severe weather, and disease combined during two separate 1831 
treks to reduce the tribal population by over one thousand. The Chickasaw 
Nation numbered slightly less than 10,000 in 1831, the year they signed 
their removal treaty. This compact exchanged tribal lands in Mississippi 
for the western portion of the Choctaw land grant, but it was six years 
before the tribe finally moved westwardo The Chickasaws refused to move 
until the Federal government dropped an ill=advised plan for the amalga-
mation of the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes. By 1837 conditions for the 
journey were muoh improved, and there were fewer Chickasaw casualties 
8 caused by removal than other tribes had experienced o 
The two tribes which suffered the highest number of deaths during 
removal were the Creeks and the Cherokeeso The deplorable conditions en-
dured by these tribes were intensified by the heavy hand of military 
supervision, necessary because of the hesitancy of the Indians to leave 
their homelandso An attempt by the Creeks to resist a premature takeov~r 
of their land in Alabama resulted in a farcical "Creek Waro" Broken in 
spirit before their journey started, the Creeks were easy prey for the 
adversities of removal and the hardships that abounded in their hostile 
new homeland. The once proud nation of 23,000 people was reduced to less 
than half that number i~ a few short years o9 
A minority group of Cherokee leaders signed the Treaty of New Echota 
in 1835. They agreed to accept a grant of five million dollars for their 
8McReynolds, Oklahoma, po 163, Thoburn and Wright, Okla~oma: A 
History .2f. ~ State and lli, People, pp. 135, 166, l ?Oo -
9McReynolds 9 Oklahoma, PPo 139-140, 155-156; Charles Richard Francis, 
"Confederate Ascendancy in Indian Territory 186o=l861" (Unpublished Master 
of Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University 9 1963), po 3 9 hereinafter cited 
as Francis, "Confederate Ascendancy in Indian Territory 1860=1861"; 
Foreman, A History of Oklahoma, po 23; Angie Debo, The Road to Disa:ppear= 
~ (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941), Wo 101, 'io3. Herein-
after cited as Debo, ~ ~ ~ Disappearanceo 
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Ea.stern lands and to join an earlier group of the tribe which had already 
settled in the new Indian Territory. The majority of the tribe opposed 
the treaty, and the discovery of the betrayal brought forth cries of 
anger and revenge. The Principal Chief of the tribe, John Ross, called 
for resistance to moving to the West, and this stubbornness resulted i n 
forced removal, controlled by the army o The results of the affair were 
unbelievable . Of the 17,000 Indians who started 9 4,000 perished en routeo 
It is small wonder t hat the Cherokees r eferr ed to this tragedy as the 
"Trail of Tears o .,10 
The Seminoles were t he last of the Five Ci vilized Tribes to make the 
fateful journey, and they proved to be the most difficult to handleo The 
tribe fought with gri m determinat ion against the army which had been 
ordered to supervise their movement. By demonstrating a lack of under-
standing of pacification and t he heavy use of duplioity9 various military 
leaders convinced the Seminoles that death was more desirable than sur-
render. The perpetual avarice of white Americans toward the Indians was 
again obvious •11 
By 1842 removal of the Five Ci vilized Tri bes was theoretically oom-
plete.12 As with al l pioneersj the displaced Indians adjusted to their 
lOF,dward Everett Dale and Gaston Litton, edso, Cherokee Cavaliers 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), ppo xvii-xviii, hereinafter 
cited as Dale and Litton, edso, Cherokee Cavaliers; Morris Lo Wardell, A 
Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 1838-1907 (Normanz University-
of Oklahoma Press,193'8T, po 8, herei nafter citedas Wardell, A Political 
History of the Cherokee Nation; Grant Foreman, Indian Removal TNormani 
Universityo1'"90klahoma Press, 1932), Po 312n, McReynolds, Oklahoma 9 Po 
156. 
11Henry Goulburn, an English envoy at the peace talks at Ghent in 
1815, said: "I had till I came here no idea of the fixed determination 
which prevails in the ,breast of every American to extirpate the Indians 
and appropriate their Territory; but I am now sure that there is nothing 
which the people of America would so reluctantly abandon as what they are 
please to call their natural right to do soo" Charles Mo Gates, "The West 
in American Diplomacy, 1812-1815," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
XXVI (March, 1940), Po 506 0 
12McReynolds, Oklahoma., po 1660 
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new environment. The Choctaws established thriving communities and 
wealthy farms within a few years. The Chickasaws also showed marked im-
provements, especially after the opening of Fort Washita in 1842, a move 
which controlled the marauding Plains Indians. 
The Cherokees experienced initial difficulties in their new lando 
The tribal factions which separated over the removal treaty were very 
hostile to each other, and the new country was also differento It had 
low hills in contrast to the mountains of North Georgia and Tennessee; 
it had scrub oak and pine, and not the handsome hard wood forests of the 
lower Appalachian Mountain chaino The sluggish rivers and creeks of the 
Indian Territory almost ceased to flow in .:the summer, not at all like the 
spring-fed streams so common in the old Cherokee countryo But the land 
was fertile, and as time healed the bitterness, the low log houses multi-
plied along the main waterwayso Cattle and cotton became the Cherokee 
staple crops, and soon these Indians were on the road to recoveryol3 
The adjustment of .the Creek and Seminole tribes took more timeo 
The Creeks had to overcome the losses of removal 9 plus the shattering ex-
periences of the "Creek Waro" These Indians showed a disinclination 
toward town life after their arrival in the Indian Territoryo They 
adopted a type of individual isolation which prevented the revival of the 
trading economy characteristic of Creek communities in Alabama.14 
The Seminole tribe also had great obstacles to conquero Their fight 
with United States .Ar,iy units in Florida gave them a late start in the 
new land. Long before the reluctant Seminoles arrived in the territory, 
the better portions of their land were settled by Creeks. The Seminoles, 
13wardell, ! Political History .2f. ~ Cherokee Nation, po 85. 
14~tcReynolds, Oklahoma, po 177. 
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displaying an unusual meekness, temporarily settled within the Cherokee 
Nation.15 Here they did little except steal Cherokee stock and live off 
a meager government dole. They had never been an agricultural people, 
and they were extremely slow to adopt these pursuits. 
With the passing of time, farms prospered, intratr:ibal hostility 
waned, and the Five Civilized Tribes in the Indian Territory showed signs 
of returning to a normal way of lifeo By 1850 the hopes and ambitions of 
16 the Indians centered on their families, homes and schools. This state 
of affairs was not destined to last. The people of the United States, 
manifesting mounting inflexibility in both the Northern and Southern 
sections of the country, continued vigorous debates on the controversial 
subjects of states' rights and slavery. 
Information about the growing sectionalism in the United States 
reached the Indian Territory at a slow but steady paceo The Southern 
Indian Superintendent and the tribal Indian agents, though Federal govern-
ment employees, were all Southern sympathizersj and they used their in-
fluence to bind the territory to the South. Missionaries living a.mopg 
the Indians, also respected and followed, were mostly Northern abolition-
ists who counseled their charges about the evils of slavery and se~ 
cession.17 
By the spring of 1861 the Southern point of view prevailed in the 
territory, although there were some important dissenterso This Southern 
orientation was not unreasonable, for the Indians were originally from the 
15Edwin C. McReynolds, The Seminoles (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1957), Po 2520 Hereinafter. cited as McReynolds 9 The Seminoles. 
I -
16P-oreman, ! History !?f. Oklahoma, PPo 32, 34, 36, 37~38. 
17I)e.le and Utton, edso, Cherokee Cavaliers, pp. 56-57; Francis, "Con-
federate Ascendancy in the Indian Territory 1860-1861," pp. 13-14. 
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South. A substantial number of them were slave holders, particu+arly in 
the Choctaw and Cherokee nations, and in 1860 there were 1,154 slave 
18 owners and 7, 369 slaves in the Indian Terri.tory. Cotton, the king of 
Southern agriculture, was grown in abundance along the Red, Illinois and 
Arkansas rivers. Gravitation toward the South was especially evident 
among the wealthy Indians who exercised a disproportionate share of in-
fluence in the tribal councilsol9 Dissenters against the Southern cause 
were not necessarily pro-Northern in outlook; they simply tried to re~ 
main aloof and independent from the struggle that was growing in in-
tensity. 
Abraham Lincoln, whose political course of action had been purpose-
ly vague during the 1860 campaign, was elected to the presidency of the 
United States in November. One month later South Carolina voted to dis-
solve "the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and the other 
States." These events caused serious repercussions even in the remote 
Indian Territory. The inhabitants, willing or not, were forced to take 
a stand with one side or the other. 
Olring the period from 1820 to 1860, the Indian Territory had seen 
the arrival of the Southern tribes, the passing of the "gold seekers" to 
California, the movement of the transitory Texas ·settlers, and the usual 
assortment of adventurers, thieves, gunmen and others typical of newly 
settled lands. After official establishment of the territory in 18309 the 
land was closed and intruders were expected to simply pass throughf bat 
18u.s., Congress, Ho.use, Preliminary Report of the Eighth Census 
~, 37th Cong., 2d Sass., (Wlshington: Government Printing Office, 1862), 
Executive Document Number 116, pp. 10-11, 1370 
19 
Foreman,! History ,2! Oklahoma, Po 1010 
20 occasionally they remained. 
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A major responsibility assumed by the United States government in 
numerous Indian treaties was to station soldiers at strategic forts with-
in the Indian Territory. The military was charged with keeping the peace, 
with preventing raids on the "civilized" red men by the nomadic Plains 
tribes, and with removing all unauthorized whiteso The first two tasks 
were handled with skill and ability. The last proved to be a more 
difficult assignment, and the soldiers were never completely successful 
in accomplishing this missiono 
In April, 1861, the United States Anny troops at forts v.ashita, 
Arbuckle and Cobb in the Indian Territory found themselves in a most un-
pleasant predicamento Texas, to the south, had seceeded from the Union 
two months earlier. Arkansas, to the east, was threatening secession. 
All supplies and war material for the Federal posts were shipped through 
one or the other of these states . The responsibility for maintaining 
the safety of the men and the government property in the forts rested 
with a newly assigned commanding officer, Colonel William H. :&nory. 21 
Colonel Dnory had been initially assigned in February, 1861, to 
command the troops at Fort Cobbo In March, while he was on leave in 
v.ashington, D. C. , these instructions were modifiedo He was ordered to 
concentrate all the Indian Territory forces at Fort Washita, located on 
20Debo, The Road to Disa earanoe, po 140; Charles J. Kappler, ed . , 
Indian Affairs";-r.a:ws-aiid Treaties 5 vols., Washington: Government 
Printing offlc~,'"1]o~1), II, p. 531. 
21Townsend to E)nory, March 18, 1861, War of the Rebellion: A Z?mpi-
lation of the Official Records of the Union""'aricr·conrederate Annie's O 
vols., !2'8books in U.S. SerialSet';-Washington: Government ... Printing Of-
fice, 1880-1901), i, I, po 656. Hereinafter cited as Official Records; 
series cited in small case Roman numeral; volume cited in large case 
Roman numeral; part of each volume cited as "Pt." 
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the strategic Texas Road, and to hold this position against possible Con-
federate penetration from the south. After Colonel Emory had departed 
from the capital for his duty 1assignm.ent, necessity forced still another 
change in his orders. These final instructions were to withdraw all men 
and supplies from the territory to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 22 
The new commander commenced the departure from the Indian Territory 
on May 3, 186L There was contact with Texas troops fallowing the 
Federal comm.and, but no casualties resulted even though a Confederate 
I 
detachment was capturedo Tpese troops were questioned and soon released o 
This generous action on the part. of Colonel Emory was probably the reason 
his soldiers were not seriously threatened as they retreated slowly 
north. 23 
From a military point of view, the withdrawal action of Federal 
forces fran the Indian Territory was a complete successj for no animals 
or equipnent were losto Qut of 750 officers and men, only two failed to 
arrive safely at Fort Leavenworth, and these two men deserted, according 
to Colonel Emory's final report. 24 
The Federal retreat had a profound effect on the Indian tribeso The 
sudden departure of the soldiers from the territory left the majority of 
the inhabitants troubled and confusedo The United States was treaty 
bound to protect and defend their land from unlawful entry. The Indians 
were unable to understand this change of policy 9 and even more important, 
they began to have serious doubts as to the sincerity and strength of the 
22 Townsend to Emory, April 17, 1861, ibid, po 667. 
23Francis, "Confederate Ascendancy in the Indian Territory 1860-
1861," p. 25. 
24Emory to Townsend, May 19, 1861, Official Records, 1, I, po 649 0 
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government in Wa.shington. 25 
The Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, · occurred on April 12, 1861. 
Three weeks later, as Federal . troops withdrew from the territory, Con-
federate President Jefferson Davis appointed Albert Pike commissioner to 
the Indian tribes. This Arkansas newspaper editor's mission was to sign 
friendship and alliance treaties with the Five Civilized Tri~es and with 
the tribes of the Plains. 26 
Commissioner Pike entered into his duties with much enthusi asm. 
This corpulent New Englander was extremely fond of his adopted Southlando 
He also liked the Indian inhabitants of the territory, although he viewed 
them rather paternalistically. His large size, his oratorical style, and 
his domineering personality made him eminently suited for treaty making 
with the various tribes.27 
The Indians, fearful of the future, were psychologically ready to 
receive the Confederate Commissioner. Pike was a shrewd and i ntelligent 
person, and readily saw he had arrived in the territory at a most oppor-
tune time. He understood conditions within the territory, and he was 
aware of the signifi cance of the geographical location of the Indian 
Nations. Familiar with the economic, political, and military potential 
of the tribes, he began his mission by opening negotiat ions with the 
25u.s., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of Interior &212, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government PrintingOf:fice, _.18 · , 
Executive Document Number 1, p. 506; Foreman,! History .2,! Oklahoma, po 
102; Robert Lipscomb Duncan, Reluctant General (New York: .E., Po D.1tton and 
Co., 1961), p. 171. He~einafter cited as Duncan, Reluctant Generalo 
26James t) • . Richardson, .coilip., A Compilation of the Messages and 
PaEers of the Confederacy 1861-§865-(2 v0ls o, Nasiiviiie: United States 
Pu lishing Co. , 1905) , f; p;-!7 • 
27Wardell, ! Politioal History .2£. ,2 Cherokee Nation, po 128; 
Duncan, -' Reluctant General, p. 178. 
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Cherokee Nation and its principal chief, John Ross. 28 
Chief Ross was also a clever and ,stute politician. Very conscious 
of his power, and cynically distrustful of all white men, he had taken 
an early stand against intervention on either sideo29 He was firmly com-
mitted to a position of neutrality as being the most advantageous for the 
Cherokee tribe. As a wealthy landholder, neutrality was the most 
practical course of action for John Ross, and Pi.kees persuasive power 
could not change the dogma.tic chiefojO 
Conseq~ently, Pike's first effort at a Cherokee alliance with the 
Confederacy ended in failure. Disappointed, he turned to tribes more 
amenable to his proposals. The Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeksj and Semi-
noles were holding an intertribal council at North Fork Town in the Creek 
Nation. This was the initial meeting of the United Nations of the Indian 
Territory, an organization composed of pro-Southern, mixed blood leaders 
from the four tribes. After less than two weeks of deliberationj these 
chiefs signed treaties for their tribes with the Confederate Commission-
31 er. 
The negotiations with the Choctaws and Chickasaws were accomplished 
with ease. The Creek treaty, however, produced a serious split within 
the tribe. Like their Cherokee neighbors, these Indians were divided in 
their attitude toward the war. The Mcintosh faction was anxious to align 
28McReynolds, The Seminoles, p. 290; Dlncanj Reluctant General, Po 
171; Francis, "Confederacy Ascendancy in the Indian Territoryl860~1861 9 " 
pp. 36-37. 
29Ross to McCulloch, June 17, 1861, Official Records, ij III, po 596; 
Wardell, !. Poli tieal Hi.story ,2.! §.! Cherokee Nation, pp. 125, 127. 
30Dale and Litton, edso, Cherokee Cavaliers, p. 99. 
31Angie Debo, The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Pre'ss7'T9yry; p7' 'S2,' hereinafter cited as Debo, 
The1~ ~ !!!b, 2f .!:a! Choctaw Repu'Qlic; Foreman, ! History .2! Oklahoma, 
P• 03. 
14 
with the Confederacy. The opposition was centered around the old anti-
treaty group, and the principal chief of the Upper Creeks, Oktarharsars 
Harjo, called Sands. The renowned Creek statesman, Opothleyahola, an 
outspoken leader of the anti-treaty faction at the time of removal, re-
mained strangely silent during this period. , He did not assume dominant 
leadership of the Federal Creeks until after the Creek-Confederate treaty 
was signed.32 
Relying on the neutrality of Chief Ross and the -Cherokee t ribe 9 
Sands and Opothleyahola called a council of t he Plains Indians to seek 
allies for their tribe o They left the Creek Nation as Commissioner Pike 
was conducting talks with Chief Rossj and arrived at Antelope Hills 
during the latter par t of Juneo33 Opothleyahola probably attended t his 
western meeting, since his presence in the Creek Nation would have 
bolstered resistance to the signing of the Confederate treatyo 
J)iring their absence Commissioner Pike opened negotiations with the 
pro-Southern faction of the Creek tribe, and his generous offers of al-
liance and protection were acceptedo The principal chief of the Lower 
Creeks and nominal head of the Creek Nation9 Moty Canard, signed t he 
treaty along with many of the pro-Southern leaderso A bribe was offered 
and accepted before Canard 0 s signature was obtainedo34 When Sands and 
Opothleyahola returned, they were incensed over the Confederat e treatyo 
They attempted to renounce the alliance, but to no availo Oninous threats 
32Debo, ~~~Disappearance, pp. 144-147; Foreman, ! History 
of Oklahoma, p. 105. -----
33Debo, ~ Road ~ Disappearance, p~ 1440 
34rb1d., p. 1450 
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by the signers further increased the tension that existed between the two 
factions of the tribeo35 
Southern sympathizers within the Seminole tribe were a minority, 
headed by Commissioner Pike's personal friend, Chief John Jumpere These 
Indians needed little prompting from the Confederate negotiator, yet 
they could not speak for the ent;re tribeo Pike signed a secret alliance 
with Chief Jumper which satisfied Confederate requirements for military 
units available for dutyo Later, .the entire tribe signed a friendship 
. 6 
pact which amounted to a defense agreement for Seminole territoryo 3 
Commissioner Pike traveled to the western edge of the Indian Terri-
tory in August, 1861, to cajole the Plains Indians into the Confederate 
sphere of inf'luenoeo At a trading post on the Washita River he sat in 
council with most of the leaders of the Plains tribeso Dressed in 
fringed buckskins and a large., plumed hat, the Confederate representative 
captivated his audienceo The treaty which resulted, a type of non~ 
aggression pact involving the Five Civilized Tribes~ was phrased for 
primitive, uneducated Indians, but the intent was clear, and understood 
by all parties concerned~j7 
The neutrality policy of Chief Ross and the Cherokee tribe deterio= 
rated completely during the six..,week period the Confederate Commissioner 
was absent negotiating with the Plains Indianso The Cherokee Nation, 
surrounded by Confederate states and tribes allied with the Southerners, 
faced an impossible situationQ The North had suffered two major defeats, 
-- '.3.5McReynolds, Oklahoma, Po 205; Debo, The Road to Disappearance, pp .. 
146 ... 147. . . - - - -
J6seminole_Treaties with the Confederate States of Americai August 1, 
1861, Official Records, iv, I, PPo 51'.3, 525~5260 
'.37Franois, "Confederate Ascendancy in the Indian Territory 1860-
1861," P• 39. 
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at Bull Run in Virginia and Wilson's Creek in Missourio There were no 
Federal troops in the Indian Territory, and the Federal Indian agents 
had renounced their previous ties in favor of the Confederacy. Apparent-
ly the Confederate States were gaining power, and disunion was an ac-
complished facto Now was the time for the Cherokee tribe to come to 
terms with the Confederacy since their interests were primarily with the 
South. So Ross sent Commissioner Pike a formal letter requesting ad= 
ditional conferences for the purpose of making a treatyo38 
When the Cherokee Council met in August, 1861, the principal chief 
ma.de three positive suggestions: join the Confederacy, support slavery 
openly by treaty, and actively assist the Sou.tho The council agreed with 
Ross• recommendations and gave him a vote of confidence. He met with 
Commissioner Pike in October, 1861, and a treaty of alliance and friend-
ship was signedo39 Like all other Pike agreements, the treaty was 
generous, fairj and unworkable, for the Confederate government could not 
keep the promises made by its Indian Commissionero40 
In October, 1861, Pike left the Indian Territory to present his 
handiwork to President Davis in the Confederate oapitai. 41 While he was 
away events occurred in the territory which partially nullified the ad= 
vantages gained by the Confederacy from his treatieso These events drove 
factions of the Creek and Cherekee tribes into rival camps 9 and the 
38wa.rdell, ! Polit1.cal History 2f. !h! Cherokee Nation, p., 13lo 
39Ibido, ppQ 132-1330 
4-0na.le and Litton, eds., CheroJsee Ca.valiers 9 ppo 101=102; Fra.ncis 9 
"Confederate Ascendancy in. tlle Indian Territory 1860 ... 1861," . pp~. 47-48; 
Annie Heloise Ab~l, The Ame~ican Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist 
(Cleveland: .. The ... Arthur ... Ho Cla.rk.:.Coo, .19.131", .po .17,. hereinafter cited as 
Abel, .The Alneriean .. IndiarLa.s .. Slav.eholder· and Secessionist; Wardellt A 
Political History !£... ~ Cherokee Nation, Po 144" -
4looe and Litton, edso, Cherokee Cavaliers, po lOOo 
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tribal disunity which followed proved t~ be a serious handioa.p to the 
South and a tragedy to the Indians. 
Sands, Opothleyahola and the Federal Creeks remained unhappy and 
apprehensive after the signing of the Confederate treaty in July, 1861. 
Sands was elected principal. chief' or the Union portion or the tribe9 and 
42 · 
the Confederate treaty was repudia.tedo The new chief' was sent as an 
emissary to Kansas to ask for Federal aid and guidanceo These hostile 
acts greatly al.armed Confederate Indian leadersj for the Federal Creek 
camp vastly increased in size due to a large influx of Federal sympathi-
zers from neighboring tribes" With Sands in Kansas, the Creeks and 
their friends were leaderless, so Opothleyahola assumed authority, a 
task for which he was admirably s'l1itedo43 
Colonel Douglas Ho Cooper, former Choctaw agent, and now commanding 
officer of the First Regiment of Choe~aw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, 
made an appeal to Opothleyahola to settle his differences with the pre-
SO'llthern faction of the Creek tribeo In Oetober Chief Ross also eon~ 
tacted the Creek leader about reoonciliationo The Cherokee chief ap-
pealed to the old warricrws sense of tribal and intertribal leyalty in 
an effort to bring this defecting part of the tribe into the Con-
federaoy.44 None of these efforts pr~ved to be successfulo 
Opothleyahola was determined to resist pressure and remain firm in 
upholding the Creek treaty with the United Stateso Du.e to the size of 
the force within the Creek camp, Colonel Cooper decided to force 
42Debo, ~ Road to Disappearance, p. 147. 
43Foreman, A History ,2!, Oklahoma, Po 105; Debo, The !!.!2, :!:.2, 121!,-
appearance, p. 1500 · 
44Joseph B.· Thoburn, "The ·cherokee Question," Chronieles of' Okla-
.!:2!!, II (June, 1924), pp .. 170-l?le · · - -
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Opothleyahola and his followers into Confederate ranks or drive them from 
the Indian Territory .. Operations to implement this plan began in mid ... 
November, 1861, and the campaign was on against Opothleyahola's 3,500 
men, women and children, together with their baggage, supplies and 
cattle .. 4.5 
The Confederate forces did not make contact with the Federal Indians 
until November 19, four days after the search had startedo This delay 
was due to overconfidence on the p~rt of the pursuing Southe:rners and 
the skilli'ul use of reconnaissance parties on the part of the Creek 
leadero The first encounter occurred late in the afternoon, and the 
skirmish was short, but brisk, with neither side gaining the advantageo 
This engagement at Round Mountain was the first Civil War combat action 
of any consequence in the Indian Territoryo46 
Intelligence reports of an impending invasion from Missouri and the 
lack of supplies forced Colonel Cooper to discontinue the attack after 
Round Mountain. The Confederate forces returned to their base of opera~ 
tions, and allowed Opotbleyahola and his band to proceed unmolested with 
their withdra.walo When the reports from Missouri proved to be spurious, 
Cooper decided to continue the pursuito He departed frem his ea.mp on 
November 29 and marched to Tulsey Town, on the site of present=day Tulsao 
He was joined there by additional forces from Texas and by units from 
47 Colonel John Drew~s First Cherokee Mounted Rifle Regimento 
Opothleyahola 0 s new position was discovered on December 8 and was 
45Muriel . .Ho. Wright!I ~'Civil .. War Report on the Battle of Round 
Mountain," Chronicles 2!,0klahomai, XX:lCIX (Winteri 1961), Po 3.520 
· ·· . ~rancis, "Confederate Ascendancy in the Indian Territory 1860~ 
1861," pp. 58=60 o / 
47cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Official Records 9 i, VIII, 
P• ?. 
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attacked immediately. The outcome or this action, which occurred at 
Chusto-Talsah, or Caving Banks, on Bird Creek, followed the pattern of 
the previous engagement since ne~ther side could claim a victory. 48 The 
Confederate forces withdrew inte a eamp south of the battlefield while 
the Union Indians, under cover of darkness, left their defensive po-
sition and retreated toward the northwesta 
The Con.federate command was thrown into turmoil after this action by . . 
large scale defection from the qherokee .regimento This mass desertion 
was caused by the reluctance or the full-blood Cherokees to fight against 
full-blood Creeks, and by the growing fear of the military prowess of the 
men or Opothleyaholao Colonel Cooper did not continue the attack the 
next day, but elected to consolidate and regroup his forces .. During the 
lull h~ was notified of a change in the overall command of Confederate 
forces in Arkansas and the Indian Territoryo Colonel James Mcintosh from 
Texas had been appointed the new cmnmander, and he had decided to take 
personal control of the chaseo49 
The last engagement fought between Confederate forces and Opothley-
ahola's Union Indians occurred on December 28 at Chustenahlah .. This tim13 
the Confederates carried the field, and the Federal Indians were routed 
and scatteredo The defeated Creeks were followed and harrassed oontin= 
ually until they crossed into IQl.nsas 0 50 These Indians endured terrible 
hardships du.ring this last phase of the retreato Their suffering in 
Kansas was even worse, since most of their possessions had been abandoned 
in flight. The Federal government was ill-prepared to receive them and 
48 :Abel, !2, American Indian !!!. Slaveholder ~ Secessionist, po 256. 
- -
49 -Cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, Official Records, i, VIll, 
P• 11. 
50cooper to Benjamin, January 20, 1862, ibido, p. 13. 
had inadequate facilities and insufficient supplies available~ As~ 
consequence, large nmnbers died from exposure, m.alnutritian, and 
disease.51 
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January, 1862, marked the high point of Confederate ascendancy in 
the Indian Territory o The Indians loyal to the Federal oau.se had been 
driven into Kansas; treaties binding all of the Indian tribes to the 
South had been signed; and troop units for the defense of the territory 
had been established and were funotiona.l.o Commissioner Pike had been ap-
pointed a brigadier general a.rid independent commander of all forces in 
the territory~52 
General Pike took pride in his assignmento The welfare of the 
Indians and their country was his sole responsibility, and he had con-
vinced the authorities in Richmond of the value of the Indian Territory 
firmly committed to the Confederate cause. The Indian units would be 
properly equipped, and they would be able to repel invasions on the 
western flank of the Confederacy with ea.seo Pike had even gained full 
approval for the assiglll!1ent of white Arkansas and Texa.s troops te his 
command, which he considered necessary for the morale of his Indian 
soldiers. He believed Indians would not fight well aloneo53 
Cantonment Davis, later called Fort Davis, was built under General 
Pike's direction when he returned to the Indian Territoryo Located on 
the south side or the Arkansas River below the Three Forks and opposite 
51Debo, The Road ~ Disappearance, p .. 151; Foreman, ! History 2!, 
Okla.hema, PPo 107-l0$o . 
52oeiieral. 01'.'.<ie,r .. , Agju..tan.t- .ang. Irispector General Department, No-•· 
:v:embe~-·22, .. 1861., Official Records.,. 1, VIII, p. 690; Stephen Bo Oates, 
Confederate Cavalry West of the River (Austin: University or Texas Press, 
1961), P• J3. . - . 
53Pike to Benjamin, November 27 9 1861, Official Records, ij VIII, 
PP• 697-698e 
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Fort Gibson, Fort Davis was named for the Confederate President.54 This 
was an attempt by Pike to impress the less appreciative members of the 
white regiments of his influence and importance in the Confederate 
capital, and to cover up his absence from the fighting the previous 
montho Du.e to cold weather and the lack of forage, many of the Indians 
at Fort Davis were sent home on furlough with instructions to return to 
active duty when calledo The white units were not furloughed, since they 
were the backbone of Gen.era! Pikees plan for stabilizing and controlling 
the Indian Terrltoryo 
A major point in all of the Confederate Indian treaties had been the 
promise that no Indian troops would be used to fight the war outside of 
the Indian Territory~ General Pike had no desire to leave his command 
area, and he did not think it proper to require his untrained soldiers to 
leave their homeland unprotectedQ This sentiment was generally shared by 
the Indian soldiers.55 
The relative tranquillity of the Indian command was broken on March 
3, 1862, by a terse message to General Pike from the commanding general 
of Confederate. forces in the trans~Mississippi_Jr,ea, Major General ~rl 
Van Dorn. The Indian Commander was ordered to move his foreesj both 
white and Indian, with minimum equipment and maximum speed to the .Arkansas 
border and join ,other units of General Van Darn's a.rmyQ56 In spite of 
General Pike's voeiforous complaints about broken treaties, he complied 
and by so doing involved himself and his Indian followers in the oostly 
54Debo, !h!, Road !2, Disa;e,pearanc·e~ Po 153G 
55Pike to Secretary of War1> May 4, 18621> Official Records; i,· XIII, 
P• 819. 
~ . . 
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Confederate defeat at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, on March 6-8, 1862057 
Both Confederate field commanders were killed in the battle, and 
General Pike found himself the ranking officer of a major portion of the 
army, although he was totally ignorant of the overall plans and strategye 
Consequently, bis leadership was negligibleo In addition to this, some 
of his Indians were accused of killing and scalping Northern soldierso 
Both incidents brought stern condemnation from Pike 0 s superiors, and the 
stigma of the defeat and the alleged atrocities followed the Indian 
Commander for the remainder of his military career, even though he was 
innocent on both accountso58 
General Pi~e spent very litUe time at .Fort Davis after the battle 
of Pea Ridgeo He gathered what forces he could from his disorganized 
command and announced his intention of building another fortification 
further south, nearer Texas, his base of supplieso He did this muoh to 
the consternation of his superiorso The Creek and Cherokee tribal.leaders 
were dismayed over his action..q whic~ had left them without adequate pro-
tection against invasion from the northo The Cherokees, in particular, 
were unhappy over his deci,sionso.59 
The new post, Fort McCulloch 9 named after one of the Confederate 
generals killed at Pea Ridge, was a formidable citadel .. Completed in the 
spring of 18629 it comm.anded the crossing of the Texas and California 
roads, but had little military value as a defensive worko 60 It was 
57James Ho Mal.one, The Chickasaw Nation (Louisville, Kentucky~ John 
P. Morton Coo, 1922) 9 po""'lj.i'Oo 
~ . . . - . . . . Pike .. to Maury, March 14, 1862!,l Maury to Pike 9 March 21, 1862.9 or ... 
fioial Records, i, VIII, PPo 286-292, 796; Foreman, ! Histo:r:z ·.2! Oklahoma., 
P• 109. .. .. _ _ 
.59Ross to Davis, May 10, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII 9 ppo 824-
825. 
6°Foreman, ! History 21, Oklahoma, po 1100 
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located in present-day Bryan County about twenty miles north of the Red 
~ver and was remote from all important Northern objectives in the Indian 
Territory. As a supply base it was adequate, but its utilization as a 
collecting and distributing point for equipment and war material was also 
limited. The Indian Territory; was last on the Confederate priority list, 
~ and it never received even minimum supply requirements. 
This carefully planned and executed bastion was General Pike 0 s reply 
to the accusations made after Pea Ridgeo Here he could command alene, 
and fight his battles behind wallso Here also the uncertainties of war 
were muoh smaller, and he could write and brood about the unfairness of 
critics and biased superiors, and the injustices inflicted upon him and 
his Indian soldiersa Fort McCulloch was,the final stage of active duty 
for the former Indian Commissioner. It was here that he resigned his 
military commission and returned to Arkansas and to the less dangerous 
and less frustrating life of a oivilian.61 
The initial engagements in the Indian Territory in 1861 were won by 
the forces of the Confederacy. These conquests in turn were nullified 
by the Federal victory at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, in March, 18620 Con= 
federate prestige was damaged by this loss, and by the use of Indian units 
outside of the territoryo The Federal forces in Kansas and Missouri were 
gathering strength in the spring of 1862, and the mili ta:ry' commanders of 
the North could see the :many advantages in occupying and holding the 
Indian TerritoryQ From. this location Arkansas and Texas could be attacked, 
and offensive operations were planned for either eventualityo It was ob-
vious that the many refugee Indians, temporarily living in Kansas at 
governmental expense, wanted to return to their homeso It was the 
61Pike to Hindman, Jtlly 15, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII, Po 8580 
24 
responsibility of the North to see that these people were permitted to 
return, and this could only be accomplished as a result of direct mili-
tary action. It was also the responsibility of the Federal government to 
see that the returned Indians. were adequately protectedo 
For almost half a century, the Five Civilized Tribes had been 
victims of circumstances neither of their choosing or likingo Even in 
the Indian Territory, where they had hoped to find seclusion from con-
taminating white influences, they could not successfully escape the 
consequences of association with the United Stateso Both the North and 
the South were guilty of using the red man for their gain and profito 
It mattered little to governmental officials in either section that 
husbands would be killed, that families would be separated, and that 
children would starve because the various tribes succumbed to Confederate 
persuasiveness, and then would reverse their position under the pressure 
of Federal military mighto -war itself was the all-encompassing endeavorj 
and all else appeared lost in the magnitude of the conflicto When the 
Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes took on the culture of the white man 
of the South, each tribe pa.rtieipa.ted to some degree in slavery~ and thus 
was caught in the seetional strifeo The tribes also had to endure the 
terror and misfortune of civil war within their own ranks in addition to 
the Civil war being waged with grim determination by the North and Southo 
CHAPI'ER II 
THE FIRST INVASION 
The opening year of the Civil War had a profound effect on the hap~ 
less red men who lived in the Indian Territoryo The Five Civilized 
Tribes became pawns in a military struggle which had their land, but not 
themselves, as the ultimate goal. The North and South realized the stra= 
tegic importance of the land west of Arkansas, and Union and Confederate 
military leaders made plans for its subjugation and controlo The .in.,., 
habitants of the territory were given only cursory attention, and the 
military operations were carried out in an extremely careless manner by 
both sides. Consequently, the country was desolated, and remained that 
way for the duration of the conflicte 
The close geographical relationship of the Indian Territory to 
Missouri and Kansas made the lands of ·the Five Civilized Tribes sensitive 
to activities which occurred in those border sta:teso If the orientation 
of Missouri had been completely Southernj the Confederate allegiance of 
the Indian country, exposed to Texas and Arkansas on the south and east:, 
would have been a foregone conclusiono Kansas, even though a Federal 
stronghold, would have been isolated and lost t® the Union causeo But 
Missouri, like the Indian Territoryj was beset with vi~lent differences 
over secession and slaveryo Strong and determined minorities in both 
areas would not submit to the will of the majority, and these hardened 
attitudes prevented rational discussion of the critical problemso 
Missouri went to war with itself9 and the Indian Territory followed suito 
2.5 
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The lines were ,distinctly drawn, and since compromise was unthinkable, 
armed combat beaam.e the omly alternativ;e available. 
A man who had tremendous influence on events in the Indian Territory 
during the first year of the war was a United States Senator from Kansas, 
Jam.es H., Lane. He was a key figure in Kansas and national polities and 
was a self-centered opportunist who never allowed principle to interfere 
with success. He was also an abolitionist, but this recent interest in 
liberating Negroes was a means to an end, since he had been a slavery 
Democrat in Indiana at the beginning of his meteoric p~litical eareero 
His exploits as the leader or a military organization of thieves and 
ruffians called La.ne0 s Brigade were known throughout the country, and he 
was hated and feared along the Kansas-Missouri border where his brigade 
had raided for plunder and general m.ischiefo1 
In the fall of 1861 Senator Lane proposed a daring expedition to 
President Lincolno Forming in Kansas, and descending through the Indian 
Territory, it would sever Texas from the Confederacy and at the same time 
liberate thousands of Southern slaveso 2 The idea caught the fancy of 
the President, but it was strenuously resisted by Federal military 
leaders since Lane was to be appointed the expedition Gmnm.ander., After 
much discussion, the expedition received a mortal blow in January 9 18629 
when Major General David Hl.tnter, commander of the Kansas Departmentll was 
given permission by Major General George Bo McClellan, General=in=Chief 
of the Army, to act as invasion force leadero Senator La.ne 9 as a 
1Ri.ohard So Brownlee, Gray Ghosts Gf the Confederacy (Baton Rougez 
Louisiana State University Press, 1958)-;-ppo 37=38; Albert Castel 91 A 
Frontier State at War: Kansas, 1861..,1865 (Ithacu Cornell University 
Press, 1958), PPo 3i='55o Herein.after cited as Castel, ! Frontier state 
at Waro --
2castel, A Frontier State at Wa.r, ppo 78-790 .... ~.------
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brigadier general and Hllnter's subordinate, had lost his ohanoe to gain 
more military notoriety.3 
This sudden change caught the Kansas Senator completely by surprise. 
He wa.s in Leavenworth, Kansas, when he heard the news, and he wasted no 
time in attempting to get the order countermandedo He wired John Covodej 
a member of the Kansas Congressional delegation~ for assistance in Washing= 
tono4 Lane then used his political in:fl.aence with Federal Indian agents 
to secure the aid of two Indian leaders, Opothleyah~la and Alu~tustenuke 9 
headmen of the refugee Creeks and Seminoles who had been forced out of 
the Indian Territory the preceeding Deoembero The Indians were in 
Leavenworth trying to obtain additional supplies for their destitute 
peoplee The day fo11owing Ho.nter6 s announcement of his leadership of th~ 
expedition, the Indian leaders wrote a joint letter to the Presidentj ad~ 
vising him of the many advantages Lane wo~d have as expedition oo:mmandero 
The message, dictated by the semiliterate red men, and attested to by th~ 
Creek agent, George Ao Cutler, said in closing: 
General Lane is our friend o His heart is big for the Indiano 
He will do more for us than any one elseo The hearts of our 
people willcbe sad if he does not comeo They will f,oll())W him 
whereever /sio7 he direotso5 
The President considered the letter a political manen.1ver 9 and sent it to 
General McClellan without aommento6 
Although unsuooess.f'u.l in his efforts to gain independent c~ntrol of 
the Texas expedition, Senator Lane 0 s determined opposition prevented 
3Thomas to Hunter, January 24, 1862, Official Records~ i~ VIII, Po 
526. 
4tane to Covode, January 27 9 1862j ibido 11 Po .5290 
· 5opothleyahola to Lincolnj January 28!,) 18621) ibido, Po 534. 
6Ibid. 
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General Hunter from retaining eommand of the invasion for~eo Lane's 
persistent objections were a major factor in the eventual transfer of 
Hunter out of the departmentQ Yet Senator La.ne~s future as a military 
leader did not improve substantially, for Hunter was replaced by Briga-
dier General James Wo Denver, a former territorial governor of Kansas a~d 
bitter enemy of Lane and his friendso7 
.At the same time that G~neral :penver was designated the ranking 
military commander in Kansas, the department was merged with the Depart.., 
ment of Missourio This new organization was named the Department of the 
Mississippi, included the Indian Territory, and was commanded by Major 
General Henry W., Halleck, whose headquarters were located in Saint Loui~i 
8 
Missourio General Halleck, a regular army offi~er and West Point gra= 
duate, was well aware of the activities of the Lane Brigade, and con-
sidered its leader to be nothing more than a bandito Halleck did not 
know Denver personally51 but since the reoEmt appointee was opposed by 
Senator Lane, he made every effort to retain Denver as the commander of 
the Kansas Distriet~9 Lane considered Denver an even greater threat than 
Hunter to his political and military future in Kansas~ and finally used a 
10 direct appeal to the President to get the general transferredo 
?special Orders, War Departmentj March 13j 1862, General Orders~ De= 
partment of Mississippi, March 19, l862i ibido~ PPo 612~ 832i Castelj ! 
Frontier _s_t_a t_e_ !! li!!,j Po 8L 
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Securing a suitable replacement for General Denver required time, 
so ten days passed before he was su.pe~seded by Brigadier General SQ D. 
Sturgis. Not cognizant that his removal had been dema~~ed by the Kansas 
politician, Denver continued planning for the re-organization of a :ma.-
jority of the Kansas regiments, and for a new and much more limited 
southern expeditiono The new endeavor had as its sole objective the re= 
conquest of the Indian Terrltoryoll 
On March 19 General Halleck received a formal coomranicatien from the 
War Department concerning this Indian Ex:peditiono With a nueleus of two 
white regiments, it was to invade and recapture the Cc:mfederate occupied 
Indian countryo The expeditio.n had the additional :missions of returning 
the refugee Union Indians to their abandoned homes and protecting the111. 
by remaining in the territory permanentlyo The order, which plainly 
stated its originator was President Lincoln, further directed Halleck to 
am. five thousand Indians and supply them for the campaign along with the 
two white regimentso The obvious intent was to organize the ref'u.gee 
Indians into units whioh could be ind~cted into the armyol2 
General Denver, as the Kansas District aommander, was responsible 
for the new expeditiono In early April he informed his department head 
that the Indian Expedition would require substantial am~unts of supplies 
and .munitions .. General Halleck gave his cionse:n.t f'or this additional 
logistical bu.rden, bat only tc the extent that the trc<lrps involved would 
be those not needed for more important taskso The department commander 
revealed a serious prejudice against Indians when he inquired of Denver 
how:ma.ny of them cou.ld be armed safely, and when he stated emphatically 
llnenver to Hal.leek, April 2 and 10, 1862, ibido~ VIII, PPo 653=655, 
6?9-680. 
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that the Indians could only fight against other Indians or in defense of 
their homes.1 .'.3 
General Halleck confirmed the Kansas oommand changes to Secretary.of 
War :Edwin Mo Stanton on April 7 o General Sturgis was the new commander 
of the Kansas District, and General Denver was shifted to the command of 
the Indian Expeditiono These eha.nges came rapidly!i> in faotw so l"apidly 
that Halleck was able to write a letter of instructions to Denver one day 
and simply repeat the same letter to Sturgis the following dayo The de= 
partment commander stressed that as expedition commander Denver should 
counter the influence of Confederate agents and representatives, and at= 
tack all military units operating within or near the Indian Territoryo 
General Sturgis, the district commander, was cautioned to advise his sub-
ordinate to assume a wide area of operations 9 and not be limited by state 
lineso14 
The new commander in Kansas had a very short tour of duty following 
his acceptance of the command on April lOo Fifteen days later9 acting 
under instructions from General Halleck 11 General Sturgis discontinued th, 
enlistment of Indian soldiers for the pending expedition into the Indian 
Territory. The following week, due to interceding Kansas ptilliticiians~ 
the district was again designated a department and was c@mpletely sepa= 
rated from the Department of the Mississippio At the same timeil a new 
general was appointed department ~ommander 9 and both Generals Sturgis and 
13nenver to Halleck, April 2, 1862j Halleck te J;)enverj April 59 
1862, ibid., pp. 655, 66~6650 
14 
Halleck to Denver, April 5, 1862 9 Halleck to Sturgis~ April 6~ 
1862, Halleck to Stanton, Aprll 7, 1862, ibidoy PPo 664=665 9 668, 6720 
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Denver were transferred ou.t of Kansase15 
The new oom.ma.nder of the new Kansas Department was Brigadier Gener-
al James G. Blunt, a prot,ge of Senator Lane, a former commander of 
oavalry in Lane's Brigade, and a vigorous abolitionist. His appointment 
came as a complete surprise to authorities in Saint Louis, since he was 
only a Kansas medical doctor with limited military experienceo His 
greatest attribute was his friendship with Senator Lane. This was not 
insignificant since it alone was sufficient to get Blunt appointed a 
brigadier general and commander of the redesignated Department of 
Kansas. 16 
When General Halleck was in.formed of the Presidentvs wishes con-
oerning the Indian Expedition, the message ended with the remark that 
prompt action was neoessaryG17 Bllt speed was ignored for nearly two 
months. This was due to the deliberate pace of the military oommandersj 
and their insistence on being prepared for every eventuality. It was 
also due to their disdain for Indians in general and a specific un-
willingness to aeoept red men as soldiers in the United States Army. 
The inactivity of the Indian Expedition changed drastically when 
General Blunt assumed command. This domineering Kansan would not allow 
the expedition to flounder in military thoroughnesso He had orders to 
put an expedition into the Indian Territory, and this he would do im-
mediatelyG The Indians would be organized and outfitted, and the 
15speeial Order, Department of Mississippi, April 6, 1862, ibido, 
LIII, p. 520; General Order~ Distriot of Kansas~ April 10, 1862, ibido 11 
VIII~ p. 683; General Order, District of Kansas, April 25 and May 5, _ 
1862, General Order, War Department, May 2, 1862, ibid., XIII, PP• 365, 
370, 368.369. · 
16castel, ! Frontier State !! .!!.!:,, pp. 82 ... 83; General Order, Depart-
ment of Kansas, May 5, 1862, Official Reoords, i, XIII, Po 3700 
17Thomas to Halleck, Ma.roh 19, 1862, ibido, VIII 11 Po 625. 
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Presidential objective would be realizedo The new department commanderf 
for reasons of ambition and dishonest personal gainj would compel its 
fulfillmento18 
A general order for the resumption of enlistment of Indians into 
regiments was issued on May 5, the same day General Blunt became the De-
partment of Kansas commandero The previous curtailment had been in ef-
feet less than a month, and this delay in re~ruiting was easily counter-
acted by a broader interpretation of the original order to include all 
Indians instead of only refugees from the Five Civilized Tribeso19 
In addition to his reinstatement of War Department Indian policy, 
Blunt instituted two additional orders which give a graphic picture of 
the personality and temperament of the general who would be responsible 
for most Federal military operations in the Indian Territoryo These 
orders show clearly his relentless nature and his dogmatic approach to 
solving problemso Blunt ordered the practice of returning runaway slaves 
to Missouri to stopo Prior to this directive, escaped Negroes had bee~ 
recaptured in Kansas by public officials and returned to their masterso 
With the new order in effect, attempting to return a slave to Missouri 
would automatically cause the offending person to b® arrestedo If the 
arresting officer thought the civil authorities would be unwilling to 
punish for this crimej the apprehended person could be tried by a mili ... 
tary commissionQ20 
The other order clearly indicated the new general 0 s intense hatred 
18General Order, Department of.Kansas, May 5S> 1862t ibido, XIII, p. 
370; Castel,! Frontier State ,!1.!:{!!,, PPo 83=84o 
· 19Thomas to. Halleck, April 4, 1862 9 Official Reco:rds 9 ilil VIII, ppo 
659-660; General Order, Department of Kansas~ May 5, 1862, ibielo, XIII, 
p. 370. 
20General Order, Department of Kansas~ May 7, 1862~ ibido j Po 3720 
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or Southerners in general and his unequivocal aversion to the hit-and-run 
tact~cs of small, independent Confederate guerrilla units operating in 
the border states. Published six weeks after General Blunt became Ka~sas 
commander, this second order emphatically stated that any person caught 
"bushwaoking" would be tried immediately by the unit attacked, and then 
either shot or hung. No mercy or leniency would be shown to any indi-
21 vidual using guerrilla methods of fightingo 
Organizing the Indians into fighting units was the most critical 
problem which faced the expedition formed to re-establish Federal control 
over the Indian Territoryo The refugee Indians were the impetus for the 
entire plan9 and their ~nlistment into regiments 9 known as the Indian 
Home Qlilards, was absolutely essential.a The first regiment was composed 
of Creeks and Seminoles who had come out of the territory with Opothleya-
hola the previous wintero The second regiment was a more composite unit, 
and due to its intertribal composition~ it took longer to recruit and 
train. The third regiment was made up exclusively of Cherokees who ens 
- - 22 
listed after the Indian Expedition had moved into the territoryo 
The initial commander of the Indian Expedition was Colonel Charles 
Doubleday of the Second Ohio Cavalry Regimento He was appointed by 
General Hunter as an acting brigadier general and commanding officer ~f 
all Federal units in the Fort Si(i)ottill Kansas, area0 This order was not 
changed during the short tenure of Generals Denver and Sturgis 9 but he 
remained in his position for only a brief period after General Blunt took 
21General Order, Department of Kansasll June 26, 1862, ibido, po 3720 
22Arinie Heioise Abel_, -The. American indian -as Participant i!l the 
Civil !!!:,t (Clevelandt- Arthur. H,.. Clark Coo, 19l9T;' Po UIJ.~ hereinafter 
cited as Abel, ~ American Indian !;!.. Particiipant ,!!l the. .. Civil-:Wa:r; Wiley 
Britton, "Some Remird.soences of the Cher@kee People,"clironl~ies ~ 
Oklahoma, V (June, 1927), Po 1800 
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control of the Kansas departmento 23 
The Department of Interior was responsible for the internal super= 
visoey structure of the tribes in the Indian Territoeya This consisted 
of a superintendent, and under him agents for the various tribes~ At 
the beginning of th:e war the entire sou·thern superintendency defected to 
the Confederacy, and this left a va~uu.m whi~h -was filled through po= 
litical appointments. Some of the new agents were unable to adequately 
perform their duties, sinlQle the Indian t:t>ibes cionGe:t>ned had j@ined the 
Confederate States,, and n()) longer desired asSIOllCliations with represent&= 
24 tives of the Federal governmentQ 
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William Pa Dole, was responsible 
for all facets of relations between the government and the numerous 
Indian tribeso A Lincoln appointee from Indiana and a~quaintanee of 
Senator Lane 11 Dole was aware of the animosity between the military com= 
manders and the Indianso He naturally sided with any individual who 
professed to understand the problems of the displaeed red meno 25 
In a letter written in May t!Ql General B1unt1> Commissioner Doile out= 
lined what he cioinsidered to be the nai:tu?'e of' the Indb.n Expedi tiono He 
pointed out the irregular nature of the Indian regilnents and the need for 
white troops to accompany the Indians on the invasiono He spi@ke also of 
matically insured that Blunt would appoint the expediti@:n leadero Dole 
emphasized that the Kansas oo:mmai.ndeir was also responsible f'((l):r supplying 
23special Order, Department of Kansasj February 15j) 1862~ Official 
Records, i, VIII, Po 5570 
24u.se, Congress, Senate~ Report$!!, ~§,e~reta:!:Y ~ InteriG£ ~j 
37th Congo , 2d Sesso (Washington: Govermne:nt Printing Offi~re j 1861) ~ 
Executive Document Nwnber 1, PPo 446=447 9 6Jl 9 650=6.52~ 6.54=6550 
25castelj ! Frontier State !:!:, ~' Po 270 
the invasion force~ These factors were readily accepted by Bluntj es= 
peoially the final task, since it presupposed the expenditure or large 
a.mounts of Federal :f'unds~ 26 
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Colonel Doubleday wasted ne time in advising General Blunt or his 
plans regarding the recic:mquest or the Indian country, although he lacked 
a olear understanding of the role or the expeditiono He assembled his 
force of white soldiers and started south toward the enemy without the 
Indian auxilia.:rieso The Ohio ~@>lone! envisioned the Cil@nquering of the 
Indian Territory as a formality, an operation which Cilould be &Cilcomplished 
with an absence 0£ diffimu.tieso His approaoh w the problems of command 
was simple" He expected maxim.um su.pipcrt f'~m higher headquarters,which 
would anticipate and supply &11 requirements for the expeditiono His re-
quest for quartermasters for a contemplated depot at Fort Gibson, secret 
·service agents for intelligence work, and one ())?" two engineers show his 
naivet,o27 
General munt had no intention of leaving Doubleday in command of 
the Indian Expedition, and during the first week of June 9 he appointed 
CGlonel William Weer, ft1»mer cci>mmanding officer of an infantry T.sigim.ent 
in: the Lane Brigade, as the new Cllommandero C@lcmel Weer~ an(l)ther friend 
of the Kansas Senator, had a reputation or being a hard=drlnldng Kansas 
politician~ but his excesses were n0>t a sel"i(l)US prcblemo28 He was a 
26Abel, The .American Indian as Participant in the Civil War, PPo 109.., 
llOn. - . - -- ~-. 
27noubleday to Moonlight, May 25t 1862, Doubleday to m.unt 11 June l, 
1862, Offieia.l Records, i, XIIIj ppo 397j 4080 
28A newspaper correspondent who acc~mpanied the Lane Brigade on its 
raiding expedition into Missouri in the fall of 1861 reported that 
Colonel Weer opposed the bl:.l.rning of the town of Osceola9 but was over= 
ruled by his fellow officerso Castel~ A Fr~ntier State at Warf Po 540 
- .. - -===~ 
prolific writer and soon flooded the Leavenworth headquarters with 
letters outlining the pr0oblems he fac:ed in his new assig:nmento But Weer 
understood the importance of the :mission ef the Indian Expedition, and he 
was well aware of the serious problems which faced it. He rea.lized that 
he was in a precarious position as CIOl:mmander.i and that he would need 
speoifia instructions on questions of governmental poli~y which would 
confront him as he moved southo Th~ methods tlOl be used in handling Con= 
federate Indians and the problem of pol.ieiy rem want«:lln destruetien of pri= 
vate property appear early in his letters t6 the Kansas Department a.de=, 
'))9 jutant generalj Captain Thomas MoonlightoG 
The greatest single problem whi~h fa©ed Col©nel Weer aft~r he be-
came the Indian Expedition ~o:mmander was the rapid training of the 
Indian regiments and the issuance of equipment to themo He had suf~ 
fioient experience w:ith military operations to know the ne~essity of 
converting the new soldiers frc»m individual to group fighterso This 
could only be done with adequate training., but without the proper equip= 
ment, training was f'ill.tileo Colonel Weer cionstantl.y impll(;)lred his SU= 
perior to provide equipmel!lt wi.th wlrl.o:h to ©JUtf'it his ntsrrl©e s©ldiel"s o 
Unfortunately, these daily pleadings went for the most part unansweredj 
and when supplies did arrivej they were either inferi©r ~r in in= 
sufficient quantityo30 
One of the most e:xaspera ting di:f'ficul ties whi.©h Weer had t@ cope 
with was the tendency of the Indian soldiers t© remain Indian civilians 
in thought and actiono They sought the advi~e of their ©hiefs rather 
29weer to Moroinlight, June 5t 69 7 and 13!> 1862j Offioial Records, 
i, XIII, pp. 418, 419=420~ 422j 430=4310 
JOweer to Moonlight, June 5j 6j and 13 1862~ ibid., PPo 418~ 419= 
420, 430-431; Weer to Doubleday, June 6~ 1862!, ibid.i PPo 418=419~ 
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than their officers; they continued to rely on superstition to the detri-
ment of their training; and they were slow in all of their actions. To 
compound this, the special Indian agents assigned to accompany the ex-
pedition sided with their charges, and the expedition commander had 
little confidence in themo In general, Colonel Weer was not enthusiastic 
about his Indian soldiers, and felt he would be censured for their 
31 actions no matter what course he pursuedo 
Equ.ally irritating to the Kansas politician were the white regiments 
of the expeditiono Some of these organizations, composite units made up 
from the detu.nct Lane Brigade, were slow in arriving at the base of 
operations at Fort Scotto Other units, present in the area!jl spent most 
of their time arguing about and plotting against their commanding 
colonels. The white officers assigned to the Indian regiments stayed 
away from their posts and further complicated the training of the Indian 
recruits. The invasion force, o~mposed or units from Kansas, Ohio, Wis-
consin, and Indianaj lacked oohesionj and despite Weer0 s efforts, did not 
amalgamate into a coordinated and smooth functioning organizationQ32 
Supplies for the expedition oontinu~d to arrive at two separate 
points, Fort Scott and Hwnbolt, Kansas, and Weerws requests to make the 
former the sole supply depot were ignoredG The lack of a mustering of-
ficer, vital for inducting the Indians into the army, provided a major 
obstacle to the comma.nder 9 s planse When this offieia1 arrived weeks 
later, he was not permanently assigned to the expeditiono Colonel Weer 
finally decided he would have to solve his problems without assistance 
31wa.rdell, ! Political History 21_ the Cherokee Nation, PPo 1.54-155; 
Weer to Moonlight, June 6, 13 and 16, l'Sii, .O.t'ficial Recordsil i, XIII, 
pp. 419-420, 430-431, 4'.34Q · 
'.32weer to Moonlight, June 6, 13, 16, 21 and 22, 1862, ibido, ppo 
419-420, 430-431, 434, 441-442, 443-4440 
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from higher headquarters. Acting on his own initiativej he marched his 
Indian regiments to Humbolt in mid-June, outfitted them as best he could, 
and then proceeded to move this portion of the command south to join the 
main body of the expeditionG Due to its size and the need for security, 
the invasion force did not travel more than ten miles per dayQ But it 
was moving, and the news of this traveled into the Indian Territory at a 
much more rapid rateo33 
The expedition was heralded by excited Confederate Cherokees from 
Colonel stand WatieGs regiment who were victims of a surprise attack at 
Cowskin Prairie on the evening of June 7. A detachment from the advanced 
portion of the Indian Expedition can be considered the victors in this 
minor skirmish, though neither side reported casualities. The Federal 
soldiers, commanded personally by Colonel Doubleday~ were as frightened 
and confused as their opponents when the aetion began shortly after dark. 
Doubleday ordered his artil1ery to fire into the Southern camp!) and it 
was these noisy explosions, not his 1500 man force!) that caused the 
sudden Confederate withdrawalo The Southern Indians moved frantically 
to a more secure location in the l~wer part of ~he Cherokee Nation!) and 
probably exaggerated the strength and capability of the attacking Federalso 
Colonel Doubleday ma.de no attempt to pursue the re·treati:ng Confederates, 
but contented himself with herding 500 captured cows and h~rses back to 
his base ea.mp$34 
The elements under Colonel Weerj which included some white regi~ 
mental detachments and the two partially filled Indian regiments!) joined 
33weer to Moonlight!) June 5!) 13, 21 and 22, 1862, ibido, PPe 418, 
430-431, 441, 443=4440 
34noubleday to Weer, June 8, 1862 9 Weer to Moonlight!) June 7 and 13j 
1862, Blunt to Schofield, June 13, 1862!) ibidot PPo 1029 422!) 43lj 427= 
428. 
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the main body at Cowskin Prairie during the last days of Juneo Here Weer 
placed an Indian regiment in each of his two brigadeso. This pairing of' 
Indian and white units was done in accordan~e with instructions from the 
War Departmento This allowed the brigade oommanders to use integrated 
formations, since it was belie'Ved the Indian soldiers would fight better 
with support from white eomrades=in~,anrJ.s o The two brigade ciomm.anders 
were Colonel Frederick Salomon of the First Brigade and Colonel William 
Ro Judson of the Se@ond Bli:'1.gadeo35 
Prior to aatual ent:ry into the Indian Territory9 Weer sent detailed 
instructions to his brigade commanders covering the ~onduct ef Federal 
troopso He emphasized the important opporturdty which the expedition 
soldiers had in winning bal(J)k the disaffected I:nidianso It was Weer~s de= 
sire that no vengeance or vindictiveness be toleTatedj) and that the right 
of private property be sorupu.lously observedo The mission of the ex= 
pedition was to restore norm.al relations with the Indian tribes~ and the 
expeditien commander wanted every effort made to aooomplish this endo 
The clear implication of Weer was to treat the Indians who had turned to 
the Confederacy with unders t,anding and :f\.llrgi venes s )6 
Throughout Junew Colonel vJ'eer l(J)ointinued to request instrulC3ti((j)ns from 
General Blunt on a variety ~f subjelC3tso Bvit the ©OnimAnding general of 
the Kansas Department remained strangely silento He offered no help to 
the expedition commander and allowed his sub@rdinate to grope in the 
conduct of operations o The first offi«:lial ©olrrespondence between the 
two men was a direotivej written on July 3j whicih answered none of the 
35Thomas to Halleokj Aprll 4!, 1862, ibido 9 VIII, PPo 659~660; 
Phillips to Salomon, June 27j 1862, Phillips to Judson, June 28j 1862, 
ibido, XIIIj PPo 452~ 4560 
36phillips to Salomon.s, June 27 ~ 1862~ Phillips to Judsonj June 28, 
1862, ibido, PPo 452~ 4560 
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important questions asked by Weer 11 but spee:ifiiaally inf'Cl>rmed the ex.,. 
pedition leader that he was not to invade either Arkansas or Texas& Weer 
was told to set up a base ef supplies in the Indian Territory and await 
further orderso The implioation was one of mild rebuke, and showed Blu.nt 
to be slightly jealous of Weer for fear his subordinate would gain 
prestige at his expenseo37 
A major weakness of Federal ~ommanders operating in the Indian 
Territory, Kansas, and Missouri was~ ~verestimate the strength of their 
Confederate opponentso Unwilling ~r unable to properly use their cavalry 
regiments to gain accurate information about the enemy, these eo:mm.anders 
were foroed to rely on rumors and hearsay as to Confederate tr®op dis= 
positions and probable clW.rses of actionQ This dependence on doubtful 
souroes of intelligence usually resulted in miscal.eulations, hesitancy, 
a.nd the loss of initiativeo 
The specter of a huge Confederate force moving north to either an= 
nihilate the Indian Expedition or attaok in strength in Missouri appeared 
in early June in l°eports coming from B:rlgadier General. E~ Ba Brown~s 
command in southwest Missiemrio Ill=defined rumors had Confederate 
Brigadier General James So Rains eonsolidating the eomm.ands of Colonels 
Watie, J.T .. Coffee~ and General Pike f'o:t" a th:ru.st into Missourlo This 
exaggerated information was forwarded to the Missoull:"i District head= 
quarters in Saint Louis and to the Kansas Department headquarte:r>s at Fort 
Leavenw(!)rth0 38 
General munt~ whose exCllitable nature was ready -oo see the worst in 
37munt to Weer, July 311 1862, ibido,, Po 4610 
'.38Brown to Bl:unt 9 June 4, 1862j SCiihof'ield to Blunt, June 7 c; 1862j 
ibido, ppQ 414, 421~4220 
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every situation, assumed this Confederate force would invade Kansas and 
i111111ediately demanded reinforcements from the War Department. Bllt he 
made no effort to forward the contents of these reports to the Indian 
Expedition until mid-July.'.39 During this long intervening period, the 
sole sou:roe of information for the expedition regarding the gathering 
Confederate force was the southwest Missouri commander, General Brown. 
He communicated with Colonel Salomon directly, via eou.rier, and asked 
for assistance in repelling the impending Confederate attacko Colonel 
Salomon, displaying a timidity characteristic of all frightened comm 
manders, sent only a small detaehment for reinforcementQ He next moved 
his entire brigade toward the enemy, then stopped~ and weakly feinted 
with light reconnaissance unitso These were easily repulsed by Con-
40 federate outposts. 
Colonel Weer, when informed of the danger to his fiank 11 dispatched 
additional reinforcements toward Missouri, bu.t continued the forward 
movement of the expeditiono He was aware of the gathering C~mfederate 
units, but he did not believe their size constituted a major threat to 
his organizationo He was c~nfident he would completely clear the Indian 
Territory of Confederate forces in a matter of weeks if sufficient 
supplies were provided for the expeditiono He was also pleased.with the 
performance of the Indian regiments of the comm.and, for they appeared 
willing to fight on all oeeasionso Their one liability was the intense 
desire to reek revenge on their Confederate enemieso41 
39Blunt to Stanton, June 10, 1862, Moonlight to Weer, July 14, 1862, 
ibid., PP• 425, 4720 
40sal,omon to Weer, June 30~ 1862, ibido, Po 458 .. 
41Weer to Moonlight, July 2, 1862, ibido, PPo 459-4610 
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The first engagement of the Indian Expedition involving more than 
light oontaet between scouting elements occurred near Locust Grove on 
July 3o Colonel Weer, as was typical of most Civil War commanders, 
elected to personally lead the units involved~ In the skirmish the 
Federal soldiers overwhelmed Confederate detachments from Colonel Watieffs 
Secord Cherokee Mounted Rifle Regimen.t and a Missouri unit commanded by 
Colonel J.J~ Clarksono The defeat was complete and Colonel Clarkson was 
captured along with his supply train of sixty wagons!) most of them loaded 
with amm.uni tiono Weera s. foree nwnbe.red about 2.50 men, but Gnl.y portions 
of two units, the First Federal Indian Regiment and the Ninth Kansas 
Ca.valary Regiment, were actually engaged in the f'ightingo The Con= 
federate force, numerica.11.y similarj was surprised by the sudden Federal 
onslaught, and then relentlessly p11rsued by the attaoking units for the 
better part of a dayo 42 
The few Southern survivors of the actiont paniG stricken and de= 
moralized, precipitated an even greater misfortune for the Confederate 
cause by their retreato These white and Indian soldiers rushing through 
the streets or the Cherokee ~apital. at Tahlequah convinced a significant 
portion of the tribe that their earlier repudiation of allegiance to the 
United States was a g:rvave mistakeo Consequentlyii Drewws regiment of Con= 
federate Cherokees deserted en :masse~ and those who did not enlist in 
the descending Federal expedition disavowed their l~ytlty to the South 
and returned to their homeso The influx of disaffected Cherokees was so 
great that the Second Federal Indian Regiment was bl"tl>ught up to author-
ized strengthi and a new unit, the Third Federtl Indian Regiment, was 
42Weer to Moonlight~. July 4 and 61ii 1862, ibido 1> PPo 137 ~ 137=138; 
MoReynolds, !!!! Sem.inolesj Po 3050 
. 43 organized. · 
The victories at Cowskin Prairie and teoust Grove were exhilarating 
and gratifying experiences. tor the members or the expedi ti.on, particnll.~rly 
( 
tor the rah.gee · Indian soldiers. ·. But l'UlC!)rs ot new Oonf'edera ta troop 
ooneentrations massing tor a oounteratt.aakpreven.~d·the hll enjoyment 
ot the newly won gains. Warped and taul ty news once again. lrfflne:rveci and 
confused Federal leaders. This spu.rious intelligence had more e.f'teet on 
I 
the subordinate commanders of the expedition than it did o:n Colonel Weer, 
am it was accepted as completely authentic in headquarters situated scme 
distance fN)Jll the oom'bat sone.44 
Colonel Weer believed a Confederate force was gathering near Fort 
McOdlooh, in. southern Indian Territol"Y', which wo11ld augment another at 
Fort Smith, Arkansas, mt h.e minimized their importanoe. He was still. 
eontident as to the final outci,cme ot the expedition. It was c,bvious ~t 
~ . ' 
a maltunotionirlg supply system, and not the Confederates, was his major 
p:robl.em. supplies were or paramC1N:nt importance, since tu 1.nits·or tht11 
invasion toree were entirely dependent on the ICansas depot tor .food~ 
ummnition9 and the reoent Cherokee additlo~ to the.oom.and had oma.-
pou.nded. th:1.1 dittiov.lty.45 
Aotivity on a large soale deolined attar the action.at Len.et,. Grcrt•• 
Weer oouolidated hi1 position by e1u.'bl:l.1hing a oamp on Grand.liver, t,en 
mil•• north ot the Contederate-oon.pied ror~ Gib10n on the A:rkauu Ri;,er. 
Prom this aentrally looated point i:n the Cherokee Nation. he sent·nt 
43roreman, A Hiato'J ot Oklahoma, p. lll1 Weer tc, Moonlight, ~ :'-, 
1862, Ott:1o:1al Reocn:a,, , ~,a. 
44w.er w.Moonlight, Jul7 6, 1862, Moonlight to Weer, J14114, 1862, 
11.u.n.t to Stanton, Jul.7 20, 1Si2, ibid,, PP• 138, 472, 482-'i83, 
1· ' 
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One ef these patr~ls Gapt'illl"~d F~rt Gibsen without a f'ight9 but an absence 
of £Grage fGr~ed the detaehment titlll return t~ the base ~ampo The Federal 
forces were sucoessful in maintaining e~ntr~l er the area, and Gl'lly teken 
Confederate resistan~e remaimed nGrth ~f the Arkansas R1vero 46 
In the spring ~r:1862 it be~ame ~bvi~~s that Cher~kee Chi.et Jehn Ress 
regretted his preGipi t~!lii a@ti(Q'l:n in aligning his tribe with the C~n.f'eder= 
aoyo In an ef'fiDlrt t'® im.p~ve the situatiitlllnll he sitlllught t(J> 'bring abwt 
changes in C~nfederate tr@itlllp disp~siti~ns wlthin the Indian ©@untiryo 
These efferts were ~ulminllted in late Jwne with a direet appeal t@ the 
Trans-Mississippi Distri©t @l®lmm.andel"il Maj®Jl" GEIMl"al Th~s Co m.nwu.n~ 
sh<:>rtly befere the Fedel"al imrasi~n f@iroe pene·tFated der&1p int®' the Indian 
Territeryo Ohief R@>ss asked f@l" p:!!sitive heilp and rmnded the C)@llnfeder= 
ate general ~r the stipulati@)ns ~f the a:Jllia.n~e tl"eaty ~alling f@r c~n= 
federate prote~ti@n c,f the Indian :mi.ti®lno Bat help did n®t IU.terialize 
47 in spite ef Hinci!m.an°s reassuring replyo 
Advised by Cher~kee refugees ~r a re~eptive ©limate within the 
tribal g0vernment~ C(!j)l@nel Weel" init:b1ted &@tiiln fitlllr negcwtiati.<®ns with 
the tribe shertly after his expediti@n began its fw~:!:'d m~vem~nto This 
was foll0wed by a request f'©l" talks with Chi et R®ss made after' the Indian 
declined by the prln@ipal l:llhie.f' o This se@i®nd <®@mmu.JtU@$1.ti@n 9 made by 
Celonel Weer after the L®isu.st Grellve vi~tery i) WI.$ o@Milia:t@ry in language, 
and a purpGseful effort-t© dissuade R~ss and the Cher~kee Nati~n fr~ 
46W'eer te--Mei»<>nl..ighti) Juy 16,i 1862 9 C:mpb~ll t® Weer,, July 141j! 18629 
ibid., PPo 160=161, 1610 
47.A.bel, -The .Ameri@ai.n Iruil.m as .. ~rti(,\ipa.nt.in the Civil Wtu.•!il PPo 160= 
161; wardell9A~tieiai Hist~ @f. ·the Chsr~e';""1".tf~~ p; ffl; R~ss t~ 
Hindman, June 2511 lS62i> Of' ~@;;r;!il i!il XIIIii J:>Po 950=9510 
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their attachment to the Southern States. This attempt, though unpro-
ductive in arranging a meeting between the head of the Indian nation and 
the expedition commander, indicated the spirit of forgiveness which 
Federal authorities offered as inducement if the tribe would repu.diate 
the Confederate alliance.48 
Simultaneously with the ,capt'ure of Fort Gibson and the clearing of 
Confederate forces north of the Arkansas River, Weer dispatohed a re-
connaissanee party to the Tahlequah region to ascertain the possibility 
for a confrontation with Cherokee tribal authorities. The small force, 
led by Captain Harriss. Greeno of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment 
and composed of elements of this unit, was a reassuring gesture to many 
of the wavering Cherokee Indians. It met no resistance in the capital, 
and information gathered there gave hope to Captain Greeno that his 
primary mission to effect a restoration of friendly relations with a ma-
49 jority of the tribe could be accomplishedo 
The following day, July 15, the patrol leader moved his force south 
toward Park Hill, the location of Chief Ross• elegant home, Rose Cottage. 
The arrival of the small cavalry detachment was an extremely tense moment, 
since it had been reported that a JOO~man force of Confederate Cherokee 
soldiers was camped in the area$ Any apprehension concerning the in-
tentions of these men was quickly dispelled when the Federal troops rode 
in, for these followers of Chief Ross warmly welcomed the Kansas soldiers. 
Captain Greeno found the principal officers of Colonel Drew's .First 
Cherokee Mounted Rifle Regiment with the chief', and together they.faced a 
48Phillips to Ross, June 26, 1862, Weer to Ross, July 7, 1862, Ross 
to Weer, July 8, 1862, ibid., pp. 4;o, 464, 486-487. 
49weer to Moonlight, July 16, 1862, Greeno t0 Weer, J'lll.y 15 and 17, 
1862, ibido, PP• 160-161, 473, 161-1620 
50 difficult dilemma .. 
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The night before Colonel Cooper, the ranking officer of Confederate 
forces at Fort Davis, had demanded the Cherokee tribe abide by its 
treaty obligations and call up all able-bodied men to repel the invading 
Federal forcee Reluctant to carry out this comm.and and yet afraid of 
reprisals from Confederate sympathizers, Chief Ross was mu.ch relieved 
when Captain Greeno solved the problem by arresting him together with 
the military officers present at the Rose Cottage eon:fereneea5l This 
prevented the issuance of resistance instructions, since arrested of-
ficials, even when paroled, lacked the requisite authority to issue law ... 
ful. orderso Ross was looking for a means to undo the provisions of the 
Confederate treaty and save his reputation as a gentleman who wuld not 
go back on his wordo The timely arrival of Greeno, a repres.entative of 
the Federal government, not only destroyed the unwanted treaty, but also 
provided the Cherokee chief with an excellent opportunity f'Gr changing 
sideso Three weeks la~er Ross and his family moved voluntarily and with 
a Federal escort to Fort Scott, Kansas, and eventually east to washing ... 
I. 
ton an~ PhiladelphiaQ When they left they took the Cherokee national 
treasury and archives with themo52 
Over 2,000 Cherokees joined the var'lous Federal Indian regiments 
during the summer of 1862, and the RtDiss and Ridge treaty factions, which 
50weer to Moonlight, July 16, 1862, Greeno to Weer, July 15 and 
17, 1862, ibidot PPo l6ll 473, 1620 
.5lu.s., Department. o:.f Interiorsi Report .2!.112!. Commissioner _2! Indian 
Affairs for !!!.!, ~ ~ (Washington: Government Printing Office, _18635, 
PP• .i;B ... 159, . hereinafter ei ted ... as .. tJ,, S. , Department. or_ Interior, Report 
of the Commissioner of Indiar1-..Aff.airs-for the Year .1862; Greeno to Weer, 
'jiiy · 15 and 17, 1862; O.ftieial Reeord's;-i, XIII;-' pp':-l;:'73, 162 o 
52salomon to Blunt 11 August 9i 1862, ibido, PPa 5Sl-552o 
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split the tribe asunder at the t:1me of removal, came into existence ag~in 
with appalling repercussions. This pattern of Cherokees against Che~o-
kees was extremely detrimental to the tribe and to the Confederacy, but 
the Federal government gained considerable advantage from the intra-
tribal rivalry. 
The commanding general. of Confederate forces in the Indian Territory 
was General Pike, the same man who had negotiated the 1861 alliam.ce 
treaties between the Five Civilized Tribes and the Confederate States. 
During and prior to the Federal invasion of the Indian country, Pike had 
been involved in heated debates with his superiors in Arkansas concerning 
conditions i:n the territory·. His stubborn re:fu.sal to accept responsibility 
for concentrating and controlling Confederate troops allowed the invading 
53 Federal command to defeat the Southern units one by one. 
Colonel Cooper, the forward Confederate f'ield commander, attempted 
to organize resistance to the Indian Expe~ition at Fort Davis, but was 
unable to consolidate sufficient strength to offer more than token op.. 
position. He became aware of the latest split within the Cherokee tribe 
and realized this was a grave setback to Confederate hopes. He tried to 
determine which Cherokees were f'ir.ml.y committed to the Southern cause and 
to offer them encouragement for the :fu.tureo His efforts were a total 
failure, since they were initiated after Federal forces had established 
a sizable foothold in the Indian aountryo54 
53Duncan, Reluctant General, pp. 232-233; W.E. Woodruff, With the 
Jfaght .Gans !!l, •g-•§! (Little· Rock: Central Printing Co .. , 1903hPJ):-07-
' Carroll to Pike, July 27, 1862, Plke.to.bndolph, July 1, 1862, Pike 
to Secretary of Wa.r,.July 20, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII, ppo 951, 
850-851, 8.56-8600 
54cooper to Drew, July 18, 1862, Civil War, Cherokee File, Grant 
Foreman Papers, Indian .Archives Divisiont Oklahoma. Historical Society,, 
Oklahoma City, Okla.homao 
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The rapid dissolution of Confederate resistance after Locust Grove 
and the realignment of the Cherokee Nation with the Federal government did 
not cause capitulation of the remaining tribes of the Indian Territory, 
nor did it allow the soldiers of the Indian Expedition to relaxo The 
drought in the Indian country was severe in the summer of 1862, and forage 
was practically non-existento The supply trains from Fort Scott were de-
layed due to coordination failures and the la.ck of strong escortso These 
conditions put the men and animals of the invasion force on short rations 
and, coupled with rumors of massing Confederates, eroded the morale of 
the command to a dangerous ebbo5.5 
General Blunt became apprehensive about the safety of the Indian Ex-
pedition during the middle of July. This concern was not due to fear of 
losing the northern portion of the Indian country to a Confederate of-
fensive, but because the invasion force represented the bulk of Federal 
forces available to defend the Department of Kansaso He was charged with 
this responsibility not only by his position as military commander, but 
also by his political ties with Senator Laneo Any attack on Kansas would 
have serious consequences for the Senator and his prot,g~, since both 
were ac·quiring profits from Army contracts with the merchants and specu-
lators at Fort Leavenworth and consequently desired to maintain their re= 
speotive positionso56 
General Blunt warned Colonel Weer in mid=July of the danger of being 
cut off fN>m his base of supplies, and the following week Blunt dispatohect 
a strong appeal to Secretary of war Stanton for reinforcementso57 Whethe:r 
55weer to .Moonlight, July 12 and 16ll 1862ll Salomon to Blunt,i July 
20, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII, pp. 487-488, 161, 4850 
56 · · 
Castel, ! Frontier Sta.ta !.:!:. ~ 9 PPo 83=84o 
57Moonl.ight to Weer, July 14, 1862, Blunt to Stanton, July 20, 1862, 
Official Reeordsj i, XIII, PPo 472, 482=4830 
the Kansas commander was convinced his department was in immediate danger 
or invasion, or whether he was attempting to increase the total number or 
units he directly controlled, cannot be ascertained. Both possibilities 
existed, and probably Blunt was motivated equally by them$ The appeal tq 
Washington produced no results, 'bttt the omninous tone of his warning to 
the Indian Expedition indicated the rear that was also prevalent in the 
invasion torceo This dread of the unknown would soon el"l1pt into drastic 
action which would completely undermine the positive effect of the ex~ 
pedition in the Indian Terrltor,ro 
On July 18 Colonel Weer was arrested and charged with gross dere-
liction of duty by Colonel Salomonf the expedition executive officer and 
second in commando Salomon immediately assumed command and issued orders 
which showed he was willing to risk a court-martial for mutiny in order 
to extricate himself and his men from a position he considered untenable. 
The new commander had paniced following receipt of unconfirmed rumors, 
and arrested Weer to avoid a Confederate jeopardy which in reality did 
not existQ5B 
Colonel Salomon, in a pronunciamento to unit oGlllll'l.anders, gave a long 
list of reasons for his aeti~nsQ The expedi'tion was 160 miles inside 
enemy territory and without oommunioation to the r,aro Long and un-
necessary marches under adverse weather conditions had seriously weakened 
the soldiers of the command. ,Supplies were almost exhausted, and there 
was no prospect of obtaining critically needed food from Kansaso ColonEtJ. ,, 
Weer would not alter his plans, and he had refused to listen to reason •. 
Salomon commented pointedly· that ••Reliable information has been receive~ 
that large bodies of the en9llly were moving to ou.r rear, and yet we lay 
58salomon to All Commanders, July 18j 1862, ibido 11 ppo 4?S=476o 
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here idle." Under these circumstances, the new commander felt he had no 
: ~ 
other choice bu.t to arrest Weer and save the expedition from disaster. 
The actual arrest of Colonel Weer and the rapid issuance of orders 
for a withdrawal movement occurred during the evening of July 18 and the 
early morning hours of the following dayo Th.e white regiments and at-
tached artillery batteries, apparently acquainted with the dissatisfaction 
and apprehension of Colonel Salomon, were prepared for the events that 
happened. They commenced retracing their route t0ward Fort Scott at 2a00 
a.m. ·on July 190 Significantly, the commanders of the Kansas regiments made 
no effort to challenge the fall of fellow Kansan Colonel Weero Signifi-
eantly also, a high degree of secrecy was used to prevent the events.from 
becoming known to the Federal Indian regiments which were scheduled to re-
main behind in the Indian Territory. This suggests a feeling of guilt on 
60 the part of the new expedition commander for the withdrawal ordero 
Colonel Salomon did not inform. General Blunt of his actions until 
two days after the expedition had begun its backward movement. The new 
commander of the fading invasion force gave a long and detailed account 
of how Weer, with brutal and improper methods~ had jeopardized the safety 
of the expedition by his utter disregard of standard military procedures 
and by his callous and uncouth attitude toward his subordinates., Colonel 
Salomon rationalized to the point that his mu.tineus action was the only 
thing which had prevented the total destruction of the Federal foroe 0 6l 
The news of the sudden withdrawal of the expedition from the Indian 
Territory was not received enthusiastically by the Indian agents who had 
59ro1d. 
6oGeneral Order, Indian Expedition, July 18, 1862, ibido, p. 4760 
61 Salomon to Blunt, July 20, 1862, ibid.,, pp., 484-4850 
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accompanied the invasion force from Kansas. These two men, E .. H. Carra.th 
and H.W. Martin, were horrified by the actions of Colonel Salomon, and 
were even more horrified at the prospects or leaving the newly won Chero-
kee allies to the mercy of their Confederate brothers. Both agents were 
also concerned about the effect this incident would have on other Indian 
tribes who were watching for signs of strength from the Federal go~ern-
ment. A strange paradox of the expedi ti.on was that Carruth and Martin 
indirectly championed Colonel Weer in their reports, even though the 
former oomm.ander's actions and messages indicated he did not like them 
and felt they were incapable of carrying ou.t their duties.62 
The Indian regiments of the axpedition were left with enl.y sketchy 
details of the Weer-Salomon events of July 16-19. Rumors circulated that 
Colonel Weer had become mentally incompetent, and that this had caused 
the rapid withdrawal. The commanders of the Indian units did not re-
ceive copies of the withdrawal order until three days after the white 
units had started their movement toward Kansas. The three Indian organi-
Batio~s, including the newly fol'llled Third Federal Indian Regiment, were 
·left without artillery or sufficient rations to serve as a Corps of Ob ... 
servation.63 
Colonel R.W. Furnas, commander of the First Indian Regiment, formed 
62weer to Moonlight, July l;ep 186:e, Carruth to Blunt, Juy .. 19., 1862, 
ibid., PP• 487, 478; Wardell, A_ Political §!.story .2! ]a!. Cherokee Nation, 
PP• 154-155. · · 
63Abel, The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War, pp. 143-
144; "Indian-PI'oneer History," cm, Po 282, Grant Foreman Collection, 
Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma. This collection of 112 bound volumes of typewritten interviews 
is the product of a Works Progress Administration project during the years 
1937-1938. The interviews were with early settlers, pioneers II and Indians 
of Oklahoma, and cover a vast range ot subjects before and after statehoodo 
Dile to the advanced age of most of the people interviewedll this information 
must be critically evaluated. 
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the three Indian units into a brigade, and as ranking officer, assumed 
command. He called a council of war, and the commanders of the various 
Indian organizations agreed to remain in the territory and protect the 
country as best they could from Confederate reprisals. The first camp 
selected as a base of operations for the new brigade was on the Verdigris 
River. A serious lowering of the morale of the Indian soldiers, coupled 
with numerous desertions, forced this camp to be almost immediately 
abandoned for another closer to the Kansas bordero The new base on Horse 
Creek put the brigade closer to Colonel Salomon and his command who had 
finally halted their retreat~ At the second location, called Camp Wattles, 
the Indian regiments regrouped, received additional supplies, and were 
augmented with artilleryo From here Colonel Furnas sent out far-ranging 
patrols to keep Confederate forces under surveillance and to protect the 
Cherokees friendly to the Federal causeo 64 
The Indian Expedition was now split into two main groups, with the 
white regiments under Colonel Salomon located at Hudson°s Crossing on 
Grand River, and the Indian Brigade of Colonel Furnas situated forty-five 
miles directly south of the camp of the white unitso The two forces were 
,in communication through a series of outposts, which gave added pro= 
tectien to the expedition against surprise attacksQ This new arrangement 
was not advantageous to the Indian regiments trying to hold and protect 
the northern portions of the Indian Territory. But it was better than 
completely forsaking the Cherokees and other Indians who had eagerly 
greeted the invading forces only one month beforeo65 
64General Order~ First Indian Brigade 11 July 19, 1862, Furnas.to 
munt, July 25, 1862, Salomon to munt, July 29, 186211 OfficiaLRe.cords, 
i, XIll-, .. pp. 481, .. 511",,512, 522.; UoSo 11 . Department .. of Interior 9 Report !!. 
the Commissioner.of .. India.n.Affairs for.the Year of 1862, ppo 160=161; 
Abel, lh!, Americanindian ~ Participant !n, the civffwar 9 Po 1450 
65salomon to Bluntj July 29, 1862, Official Records~ 1 9 XIII, po 521; 
Abel, lh!, American Indian!!. Participant f!! ~ Civil .!i:si PPo 145-1460 
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General Blunt was shocked when he received the news of the arrest of 
Colonel Weer and the head-long retreat of the Indian Ex:peditiono His 
apprehensive nature was agitated even more by the possibility that the 
Indian regiments might be lost to enemy action or that Kansas was once 
against volunerable to invasion from the southo He made strenuous efforts 
to halt the movement of the retreating expedition, but he did not, as could 
have been expected, attempt to salvage the reputation of his subordinate, 
Colonel Weero On the oontraryj Blunt0 s instrttotions to Colonel Salomon 
were mild in tone and stressed the necessity for saving as muoh as pos-
sible of the gains made during the initial weeks of the invasiono66 
The Cherokee Nation and the white and Indian soldiers of the in-
vasion force were discouraged by still another retreato The specter of 
massing Confederate units reappeared along the Missouri-Arkansas border 
on August 7, and these reports, when relayed to Colonel Salomon, caused 
instantaneous reaotiono 'With a speed similar to that shown three weeks 
before, he moved the bulk of his command by rapid marching to Fort Scotto 
The Indian Brigade, alone and isolated approximately eighty miles from 
the supply depot 11 was forced to follow Colonel Salomon°s white units into 
Kansas .• 67 
The unhappy withdrawal of the Indian Expedition to Kansas was in 
part the result of improper handling of supplies and the laek ef critical 
evaluation of intelligence as to enemy capabilities and intentions 0 
General Blunt became painfully aware of this after learning of Colonel 
Salomon's second withdrawalo The department commander decided that the 
66m.u.nt to Salomon, August 3, 1862, Official Reca:rds 9 i, XIII, pp. 
531-532. 
67 Salomon to Blunt, August 9, 18629 ibido~ PPo 551=.5520 
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only way to prevent sueh reocourrenoes would be to take personal charge 
of the forces and not attempt to direct them from Fort Leavenwortho He 
knew that wars were won with offensive operations, and not with defensive 
actions and withdrawals. He knew also that the key to military success 
was aggressive, forceful leadershipo This quality Blunt had in great 
abundance. 
The Federal invasi~n effort to re-establish control over the Indian 
Territory ended in withdrawal, bu.t the gains made by the expedition were 
important in several respeotso The Federal government had proven its 
ability to organize and supply an offensive operation~ and the experience 
gained would improve similar future endeavors. The attitude of forgive-
ness drove a permanent wedge between the Indian tribes and the Confederacy 
which the Southerners could never overcome. Lastly, the Indian Expedition 
demonstrated conclusively that even a halting attempt by the Federal 
military forces was of greater magnitude than the best the Confederates 
had to offer. The final outcome of the war at this point should have been 
obvious to the tribes of the Indian Territory, even to those persons who 
staunchly supported the Southo 
CHAPTER III 
PRELUDE TO VICTORY 
The inglorious retreat of the Indian Expedition in July 9 1862, 
seriously negated the advantages gained by the Federal forces in re-
establishing friendly relations with the Southern Indian tribes. The 
Cherokee Nation was an exception to this 9 but even though the expedition 
insured Cherokee allegiance 9 the tribe still had a substantial Confederate 
minority led by Colonel Watieo The other four tribes remained Southern 
supporters although many of them complained about the privations they 
faced. All tribes would have to endure the misery of intermittent guer-
rilla warfare for almost another year before Federal forces would launch 
another f'ull-soale offensive. The Federal withdrawal gave hope to most 
Southern Indians that the weak Confederate forces might be able to 
maintain their precarious position in the territoryo 
When Colonel Salomon ordered the rapid evacuation of the white regi-
ments of his usurped command toward Kansas 9 the official directive omitted 
the Federal Indian regiments from the retrograde movemento Instead 9 thes~ 
quasi-military units, partially trained and with less than minimum re-
quirements of provisions and equ.ipment 9 were for all intents and pu.rposes 
abandoned as a Corps of Observationo Theoretically, they were to wateh. 
Confederate activity and provide security for the loyal members of the 
Cherokee Nationo Realistically, the Indian units were left as a rear 
guard to insure the safe withdrawal of the white majority of the ill-fated 
expedition. 
The Confederate forces under Watie and Cooper did not initiate 
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operations against the expedition as Colonel Salomon expected, nor did 
they attack the troops of the newly formed Federal Indian Brigadeo This 
lack of aggressiveness was a common. failing of Confederate forces in the 
Indian Territory and permitted the Federal Indians to recover from the 
shook of losing their white oomrades~in-armso There was only one minor 
skirmish involving the adversaries in the late summer of 18620 This was 
an engagement between elements of the First Federal Indian Regimentj 
commanded by Major William Ao Phillips, and a detachment from Colonel 
Watie's regiment of Confederate Cherokeeso 
The action took pl~oe on July 27 at a crossroads seven miles from 
Fort Gibson called Bayou Menard, although dispatches erroneously re= 
ported the location as Ba.you Bernardo Major Phillips, conducting an ex-
tended reconnaissance patrol, had divided his command into three groups 
to scour the vicinity of Tahlequah and Park Hill for Confederate activityo 
All three detachments had instructions to rendezvous a:t Bayou Mena.rd o 
The Confederate unit, unaware of the three separated Federal elements, 
blundered into the center groupo After an initial exchange of gunfire, 
they attempted to overpower their opponents with an imprudent charge, and 
their aggressive action trapped them between Phillipijs converging foreeso 
The Southern unit was badly mauled, and their eammander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Taylor, was killedo The remnants of the Confederate patrol with-
drew in great confusion toward Fort Gibson. Thirty=two dead Cherokees 
were found at the scene of the aetionj and prisoners captured after the 
skirmish said that more than a ht1ndred men were either ldllea or woundedo 
The Federal force lost only one man~ and Major Phillips was well pleased 
with the performance of his Creek and Seminole soldiersQ1 
1McReynolds, The Seminoles, po 306i Phillips to Furnas, July 27 and 
August 6, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII, ppo 181=182~ 183=1840 
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The high commands of both the Federal and Confederate forces in the 
Indian Territory were_not in close proximity with the troops actually en-
gaged in the fighting, and both commands were hampered with internal 
struggles of generals who sought increasing power at the expense of their 
rivals. Those wearing the stars of responsibility were highly sensitive 
of their personal prerogatives, and made constant efforts to enlarge 
their partioular area of authority. They were motivated by combinations 
of ambition, jealO"Q.sy9 fear, and hate; their actions, whether initiated 
in Saint Louis, Fort Leavenworth, Fort McCulloch or Little Rock, had tre-
mendous impact on the comm.on soldiers engaged in deadly combat in the dry, 
hot Indian country. 
The nominal commander of Confederate forces in the Indian Territory 
during and after the invasion by the Federal Indian Expedition was Gener-
al Pike. He was ordered in late May, 1862, and again in early June by 
the newly appointed commander of the Trans-Mississippi D1strict 9 Major 
General Thomas Co Hindman, to move his brigade to Fort Gibson, 200 miles 
closer to the attackers. Bllt Pike elected to remain within the security 
of Fort McCulloch and not to ru.sh north to assist in the containment of 
the Federal expedition commanded by Colonel Weero 2 
The deterioration of relations between the two Confederate generals 
began several weeks prior to the actual invasion when Hindman insisted 
Pike transfer the bulk of his white regiments and oneQthird of his ar-
tillery back to Arkansas. Bitterly opposed to leaving the Indian Terri-
tory destitute of white soldiers, the Confederate general gradgingly 
complied with the wishes or his new superior, but not before reminding 
2General Report, Major General T.C. Hindman, lune 19, 1863, ibid .. , 
pp. 40-410 
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him of the consequences involved in removing a significant portion of the 
com.bat units from the Indian country. Pike also made a pointed issue of 
the detrimental effect this loss ot support would have on the Indian in-
habitants of his oommand. 3 
When the Federal invasion began in late June, as the former Indian 
commissioner had gloomily predicted, Hindman immediately ordered ~ke to 
the scene of the fighting. By this time Pike was only commanding Indians 
and, to make matters worsei his soldiers were raggedi poorly armed, and 
had not been paid in months.. Most of the equipuent General Pike had 
painstakingly secured for his comm.and had been commandeered by the 
district commander, and these actions had infuriated Pike to the point 
4 that insubordination was his recourse. First he procrastinated, but 
finally he resigned from the Confederate army .. Pike was most unhappy and 
frustrated over the treatment given him by his superiors,. and was deeply 
disturbed because no one in Little Rock or Richmond apparently cared 
about their Indian allies on the western fringe of the Conf'ederaey .. 5 
After he tendered his resignation, Pike allowed his temper and sharp 
tongue to overrule his common sense,. He wrote numerous lett.ers about the 
unfair treatment accorded him and his Indians, and when these efforts did 
not produce the desired results, he went so far as to address a public 
letter to the Five Civilized Tribes concerning his reasons for returning 
to civilian lifeo This vituperative piece of. correspondence was printed 
3Hindman to Pike, May '.31, 1862, Pike to Hindman, June 8, 1862, ibido, 
pp. 943, 936-9430 
4carroll to Pike, June 27, 1862, Pike to Randolph, July 1, 1862, 
General Order, Department of Indian Territory, July 17, 1862, ibido, pp .. 
951-952, 850-851, 970-9710 . 
5aeneral Report, Major General T.Co Hindman, June 19, 18639 Pike to 
Secretary of War, July 15, 1862, Pike to Hindman, July 21, 186~, ibido, 
pp. 4o-41, 857-858, 973. 
and given wide cireul.ation. In i.t General Pike subtly informed the 
Indians that the Confederacy loved them, th.at he loved them, but that 
the ev:il commanders in Arkansas hated them, and th.at it was those men 
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who had caused the misfortune that was occurring in the Indian Territory.6 
This final act brought the relations between Hindman and Pike to the 
brealQ.ng pointo Hindman took immediate steps to have his su.bGrdinate nGt 
only relieved from command, but also court-martialed., The haughty Indian 
commander was arrested, and only the belated acceptance of his resignation 
by authorities in Ricbm.cmd permitted him to escape the humilia:tion of a 
. 7 
trial which would have found him gu.iltyo 
The paradox to the tragic story of General Pike was the complete 
independence of the Indian forces, a fact which Hindman did not discover 
until after actions had been initiated which could not be changedo Al-
though cognizant of the independent nature of his command, Pike was con-
.fused by army reguJ.ations and the ambiguous character of army orders to 
the degree that he acquiesced to orders from General Hindman which he 
could have summarily disregarded.a The d$1D.aging effect these sordid 
happenings had on the morale of the Confederate Indians can be easily 
measured by the negligible efforts the shortage .... plagued command made in 
attempting to turn back the Federal Indian Ex:peditiono 
6Pi.ke to Drew, July 14, 1862, Civil War, Cherokee File, Grant Fore-
man Papers 51 Indian Archives, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma. City, 
Oklahoma; Pike to Secretary of War, July 20, 1862 11 Pike to Hindmanl) July 
31, 1862, Pike to.Davis,_JuJ.y_Jl, 1862, Pike to the Five Civilized Tribes, 
July 31, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII, PPo 859, 973 .... 974, 860-869 11 869 ... 
8710 
?Randolph to Holmes, October 27, 1862, Newton to Roane, November 3 
and 4, 1862, Holmes to Sec.retary of War, November 15, 1862, Pike to 
Davis, November 19, 1862, General Report, Major General T.,C., Hindman, 
June 19, 1863, ibido, pp~ 906, 980-981, 918, 921-922, 4lo 
8Special Orders, Adjutant and Inspector General Office, November 22, 
1861, ibid., Po 9?8o 
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The commanding generals or Federal forces were also engaged in 
wrangles over who would control activities in the Indian Territory. These 
stru.ggles had begun in Kansas at the beginning of the war between General 
Halleck and General Hunter and a host of politicians led by Senator, and 
sometimes Brigadier General, La.nee After General Blunt, Lane's prot,g,, 
assoed command of the Kansas Department in May, the internal maneuvering 
abated, bu.t only temporarilyo It emerged again in September when Halleck 
was promoted to (]eneral-in-Chief, and Major General Samuel Ro Curtis be-
came the Missouri Department commandero 
General Blunt took personal command of all Kansas Department troops 
in August after the Indian Expedition had returned to its base at Fort 
Scotto At this forward supply depot, the Kansas general convened a court-
martial to investigate the circumstances surrounding Colonel Weer9s ar-
resto Since most of the officers concerned were deeply involved, es= 
tablishing blame for the invasion fiasco was im.possibleo Rather than 
cause further complications, General.Blunt solved the dilemma by re-
storing Colonel Weer to his !ank and dismissing all chargeso9 
In September, 1862, Confederate forces in Arkansas under the leader-
ship of General Hindman again became a menace to the Federal commands in 
Missouri and Kansas, and concerted efforts had to be made to destroy themo 
General Blunt, fearful of a Confed.erate invasion of Kansas, ~s especially 
anxious th.at the enemy troops be contained and kept outside cf his depart= 
ment .. His move to Fort Scott to take command of his forces is substantial 
proof of this anxietyo 
9J.C .. Hopkins, "James Go Blunt and the Civil Wa~" (unpublished Master 
of Arts Thesis, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1952), ppo 24-
25, hereinafter cited as Hopkins 11 "James G .. Blunt and the Civil War!'~ 
General Order, Department of Kansas, August 8, 1862, Official Records, i, 
IDI, Po 549. 
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The Kansas department commander organized his f'oroes into three 
integrated white and Indian brigades commanded by Colonel W.F. Cloud, 
Colonel Weer, and General Salomon. The Army of Kansas was given con-
oentrated training to instill discipline, and with. su.f'ficient supplies 
and equipment was soon brought back into a state of general eff'ioiencyo 
When intelligence reports proved MissO'l!l.ri, not Kansas, was the Confederate 
objective, Blunt ordered two or his brigades into that stateo They were 
to coordinate their efforts with Federal forces under Brigadier General 
John Mo Soho.field, the ocmmander ef the S.outhwest District of Misscurio 
Colonel Cloud 6 s brigade was retained in the Fort Scott area where. it was 
to maintain contact with the bulk of' the army and, if no threat de-
veloped toward Kansas, it was to carry out pa.troling operations in the 
Indian Territory.lo 
The independent status of Kansas and General Blunt was abruptly 
ternd.nated on September 19 with a presidential order which recombined 
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory into a new Depart-
ment of Missouri under the command of General Cu:rtisoll No reason was 
given for this change, but it can be presumed that th~ disintegration of 
the Indian Expedition and the elevation or General Halleck as head of 
all Federal military operations were primary factors behind this attempt 
to end the influence of Senator Lane on military affairs in the WEtst. 
General CUrtis, a slow and cautious indivi.dual!ll owed his new po-
sition to his statas as a Missouri political figa.re rather than his mili-
tary background as a West Point graduate. After assuming command of his 
enlarged department, he wrote Blttnt directly about the dissolution of the 
10General Order, Department of Kansas, August 24, 1862, Special Order9 
Department of Kansas, September 13, 1862, ibid., PP• 595, 630. 
11Genera.J,. Order, War Department, September 19, 18629 ibid., Po 6.53. 
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Kansas command. Simultaneously, Curtis informed General Schofield of his 
comprehensive plans, ~nd included a copy of his notification letter to 
Blunt as information, a normal procedure of military coordination. 
Schofield immediately wrote Blunt of his loss of authority, and due to 
the slowness of Civil War letter mail, Blunt received this message before 
he received the one from Curtiso The Kansas general was told very subtly 
that Schofield would soon be his superioro12 
General Blunt's reply to the Schofield dispatch was depreoative, for 
he had no desire to accept a role subordinate to an aspiring and capable 
commander. He quickly informed Schofield of his laek of official notifi-
cation of the department merger and, while he was ready to cooperate 
against a common enemy., he had no intention of carrying out orders of an .. 
other brigadier general. Blunt further announced the impending movement 
of his command group to Missouri where he. and Schofield, as coequals, 
could carry out the destruction of advancing Confederate foroes~13 
General Curtis' official confirmation of the establishment of the 
new Missouri Department was received by Blunt shertly after he sent his 
caustic reply to Schofield. The Kansas general showed unusual sub-
missiveness in his cordial reply to General Curtis. He extolled the 
soldierly qualities of the Cherokee Indians who had joined Federal forces 
in July, and informed his superior he was ready to mo·ve into Missouri 
with an 8,000 man force. But this loss of authority was a severe blow to 
Blunt•s ego, and one whioh he would attempt to change as soon as possibleo14 
12Jay Monaghan, Civil War ~ .!:h!, Weste~n Border 1854-1865 (Bostons 
Little, Brown. and. Coot, l955hPo 229; Curtis to Sohofield, September 27, 
1862, Official Records, i, XIII, PP• 673-6740 
l3Blunt to Schofield, September 30 9 1862, ibido, PPo 691-6920 
14Bl_unt to Curtis, October 1, 1862, ibidot PPo 696-6970 
There was little fighting in the Indian Territory for three months 
after the sld.rmsh at Bayou Menard in late July, 18620 Both sides were 
too exhausted and too preoccupied to do otherwise. In an effort to fa-
cilitate tighter control over his forces, General Ctirtis oombi:ned the 
commands of General Blunt and General Schofield into the Army of the 
Frontier on October 12 .. This f'llrther inhibited Bluntes independence, for 
Schofield was named army commander over Blunt by virtue of his earlier 
date of rankol5 
On October 22, 18629 a decisive engagement oocurred at Fort Wayne, 
a former army post in the Cherokee Nation, located approximately fifty 
miles north of Tahlequah and just inside the territory border from 
Arkansas. The combatants in this action were soldiers of the First Di-
vision, Federal Army of the Frontier, and the Confederate Indian Brigade., 
General Blunt was the commander of Urrl,on forces, and Brigadier General 
Cooper, recently promoted to his one star rank by the Confederate Congress, 
was neminal head o:f' the swther:n organizati@nol6 Twe days prior to this 
encounter, General Schofield received intelligence repcrts that Brigadier 
General James So Rains, a Missourian and commander of a Confederate force 
in western Arkansas and the Indian Territory, had divided his commando 
The bulk of it remained with R.ains in Arkansas, and a smaller fGrce, 'IUlClier 
Cooper, had moved to the vicinity o:f' Maysville, Arkansas. Beth Con-
federate generals had orders to initiate offensive opera:tions against the 
rapidly increasing Federal forces in Missouri and Kansaso l7 
15oeneral Order, Department of Missouri, October 12, 1862, ibido, 
p. 730. 
l6Blunt to Schofield, October 22, 1862, ibido, p .. 3250 
17oeneral Order, Army of the Frontier, Ootober 20 11 18629 i'bido, PP• 
'754-755; Wi.le;y Britton, The Civil War on the Border (2 vols., New Yorks 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1890-l~04J, !, Po j'75. Hereinafter cited as Britton, 
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The Federal plan or at.tack was f'or Schofield to strike the ma.in Con-
federate army under Rains while Blunt with two brigades of his division 
was to seek out Cooper's Indian commando The Third Brigade of Blunt's 
division was not directly involved in the action, sinoe it had been de-
signated as seaurity for the supply trains. The movement of the left 
wing of the Anny of the Frontier began on October 20 and, after a four-
teen hour march, Blunt and his command stopped at Bentonville, Arkansas, 
. where he rested his troops. The following day the supply train wl th 1 ts 
escort closed in on the main body.18 
At.Bentonville Blunt obtained from scouting parties speoifie infor-
mation that the Confederate forces were encamped at Fort Wayne across the 
border from Maysville, and thirty miles west or his lcela.tiono On the 
afternoon of October 21 the Kansas general informed his subordinate com-
manders of his plan of attack. It called for an all-night march and a 
shattering daybreak assault on the Confederate position. The Federal 
eolWlll'l would be led by the Second Kansas Cavalry Regiment, oll»mmanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel O.Ao Ba.ssetto The remainder of Colonel Cloud 0 s brigade 
and the brigade of Colonel Weer would followo The supply train was to 
remain in the Bentonville areao19 
The route through the.northem Arkansas countryside was rough, with 
the hilly terrain offering eonsiderable hinderanee to movemento The 
tired Federa;l. soldiers had great diffieulty in keeping a proper interval 
between unitso The darkness acted as an additio1?41 impediment to the men 
18schofield_to ·.Curtis, October 21, 1862~ Blunt to Schofield, October 
28-, 1862-, .. 0ffioial Records, i, XIII, pp .. , 755 ... 756 51 325; Brl.ttcm, The Civil 
War on the =Bo ... · rd ........ er ...., Ij p .. 367.. -__ _.......,.._ 
l9Ibid.,, Po 368; Blunt to Schofield, October 28i 1862,.0ffioial 
Records, i, XIII, Po 3260 
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of the marching infantry regiments, but not to the mounted cavalry units. 
At 2100 a.m. on October 22 Colonel Cloud was f0rced to halt his brigade 
in order to close up the straggling column which had lengthened to several 
miles. General Blunt, who was in the center of his command, waited over 
an hour for the rear elements to catch up, then impatiently moved forward 
on a personal reconnaissance. At the same time he ordered the stopped 
brigade to continue its forward movemento 20 
Accompanied by an officer and two men from the lead regimentt Blunt 
moved far out in front of his troops and had :rrrnch success in ascertaining 
the exaot location of the Confederate cam.po This informati~n was ob= 
tained from a Southern woman, who mistook the Kansas general for a member 
of General Cooper's command, and a Negro slave, who agreed to guide the 
Federal forces in exchange for his freedomo General Blunt9 excited at 
the prospects of achieving a eomplete surprise over the Confederates at 
daylight, quickly returned to the leading elements of the advan~1n.g 
column. There he dispatched two companies to the town of Maysville to 
prevent Southern pickets from alerting the main Confederate oam.po2l 
At this point General Blunt, much to his ohagrim~ dis~overed that 
the bulk of his forces was still seven miles to the rearo The ~rder to 
move forward had not been properly relayed, and the oa:valry regiment had 
remained in position waiting for the arrival of the slower moving in~ 
fantryQ Dawn was less than one hour awayo The Federal c~mmander 9 dis-
playing aggressiveness typical of a successful military leader, elected 
to commit the three cavalry companies available in order to hold 
20Br::ttton, The Civil Wa.r on the Border, I 9 po 369; munt to Schofield, 
Ootober 28~ 1862:11 OffioialTe'oords jl i, XIII 9 Po 3260 
2ln,ido,, Britton, The Civil War on the Border~ Ij Po 3700 
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Confederate troops until the remainder of the command co·uld rush forwardo 
He ordered Colonel Cloud to the rear to bring up the main body as rapidly 
as possibleo 22 
The small Federal detachment, riding fast, moved across a large open 
field known as Beattiees Prairie and drove in the Conf'ede?'ate outposts. 
The Kansas cavalrymen then attacked the main Southern position where the 
soldiers were just awaking. The Confederate encampment of approximately 
2,000 men was in a thick woodsj and the extent of it had not been pin= 
pointed by the Federal commandero But t•elying on the s·uddenness of the 
assault and the confusion which followed, General Blunt kept the situ-
ation under control by having his men fire into the general area of 
23 suspected enemy concentrationo 
The balance of the Second Kansas Cavalry Regiment 9 augmented by two 
mountain howitzers, arrived at the scene.of the action shortly after the 
fighting began. They were dismounted and committed by their regimental 
commander, but due to their position on the extreme flank of the Con-
federate line, they did not achieve a telling effecto The unit was-
therefore halted, remounted, and moved to a more central loaation where 
they ooul.d use their fire power to advantage against the .hard-pressed 
Confederateso 24 
During the period when the Federal oavalry regiment was being mGved, 
the confused Confederates attempted a. complicated maneuver to outt"lank 
22munt to Sohofield9 October 28,i 1862, Official Records, ij) XIII, 
p. 327; Britton, ~. Civil ~ 2..12 ~ Border, Ill p~ 371. 
23.:sassett to Hill, October 24, 1862, Blunt to Schofield~_october 28, 
1862~.0fficial Records, i, mI, pp. 329=331, 327~ Britton~ The Ci'vil War 
.2,!! .!:h2, Border, I, po 3730 . - -
24Blunt to Schofield, October 28, 1862, Bass.ett to Hill, Qtjtober 24, 
1862, Official Reeords 9 i 9 XIII, pp. 327 9 3300 
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both ends of the exposed Federal lineo As the troops ef General Cooper 
began their advance. units from Colonel Weer's brigade, the Sixth Kansas 
Cavalry Regiment, and the Third. Federal Indian Regiment arrived. To-
gether they stopped the half-hearted Confederate.eounterattacko At the 
same time, five companies of the repositioned SeoGnd Kansas Cavalry 
r11shed the center of the Southern position where a lone artillery bat-
tery was locatedo The assault was a complete successo The four-gun em-
placement was captured, and the wavering Confederate solclier>s, seeing 
their main support being haul.ed away by jubilant Federal tl"@~psj bolted 
and fie~ in pandemonium. from the .fieldo 2.5 
The retreating Confederate soldiers, primarily Indians, were re-
peatedly attacked by the fresh~r units ~r the Federal commando The tired 
condition of the Federal horses was the only reason the pursuit did not 
become a complete annihilationo The c~nfederates were able eventually to 
outrun their antagonists, but they did not step their disorganized flight 
until.they reached Fort Gibson, seventy miles sou.th and west from the 
initial engagemento 26 
General Blunt was most eciimplim.entaey- about the skill and ability ef 
his troops, although he reported that the viotory would have been even 
greater had the Federal .eolwan been ~losed when the Confederate camp was 
first sightedo The total oawalties of the Federals were five killed ~d 
five woundedo Approximately _fifty Confederate dead were bu.ried at the 
site of the action, and Blunt announced that Com.federate p:risoners re= 
27 ported their losses in killed and wounped at more. than 150 o. 
25m.unt to .. Schof'iel~, October 28p 1862, ibido, Po 32?; Britton, The 
Civil War on the Border,!, Po 3'74o -~--
26m.unt to Schofield, October 28, 1862, Of'fic:lial Records!) i, XIII', 
P• 327. . . 
27 Ibido, PPo 327•3280 
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General Blunt and General Schofield were both elated over the suoeess 
ot Federal arms at the Fort Wayne engagement and equally optimistic about 
the :f'tlture. Blunt predicted the Confederates would be unable to recoup 
their losses and gave a glowing report ot a contemplated advance to Fort 
Smith, Arkansas, which he would seize and hold with minimum effort. The 
Kansas general assured his superiors he could secure most of' the Indian 
Territory and allow additional ref'u.gee Indians, unhappily existing in 
Kansas, to return to their homeso General Schofield agreed with the 
estimates or his subordinate and felt the Federal Indian regiments alone 
28 co1;1ld pacify and defend the Indian oountryo · 
The aftermath of the Confederate defeat at Fort Wayne found General 
Cooper most apologetic over the lack of fight displayed by his soldierso 
As is the case with most vanquished commanders, he had many excuses tor 
the poor showing of the Confe~erate Indian Brigade. He blamed General 
Ra.ins for removing all the white infantry regiments from the command prior 
to the Federal attacko Cooper insisted that the order to invade Kansas 
placed his forces in a position where they could not adequately provide 
for defense. He said the slow oonoentration of' Indian soldiers precluded 
an available force ready to meet all contingencies• and that poor equip-
ment and improper rations were responsible for his troops being physically 
unfit to withstand the Federa;t assaulto 29 
Apparently none of the individual Confederate commanders made any 
effort toward giving direction and control to the hapless Southern forces 
at Fort Wayne. Cooper stated illness of an undefined nature had forced 
28schofield to Curtis, October 24, 1862, Blunt to Schofield, October 
24, 1862, ibido, PPo 759-760, 7600 
29cooper to Newton, Ootober 2.5, 1862 11 ibide, pp. 331 ... :332. 
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him to relinquish command a.t the time of the engagement, but he was vague 
a.bout the officer who actually had charge of the troops in the eombat 
area.. Lieutenant Colonel M.W. Buster, commanding a Texas oavalry bat-
talion, was listed by Cooper as the officer in charge, but Cooper was 
present in the enoam:pmento In a postscript to the official report, 
General Cooper said that Colonel ~tie was also exercising command while 
he was sick, and the Cherokee colonel, by his own admission, was present 
and involved in the engagemento30 
Two months after the action at Fort Wayne General Cooper completely 
excused himself and his men for the defeat. He viewed the skirmish at 
that date as a Confederate victory, since the loss of the artillery was 
compensated for by what he reported as heavy casualties sustained by the 
attacking Federal forces. Cooper was lavish in his praise for Colonel 
Watie and his regiment for their successful rear-guard activities and for 
the Choctaw and Chickasaw regiment 0 s tenacious fighting. Uniquely, a 
member of the Choctaw unit saw the actions of his regiment in a muoh 
different light. He reported in pidgin English that most of the regiment 
fled from the fight ignoring the commands of their officers, and that 
"Choctaw he no stop til way off, pass big prairieo" This clearly indi-
cates that members of this unit were leaders in the retreat from the en-
,gagement. 3l 
Both sides were highly inaccurate in the calculation of oasua.lties, 
and the figures of killed and wounded were exaggerated to prove the 
30cooper to Newton, October 25, 1862 11 watie to Cooper, October 25, 
1862, ibid., PP• 332, 336-337. 
31cooper to Hindman, December 15, 1862, ibid., PPo 332-335; "Indian-
Pioneer History," XLII, pQ 89, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Histori-
cal Soci.ety. · 
70 
validity •f' the.reports. The Confederate oCi>lll?U.nd had suf'.tered severely-, 
siMe Cooper only paused at the Fort Gibsen-Fort Davis area, ancil then 
continued the withdrawal south to Scullyvill'• located deep in the Chectaw 
Nation. 
The cemmander e:t Co:ntederate forces in the Trans ... }ti.ssissippi Depart-
ment, Majer General Thadeus H. Holmes, presented additional facts about 
Fort Wayne in his November repert w the .Cen:f'ederate war Departm.ento .Ac-
eerding tG him, Cooper was tetally- responsible tar the actio:m.s of the Con-
federate soldiers during and af'ter the engagemento The Indian oemm.ander 
was aoeused of not cont:N>]J.ing his men because he was incapacitated from 
the effects.of alceholo Cooper and Rain~ were charged by Holmes as being 
incompetent due to their intemperate drinking habits)2 
General Curtis, the coaander of' the Missouri Department, was pleased 
with the success of Blunt9 s co~nd, and he was also optimistic ever the 
early- liberation of' the Indian Territory.. But his cautious nature and his 
fear of a eonsolidated Confederate army attacking his divided forces along 
the Hissouri-A.rkansas-InQian Te:rrite:ry herder severely curtailed-the plans 
and ambitiens of' his su.bord:lna:t.es, Sclui:ifield and Blunt., The timidity- of 
Curtis shackled tbe Army ef the Frentier inte inactivity and gave the hap-
less Confederate ~ommand in the Indian Territory an oppertunity- to recover 
parti8:1,1Y :frem their previous losses,)3 
The Army of the Frentier spent the winter ef 1862 in Arkansas trying. 
to maintain contact with the dwindling Cenfederate command er General 
Holmes. The First Divisien was positioned in the nerthwest cerner of the 
32Holmes to Secretary of' War, November 1.5, 1862, Otf'ieial Records, i, 
mI, P• 918. . 
3'.3cartis to Halleck;,- October 24, 1862, Curtis to Sohofiel<f, Oetober 
2.5, 1862, ibid., PPo 324 ... 325, 7930 
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state, and General Blunt, disgusted with his wary department commander, 
sent far-reaching patrols throughout most of the. Chero~ee country. The 
majority of these reconnaissance efforts were made by Colonel Phillips 
and his newly organized Third Federal Indian Regiment. Phillips was re-
sponsible for the organization of the new Indian unit, and had been 
34 promoted to his new rank as a reward for his serviceso 
The Indian Territory north of the Arkansas River was a barren land 
because of the extensive military operations and the torrid weather which 
had occurred there the preceeding summero It was impossible for any 
sizable Confederate force to maintain itself on the country, and the 
Federal regiments which moved in temporarily could stay only as long as 
sufficient supplies were transported to themo The Third Federal Indian 
Regiment, filled with former Confederate Cherokees, had a vested interest 
in remaining in their homeland, and their commander, Colonel Phillips, 
used all plausible excuses compatible with military neoess:iity to defer to 
their wishes. 
There were some positive advantages to be gained by the presence of 
the Federal unit in the Indian country o The extensive salt works on the 
Illinois River were worked by the Indian ioldiers and provided this 
valuable commodity for the entire First Division and for the inhabitants 
of the area. Fort Gibson, which dominated a large part of the Cherokee 
Nation, was occupied intermittently by the Federalso This prevented the 
post from falling into the hands of the Confederates who occupied Fort 
Davis on the opposite side of the Arkansas Rivero35 
34schofield to Blunt, October 25, 1862, Blunt to Schofield, November 
9, 1862, ibid., pp~ 763-?64, 7850 
35 Blunt to Schofield, November 9, 1862, ibido, P·o 7850 
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There was minimum activity by Federal forces in the Indian Terri toey 
during November and most,of December, 18620 An important battle oo-
curred at Prairie Grove, Arkansas, on December 7, however, which caused 
Confederate hopes in Arkansas and the Indian Territory to drop even 
lowero The Army of the Frontier, commanded by General Blunt in the ab-
sence of General Schofield, defeated the First Corps of the Confederate 
Army of the West, comm.anded by General H.indm.ano Once again the aggres-
siveness of the Kansas general and luck combined to produce a significant 
Federal viotory.36 
Three weeks after Prairie Grove, General Blunt returned Colonel 
Phillips to the Indian ocm.ntry, but this time the Third Federal Indian 
Regiment was properly reinforced with elements from the Sixth Kansas 
Cavalry Regiment and one section of an artillery battery. This strong 
Federal force did not stay on the north side of the Arkansas as before, 
but boldly crossed the water barrier on December 27 and attacked Con-
federate forces located at Fort Daviso The defenders, comm.anded by 
General Cooper, were easily dislodged and driven eastward toward Fort 
Smith. After a short pursuit, the Federal soldiers returned to the 
abandoned Confederate post and burned it to the groundo The ten acre 
station, with its extensive barracks and warehouses built- in the :fall of 
1861, was totally destroyeda37 
In November of 1862 the Department of Missouri was subdivided into 
36sehofield to Curtis, January 1, 1863, ibida, i, XXII, pto 2, Po 60 
_37Foreman, ! HisU:>r;y: _,2! Oklahoma, Po 114; Cartis. to Ha11eok, January 
2, 1863, Phillips to C11rtis 11 January 19, 1863 5 ,Official Records, i, XXII, 
ft. 2,-PP• 7, 61; "Indian-Pioneer History," IV; PPo 363-364, Indian 
Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society; Marion Stuart Brooks, 
"The History of the Indian Territory Du.ring the Civil Wilr" (Unpublished 
Master of Arts Thesis, University of Oklahoma, Norman11 Oklahoma, 1917), 
p. l?j. Hereinafter cited as Brooks 11 "The History of the Indian Terri-
tory Daring the Civil War.,tt 
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districts to simplify administrative procedures in the large and cumber-
some Federal command. The various generals of the Arm::, of the Frontier 
were given additional supervisory duties over these areas. General 
Blunt was appointed commander of the Kansas District, and General Scho-
field was named commander of a smaller district in southwest Missourio38 
General_ Schofield reorganized the brigades ~r Blunt0 s First Di-
vision in January, 1863, and created an entirely new Third Brigade. 
Under the command of Colonel Phillips, it was called the Indian Brigadeo 
The new unit had some white soldiers, including a battery of artillery 
and one battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment, but its main 
fighting strength was the three Federal Indian regiments. The new 
brigade was given the mission of establisliing itself along the Arkansas-
Indian Territory border to provide protection for the Union inhabitants 
living there. Colonel Phillips was also appointed commander of the 
Western Arkansas and Indian Territory distriots.39 
Colonel Phillips had a personal interview with General Schofield 
two days after the Indian Brigade was created. Schofield outlined the 
instr11otions Phillips was to follow in policing and patroling his newly-
assigned districts. ·rn addition to the major tasks of pro-Viding pro-
tection and coping with Confederate guerrilla bands, the new brigade 
commander was to fnrnish food for the Indians living in the countryo He 
was also to make a concerted effort to win back the allegiance of tribes 
which had joined the Confederaoyo Colonel Phillips was allowed wide 
380eneral Order, Departmentof Missou.ri 9 November 2, 1862, Official 
Records, i, XIII, P• 7770 
39schofield to Curtis, January 6, 1863, Schofield to Weer, January 
8, 186:,, General Order, Department of Missouri, January 13, 1863;, ibid., 
PP• 22, 26-27, 40; Wiley Britton, "Some Reminiscences of the Cherokee 
People," Chronicles !! OklahGma, V (June, 1927), p. 182. 
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latitude in accomplishing these specific duties, and General Schofield 
apparently placed a great deal of confidence in the ability of' this sub-
ordinate.40 
Phillips had anticipated Schofield's instru.etions to encourage the 
defection of Confederate Indianso :Dl.ring the December raid which de-
stroyed Fort Davis, Phillips had indirectly contacted Creek Colonel D.N. 
Mcintosh, who according to informants, was anxious to sever his re-
lationship with the Southern stateso Colonel Phillips and the dis-
affected chief did not talk personally, but it was clear Mcintosh was 
more than ready to change sides. In fact, the eagerness intimated forced 
Phillips to caution the Indian colonel to be patient until Federal forces 
were strong enough to provide protection against Confederate re-
prisals.41 
Du.ring the same foray across the Arkansas River, Phillips obtained 
indications of dissatisfaction among .the Choctaws. He believed that even 
though this Indian nation had a majority who strongly supported the Com-
federate cause, there was a significant minority who were ready to re-
turn to their treaty obligations with the United Stateso This was prob-
ably an erroneous opinion on the part of Phillips, for research has not 
substantiated the information he reoeivedo The horrors of war had not 
been forced on this tribe in 1862. The Choctaw regiments had been 
primarily stationed in their own country» and they had not been ex.posed 
to the rigors of a prolonged campaign, which was always a key factor in 
40schofield to Phillips, January 11, 1863, Official Records 1 i, XXII, 
Pt. 2, P• 33. 
41Phillips to Curtis, January 19, 1863~ Schofield to CUrtis, January 
6, 1863, ibido, PP• 61, 22; Brooks, "The History of the Indian Territory 
Dllring the Civil War," PPo 1?3-174; Thoburn and \\fright 9 Oklahoma:! 
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making Indian soldiers dissatisfied with their loto Th.e clandestine 
negotiations with the Creeks and the Chootaws were abruptly terminated 
when General Blunt recalled Phillip's command baok to Arkansas, and 
42 nothing oame <!>f them. 
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The Cherokee Courie il o<!>nvened for long-delayed tribal business at 
Cowskin Prairie on February 4, 18630 This new location, rather than the 
oapital of Tahlequah, was a precautionary measureo The Indian Brigade 
was encamped across the border in Arkansas and could provide protection 
against any Confederate attempt to disrupt the meetingo All Southern 
members of the legislative body had been purged the preoeeding August 
after Chief Ross had changed his allegiance. The close proximity of the 
Indian Brigade was convenient for a second reason, since a large ma-
jority of the members of the council were soldiers in the Second and 
43 Third Indian Regiments ~nd were needed to have a quorwno 
The assembly met for several weeks and deliberated on questions which 
were a.xiomatio to the Civil Waro Before it disbanded it gave Ross, the 
absent chief, a vote of confidence, repealed the 1861 Confederate treaty, 
reaffirmed Cherokee ties with the United States, and freed all Negro 
slaves living in the Cherokee Nationo It also reminded the Federal 
government, through Colonel Phillips, of its obligation to insure the 
rapid return of refugee Cherokees living in Kansaso 44 
42Phillips to Curtis, January 19~ 1863, Official Records, i, mI, 
Pt. 2, PP• 61-62; Debo 9 The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Rapublie,.ppo 
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Colonel Phillips had spent nine months of active service with two 
Indian regiments when he assumed command qf the Indian Brigade, and thus 
he was well aware of the capabilities and limitations of Indian military 
organizations. He was determined to use this experience to improve the 
fighting ability of his new brigade. Phillips was most anxious that ad-
ditional white officers be assigned to Indian companies along with white 
orderly sergeants who would handle the administrative details so vital 
for any smooth-f'unotioning military organizationo 45 
The brigade commander knew the value of training and drilling as a 
tool for instilling discipline in troops. He had instituted a policy in 
the Third Indian Regiment which required the unit to have a dress parade 
every day except when they were on actual field dutyo He continued this 
in the larger organizationo Phillips was fully conscious of the de-
leterious effect alcohol had on his ohargesj s~ he took stringent measure~ 
to prevent its importation into his commando To prevent misunderstanding 
of army rules and regulations by the uneducated Indians, Colonel Phillips 
had a long series of general and special orders published. These di-
rectives covered all phases of day-to=day aetivities in the brigade and 
spelled out in simple language what was expeeted of all personnelo In 
the spring of 1863 the efforts of Colonel Phillips to rebuild the Indian 
regiments from the shambles left by the abortive invasion of the pre-
vious summer paid rich dividends. After four months or intensive train-
ing, punotua ted with actual combat operations si the Indian Brigade became 
an efficient and thoroughly coordinated orga.nizationo46 
45Phillips to CUrtis, January 199 1863, Official Recorcls 9 i, XXII, 
Ft. 2, PP• 56-580 
46Ibid., PPo 58-61. 
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The high command of Federal forces engaged in activities in the 
Indian Territory changed drastically during the spring of 1863. General, 
Curtis, the Missouri Department commander, was overly condescending on 
policy matters with General Blunt, the former commander of the Kansas De-
partment. Blunt was now a division commander in the Army of the Frontier. 
General Schofield, the commander of the Army of the Frontier9 was con-
tinually ru.tfied over the undisguised partiality displayed by Curtis 
toward Schofield's subordinate. Schofield, a vain. but capable individual, 
disliked Blunt because of professional jealeu.sy, and the mounting dis-
taste which Schofield developed tor Cllrtis was motivated by the same 
reason. 47 
The dislike Schofield had for m.unt was mutual, for both men were in-
tensely ambitious. The military eareer which Schofield had started at 
West Point. had given him the opportunity to obtain the single star of' a 
brigadier general several months before political connections could gain 
comparable rank for Blunto Ciroumstances soon changed the situation, for 
the engagements at Fort Wayne and Prairie Greve provided the impetus for 
Blunt•s promotion to the coveted two stars or a major general. Schofield 
became intangled in a J!)Olitical struggle in the United States Senate where 
the maneuvers of Senator Lane denied him the confirmatien 0£ bis seeond 
star notwithstanding a presidential nominationo While Blunt was honored 
and praised for his exploits, Schofield, his ego crushed by unfavorable 
Senate action, quarreled and became openly antagonistic with General 
48 Curtis. 
47schofield to CU.rtis, January 1 and '.3s, 1863, Curtis to Schofield, 
January 2, 1863, ibid •. , pp.. 6, 12-13, 7-80 
48John M. Schofield, Forty-§!2s Years !_! !h!, !!!St (New York: The 
Century Co., 1897), p. 64, hereinafter cited as Schofield, Fortya§!! 
Years~ the~; James Go m.unt, "General Blu.nt's Account of His Civil 
War Experiences," Kansas Historical Qu.arterly, I (May, 1932), pp .. 224, 240 .. 
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Gener-1 Halleck, the General-in-Chief of the Army, had never been 
pleased with the efforts or the Missouri Department commander. The dou.bts 
he had concerning the competence and efficiency or CU.rtis were strengthened 
by subtle comments and.suggestions made by Schofield which indicated the 
dep&:rtment commander was not performing his duties in a satisfactory 
mamier. Curtis suspeeted the source of Halleok's Wlc<i>mplimentary and 
harrassing instl'll.otions, ~t he did not want to aoeuse Halleck or un-
ethical .. conduct. Instead of an open confrontation, CU.rt.is counter-
attacked Seho:r:teld for his covert actions with orders which prevented the 
Army of the Frontier from carrying eu.t even limited offensive operations. 
The inactivity became unbearable, and on Febl"l1ary '.3 Sehofielcil appealed to 
the General-in-Chief for• transfero After a two month delay the request 
was apprc,ved, 'bllt not before Curtis had replaced Schofield as army eom-
mander with an available two-star general. 49 
Attar the transfer of General Sehefield 11 Colonel Phillips, in command 
of the almost isolated and almost fergotten Indian Brigade, was placed in 
the llllenviable position of ~eporting to two general officers who had dia-
metrically opposite views as to how he should conduct the affairs of his 
command. As a district commander, Phillips reported directly to General 
Curtis, the department commander .. As a brigade commander, whose unit re-
ceived its supplies from Fort Scott, he a1so reported to General Bl.unt.50 
Blunt had previous experience with the various Indian regiments, and 
as the commander of the now detanet Kansas Department, he had been 
49Schofield to Halleck, January '.31 and Febra.ary 3, 186'.3, General 
Orders, Department.of Missn:ri'j March '.30, 186'.3, Orders, War Department, 
April 7, 186'.3, Offieia1 Records, i, .XXII, Pto 2, PPo 88, 94.-95, 185, 2040 
50m.unt to Phillips, Febl"l1ar;y 23, 186:,, Phillips to Bl.unt, March '.3, 
186'.3, Phillips to Curtis, March 9 and 10, 1863, ibid.,, pp.,_ 121-122, l'.39· 
140, 149-150, 1.51-1520 . 
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initially responsible for Indian recruitment. It was only natural that 
Phillips would seek the assistance of the Kansas general. Blunt had been 
most complimentary @f Indian s@ldiers, and he was obviously sympathetic 
with the problems of the tribes, especially their desire to return to 
their homes in the Indian Territoryo5l 
General Ctlrtis, although not totally unsympathetie 9 exhibited a 
general unconcern toward the Indianso He knew little about the diffi-
culties which the Indian soldiers and their families had endured as a re-
sult of the war. As a former Missouri politician, Curtis was motivated 
primarily by his desire to maintain his position as a department com-
mander. If the Indian Brigade and the destitute families they protected 
had to be sacrificed for the sake of Missouri~ this was regretable, but 
su&ltwe.re the ·fortunes 0f waro.52 
The Indian Brigade commander announced his intentions of changing his 
base of supplies early in March by establishing Fort Gibson as a commis-
sary depot. Phillips planned to fortify the post and occupy it with his 
entire command. He believed there was sufficient grass in the Arkansas 
River valley to sustain his horses, and at Fort Gibson he could prevent 
the Confederates from moving back into the partially subdued Creek and 
Cherokee Nations. Phillips 0 request for the clearance of these plans was 
vetoed by General Curtis~ but when he made a similar appeal to General 
Blunt he received an affirmative reply. Later in March the Indian Brigade 
eo:mmander was informed he should deal.directly with the Kansas district 
commander, since the command structure had been altered and General Blunt 
51Blunt to Phillips 9 March 9~ 1863, Phillips to Blunt9 March 19 and 
21, 1863, ibid., pp. 147-1489 1629 168=1690 
.52eurtis to Phillips, February 179 March 7 and 12 11 1863 11 Phillips to 
Curtis, February 17, 1863~ ibidof pp. 113=114~ 147, 153j 114,...115. 
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was responsible for the Indian Brigade.53 
The Curtis-Soho.field feud planted seeds of distru.st in the mind o.f 
General Halleok, and this, coupled with other reasons, .finally resulted 
in the removal c,f Curtis as Missouri Department o0111111Ander. CUrtis had 
become deeply involved in Missouri state politics, and Governor Hamilton 
R. Gamble had appealed to President Lincoln .for his dismissal. In ad-
dition, Cttrtis had kept large numbers of uneeded troops in Missouri in 
the .face o.f urgent orders from the War Department to reinforce Major 
General U.S. Grant, who was campaigning near Vicksburg, Mississippi. 
Ironically, Curtis was replaced by his arch en.emy General Soho.field, who 
had been promoted to major general with the same date of rank as General 
54 Blunt. 
The Con.federate o:omu.nd stru.oture responsible for the Indian Terri-
tory was also plagued by petty jealousies and unwarranted grievances after 
the summer of 1862. Comm.anders at all levels had to cope with the per-
petual difficulty of incGlllpetent leadership compounded bya critical 
shortage of trained and capable officers. In July, 1862, General Holmes 
was placed in command or the Trans-Mississippi District, which was rede-
signated a department and included the states of Texas, New Mexico, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri and the Indian Territoryo Ge_neral Hindman 
was retained with his former command intact, called the First Corps, Army 
o.f the West. Holmes, aware or the bitter dispute between Hindman and 
53Phillips to Cu.rtis, March 2 and 20, 1863, General Order, Department 
of Missouri, March 30, 1863, ibid., PPo 137-138, 165-166, 185. 
54Halleek to CU.rtis, Febru.ary 10 and 17, March 16, 1863, Curtis to 
Halleck, February 11, May 6 and 13, 1863, CU.rtis to Howland, February 22, 
1863, Hall.eek to St:un.ner, March 17, 186), Halleck to Soho.field, May 13 and 
22, 1863, Lincoln to Soho.field, May 27, 1863, ibido 11 ppo 104, ll'.3 11 156-
157, 107-108, 270, 278, 120-121, 158~159, 277, 290-292, 293; Schofield, 
Forty-~ Years !! ~ !!:!z.11 p .. 66. 
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Pike, attempted to settle the affair by accepting Pike's resignation in 
September, subject to approval by higher authority. He then appointed 
Brigadier General Johns. Roane, a former governor of Arkansas, as com-
mander of the, Indian Territory. General Holmes made the terse but ori ti-
cal c011I111ent that "Roane is useless as a commander, and I have sent him 
to take care of the Indians." Prejudice against red men was not con-
fined to north of the Kansas border.55 
After the debilitating defeat at Fort Wayne, additional Confederate 
command changes involving the Indian Territory became mandatory. Briga-
dier General William. s. Steele, a West Point graduate, was ma.med the com-
mander of the scattered Indian command, replacing Roane who resignedo 
General Hindman, censored by the Confederate Congress for his stern 
measures against the civilian population of Arkansas, broke with General 
Holmes and angrily transferred out of the crumbling department in January, 
1863. On February 9, Lieutenant General Eo Kirby Smith, whose reputation 
as a sueeess.:ful general officer provided the basis for his assignment, 
was appointed supreme commander of all Confederate forces west of the 
Mississippi River. He was unable, however, to stem the tide of reversalso 
The lack or men, money, and equipnent in Arkansas and the Indian Territory 
were obstacles which this capable commander could not overeomeo56 
The charges of inoompetenee against General Cooper, made after the 
55speeiaJ. Order, Adjutant and Inspector General Department, July 16, 
1862, General Order, Trans-Mississippi Department, August 20, 1862 9 
Special Order, Trans-Mississippi Department, September 28, 1862~ Holmes 
to Cooper, October 26, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII, ppo 855, 877, 
883, 898-899. 
56Anderson to Hindman, January 13, 1863, Cooper to Holmes, January 
14, 1863, Special Order, Adjutant and Inspector General Department, 
January 30, 1863, Cooper to Smith, February 9, 1863, Hindman to Anderson, 
February 7, 1863, Holmes to Hindman, February 7, 186'.3, Hindman to Holmes, 
Febru.ary 8, 1863, ibido, XXII, Fto 2, PPo 771, 771-772, 780t 786-787, 784, 
784,. 78.5-786. , 
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Fort 'Wayne defeat, were never brought to trial. He continued limited 
activities under the close supervision of General Steeleo This new com-
mander of Confederate forces in the Indian Territory was hamstrung by 
shortages of every description. He was also troubled with personnel 
difficulties, for numerous Southern Indiansj disgusted because earlier 
promises had not been kept, left their units and returned to their homeso 
Steele accomplished very little in the spring of 1863 toward bringing his 
disorganized and under-manned regiments into suitable condition :for 
field operations in the territory.57 
The boundaries of. the Federal District of Kansas were changed on 
March 30 to include the Indian Territoryo General Blunt immediately 
ordered Colonel Phillips to move his brigade southwest :from Arkansas and 
establish a firm foothold in the Indian country by permanently occupying 
Fort Gibson. The commander of the Indian Brigade needed little encourage-
ment to carry out this order~ since he had been begging to make the move 
for several weeks.58 
The Indian Brigade moved into the Indian Terrltsry in early April, 
much to the satisfaction of the Indian inhabitants. These mistreated 
people were formally told that the brigade would remain permanently in 
the Indian country to provide them with protection and assistanceo Fort 
Gibson was occupied in force, and work was begun to build extensive 
57Anderson to unknown general, December 29, 1862, ibido, Pto 1, Po 
905; Cooper to Hindman, January 8, 1863, Steele to Cooper, January 18, 
1863, Steele to Anderson, January 27, 1863, Crosby to Cooper, January 27, 
1863, Steele to Anderson, March 5, 1863, ibid., Pt. 29 pp. 770, 775 9 776= 
777, 777-779, 794. 
58General Order, Department of Missouri, March 30, 1863, ibid., p. 
185; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahomas ! History ,2!. !:£1.Ei State !!!£· lli People, 
p. 344; Grant Foreman, "The Centennial of Fort Gibson," Chronicles of 
Old.ahoma, II (June, 1924), p. 126; "Indian=Pioneer History," XLIII,Po 
401, Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society. 
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f'ortifioations around the central compound. Cherokee re:fu.gees from Kansas, 
elated over the final liberation of' their lands, returned t.o the terri-
tory in droves. But a sudden attack by a Confederate force on Federal 
troops at Fayetteville, Arkansas, threatened to cancel the ga.ins made by 
Phillips and ~s Indian Brigadeo General Curtis,·timid and fretting in 
Saint Louis while commanding the Missouri Department, ordered the im-
mediate evacuation of the Indian Brigade to counter the Confederate 
activity • .59 
Colonel Phillips, determined to maintain his position, appealed to 
General Blunt to intercede ~th the department commander in behalf' of the 
brigade and their families. After many messages passed between Blunt and 
Curtis, the Kansas general finally informed his superior of the serious 
consequences a withdrawal would causeo If the department commander was 
determiruad to make this change, he would have to assume full responsi ... 
bility for the impairment of the war effort which would automatically 
follow. While Curtis continued to indulge in. slow, painful eogitation, 
the problem was solved by the War Department order which replaced him 
'with Schofield. The new department commander was much more sympathetic 
to the situation in the Indian Territory!) and allowed Colonel Phillips to 
maintai:n his brigade in its forward position at Fert Gibsono~O 
The Indian Brigade was extremely active during April and May in the 
vicinity of' Fort Blunt, the new name Phillips had given Fort Gibsono The 
.59Phillips tC1> Blunt, April 2, 8, 9 and 12, 186:;, Cu.rtis to Phillips, 
April 20, .186:;, Curtis to Blunt, April 23, 186:;, Official Records,· i, 
XXII~ Pt. 2, PP• 1'6-191, 205, 207 ... 208, 211-212, 2301> 244 .. 
:_60Phillips to Blunt, April 24 and 27, 186:;, Phillips to Curtis, 
April 27, 186:;,. Blunt to Curtis, April 29 11 186:;, Blunt to Phillips, 
April' 30, 1863, Schofield to Blunt, May 309 1863 9 ibido, ppo 247-248, 
256, 258, 260-261, 262, 296. 
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brigade had been denied permission to move permanently across the Ar-
kansas River due to a reported Confederate build-up southeast of Fort 
Blunt, but this prohibition exempted patrol actions and. raids. Phillips 
took advantage of these instructions to stage a large scale raid on 
Webber's Falls.61 
The mission of the Federal operation was to prevent the assembling 
of the Confederate Cherokee Council which had scheduled a meeting for 
April 25 in this small Creek Nation community.. The February delibera-
tions of its Federal Cherokee counterpart apparen.tly triggered this be-
lated Southern legislative activity. The oouneil, composed primarily of 
soldiers .from Colonel Watie's Cherokee regiment, mt1st have had important 
business to transact, for Con.federate General Steele moved additional 
troops to Webber's Falls to give its members added protection.62 
Phillips was determined to show the strength of the Federal govern-
ment by preventing the meeting of the Cherokee lalilrl8.kers .. With a strong 
force of 600 Indian and white soldiers, the Union commander made an all-
night, thirty. ,mile foreed march from Fort Gibson on .April 24, and struck 
the Confederate encampment at dawn. Like the engagement at Fort Wayne, 
the Southerners were surprised and fied from the action after a very weak 
defensive effort. This panic was complete, for many of the Confederate 
Indians rode out of their camp in night -elotheso . Casualties were .rela-
tively light considering the number of soldiers actually participating i~ 
the sld.nn.ish. The Confederates had fifteen killed, including two officers, 
6lmunt to Phillips, April 11, 1863, Phillips to Blunt, May 9, 1863, 
ibid., pp. 210, 276r Phillips to CUrtis, April 26, 1863, ibido, Pt. 1, 
pp. 314-315. 
62Phillips_to CUrtis, April 26, 1863, ibid. Po 315; Abel, The,J\m.eri-
~'· -Indian as'· Participant.!! 2, Civil War, po 2h; Foreman, ! 1:l!ft'o:ey· !!. 
Oklahoma, p:-i17.. · 
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and many wounded. Colonel Phillips reported two killed and ten wounded. 
The Federal force pursued the frightened Confederates for only a short 
distance, then returned and destroyed the Southern campo Conflicting 
reports indicated the council meeting was either canceled or postponed 
until later in the yearo63 
On May 20 Missouri Colonel J$TQ Coffee, comm.anding a mixed force of 
Confederate Arkansas, Missouri, and Indian unitsi made a raid across the 
Arkansas River. The ultimate objective of the foray is not-definitely 
known, but due to the size of the force it is unlikely that they in-
tended to assault the extensive works at Fort BJ.unto An attack on an 
approaching Federal supply train also seems improbable t for the trains 
were heavily guarded and the Southerners were too close to Fort Blunt to 
risk a stationary ambusho The probable purpose of the Confederate patrol 
was to capture the stock which were grazing about five miles from the 
Federal post. 64 
The raiders managed to get across the river without detection and 
were successf'u.1 initially in overpowering the guards around the Federal 
herd. Phillips reacted rapidly to the Confederate attack, and dispatched 
a force to intercept the Confederates as they were moving the captured 
animals toward the ford at Webber 0 s Fallso Coffee 0 s men established a 
defensive position to withstand the Federal counterattack, and in the 
63Phillips to Curtis, undated, Phillips to Blunt, May 9, 1863, .Q!.-
fioial Reoords, i, XXII, Pto 1, ppo 31.5 9 316; Wiley Britton, Memoirs!!, 
the Rebellion .2 ~ Border, 1863 (Chica.go: Cushing, Tpomas and Coo, 
ISB'2J, PP• 226-227, hereinafter oi ted as Bri. tton, Memoirs of the_ Re~ 
bellion. on .!!!. Border, 1863; Wiley Bri tton9 l'h!, Union Indian Brl'ade a:a 
the Civi1war (Kansas City~ Franklin Hudson Publishing. Coo, 1922 , Po 
222, hereina?ter.oited as Bri.tton, ~ Union Indian Brigade; Abel, ~ 
American Indian as Participant!.!'.!~ Civil War9 Po 27L 
64Phillips to Blunt, May 22, 186Jll Official.Records 2 i, XXII, PtQ 1, 
P• 337; Abel, The .American Indian !:.!. Participant in. the Civil !!:!:,, PPo _ 
271-272; Foreman, "The Centennial of Fort Gibson," Chronicles of Oklahoma 9 
II, p. 126. --
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process lost some or the captured horses. The Southerners were able to 
halt the onrushing Federals, and even succeeded in driving them back 
toward Fort mu.nt. Phillips threw additional men into the .fight, and 
these reinforcements, led personally by the brigade commander, slowly 
forced the Confederates to recross the river .. 65 
Federal casualties were about twenty ... five killed or missing .. The 
Southern force lost an equal number or men.. The Union commander in-
sisted that he had won a signal victory, but this claim is highly 
questionable if the mission of the raid was to capture Federal horses .. 
The Confederates were able to take approximately three hundred horses and 
mles belonging to the Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment back across the Ar-
kansas. Since Colonel Phillips was critically short of cavalry at this 
time, this loss, not mentioned in his official dispatch, made his re-
connaissance and security tasks even more difficult.66 
General Schofield and General Blunt renewed their quarrel with vigor 
in June when the Missouri Department commander split the District of 
Kansas into two parts. munt was removed from his headquarters at Fort 
Leavenworth and was relegated to a small and insignificant commando 
Called the District et the Frontier11 it was composed of the lower half of 
Kansas, a few oounties in western Arkansas, and the Indian Territory .. 
This change was bitterly resented by Blunt and his champion, Senator Laneo 
The lucrative arm.v contracts would now be granted to the LeavenWGrth 
merchants by another general, who WGuld be either honest. or if' otherwise 
inclined, would require remuneration for himself. There would be nothing 
65Phillips to Blunt, May 22,-186J,.Official Rec0rds, i, XXII, Pto 1, 
PP• 337-338; Britton,.!!:!.!. Union Indian Brigade, PP• 230-2320 
66 ·. . . . ,•-.. . 
munt to Phillips, May 30, 1863, Of'ficiaLReeords9 .. i., I.XII, Pto 2, 
PP• 297-298; Britton• Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, 1863, PPo 
257-258. - - . - -
for the large group or Kansas politicians under the control and pa-
tronage Cl)f Senator I,aneo67 
8? 
This loss or responsibility and prestige caused General Blunt to be 
all the more anxious to gain another smashing victory in the fieldo He 
began immediate plans to personally take charge of the troops in his 
command, which included the Indian Brigade, and to attempt to recover 
the power he had losto At the same time, his superior and rival General 
Schofield, initiated actions to delve into the activities or the Kansas 
general in an effort to bring a.bout his down.t"allo 
The slow but steady increase of Federal strength in the upper 
portions of the Indian Territory in the spring of 1863 could not be 
checked by the feeble efforts of the Conf'ederate Indian ~ommando The 
internal struggles in the Federal hierarchy had delayed but never stepped 
the buildup which ultimately resulted in the permanent occupation of Fort 
Blunt by the Federal Indian Brigadeo The hopes of Confederate General 
Steele for a full-scale Southern offensive failed to materialize due to 
serious supply and personnel shortages o The probability of another 
Federal invasion, this time sou.th of the Arkansas River, became more and 
more a distinct possibilityo Demonstrations er Federal power at Webber0 s 
Falls and around Fort munt caused grave misgivings among the Indian 
nations still professing allegiance to the Southern cause. Yet nothing 
could be done to stop the inevitable. The Confederate Indians could only 
wait. 
67schofield to Halleck, June 1, 1863, General Order, Department of 
Missouri, June 9, 186;, Schofield to Blunt, June 10, 1863, Officia1-
;Records, i, XXII, Ptio 2, PPo )02, 315; Castel, ! Frontier State ll ~' 
pp. 15Z...155. . 
CHAPTER IV 
THE UNION EMERGES VICTORIOUS 
The Federal victories at Webber0 s Falls and Fort Blunt in the late 
spring of 1863 had been serious blows to Confederate ambitions for the 
recapture of the northern portion of the Indian Territoryo The invinci-
bility of Federal arms had thoroughly discouraged the Confederate Indians, 
and their lack of supplies and equipment had ma.de them all the more re= 
l uetant to intensi.fy their efforts to drive the Federal invaders out of 
the Cherokee and Creek Nationso 
The Federal Indian Brigade, which. had occupied Fort Blunt in April, 
was firmly entrenched behind massive fortifications and contained suf= 
fioient troops to def end the position agains·t. either a frontal assault or 
a prolonged seigeo Refugees from the various tribes had returned in 
large numbers from Kansas and Texasj and were beginning to resettJ.e on 
their farms and plant cropso The situation was outwardly most favorable 
for the conquest of the Conf'ederate-~ontrolled terrl tioiry south of the 
Arkansas Rivero 
There were serious difficulties faeing C0lonel Phillips as he sought 
to stabilize the Indian country, although the extent of these perplexities 
were unknown to his Confederate enemieso These problems were of suf-
ficient magnitude to oause him great anxiety~ yet his superiors did not 
take the necessary steps to correct the more glaring deficiencieso Their 
unwillingness to act caused fright:f'ul hardships for the Federal soldiers 
defending the Indian Territory~ and this lack of support by· higher military 
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authorities forced the civil population of the country to exist under even 
more miserable oonditionso 
Not a small part of the lethargy was due to the continuing struggle 
for power between General Schofield and General Blunto Their fight had 
been resumed shortly after S~hofield replaoed Curtis as commander of the 
Missouri Department and continued without abatement for several monthso 
Neither of these offi~ers was willing t0 all~w the war eff~rt to take 
precedent over their attempts to put the other in an unfavorable lighto 
Schofield, as the department @ommander and friend of the General=in= 
Chief, had a decided advantage (())Ver his opponent 9 and he used his po-
si ticm whenever he had the opportunity o 
In mid-June, l863j General Schofield initiated a form.al investiga-
tion of the supply proicedures of General Blunt9 s Kansas District in an 
attempt to prove f~aud against the g~vernmento This direct attack on the 
Kansas general f~llowed the reshuffling of the boundtl!l.ries · (Q)f the di:stri@t 
one week earlier, whieh had removed Blunt from his headquarters at Fort 
Leavenworth. The formal request to the War Depar·tment ~arried a stigma 
of dishonesty that was seYverely damaging to Blurl't.0 s reputati(:)l'l whether 
1 or not actual proof was discoveredo 
At the same time that the investigati~n was started~ Blunt became 
embroiled in a jurlsdicrtional dispute with a quartermast,er offioer at 
Fort LsavenWIO):lftho This affair~ which gave substanele to the charges of the 
department commander» was slowly f~rwarded through official. ohannels un~ 
til it reached the War Department. General Halleck backed up Schofield's 
contention that supply and quartel'lll.aster transaotions were independent of 
lschofield to Townsend, June 15~ 186:, (~rroneOJusly dated Jul;rl5) 9 
Official Records~ i, XXII, Fto 2, pa 3190 
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control of the district eommanderso He refuted Bl.unt•s claim to the con-
trary and said that supply officers could not be ordered to carry out in-
structions which were in oppc,sition to the over-all logistical plans for 
2 i-a department or district. 
General Blunt, unaware or the pending imrestigat.ion of army eon,.. 
tracts at Fort Leavenworth., discovered the existence of the damning in-
quiry in late July after he had begun the summer oampaign in the Indian 
Territoryo He completely disregarded normal army procedures of com= 
mu.nication in his oounter,.a.ttaok, and he challenged his accuser by di-
reet correspondence with Secretary of War Sta.ntono His vituperative 
letter was filled with oounter-aoousations against Schofieldo According 
to Blunt, Schofield was respons:i.ble for numerous failures which not only 
caused him grave injustice but also seriously damaged the successful. 
3 conduct of the war in the Westo 
Schofield was not the only villain involved in the plot which Blunt 
said was aimed at his downfall .. The Governor or Kansas, Thomas Carney, 
and: the Su.perintel'ldent or the Southern Indian Tribes, Colonel Coffin, were 
also attacked and called robbers tor their actions which had defrauded th~ 
refugee Indianso Several. commissary officers at Fort Leavenwor~:,·V"en:•e 
... ~ .. 
charged with abuse of their powers and general misappropriation. er 
government .funds and propertyo The incensed general concluded his re-
marks with a veiled threat that he would no't, push his efforts to right 
these wrongs at present because or the pressing problems of commando Bu.t 
as soon as the war was brought to a sucoess:ful conclusion these "base 
2Easton to Allen, June 18, 186:,, ibido, 326 .. 327; Castel,:! Frontier 
... st .... a ... t ... e ~ !!!:, pp.. 154-1550 -
3B].unt to Stanton, July 26, 186;, Official Reoords,.i, XXII, Pto 2, 
PP• 398-3990 
.. 
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caluminators shall be called to an aooou:nto n4 
The pressing problems of command or the District of the Frontier, as 
Blunt's new area of responsibility was called, continued to disturb him 
after he bad presented his case to the Secretary of War. The weather in 
the Indian Territor1 was unbearably hoto The comm.and was relatively alone 
in a barren country, and the all-important sapply system was not function ... 
ing smoothlye Confederate bands constantly threatened the road between 
Fort Blunt and Fort Scott9 and a signifioant percentage of his available 
manpower was occupied with escort duty for the supply trains o As an 
added difficulty, Blunt was aff1ioted wlth a fever-producing disease, 
probably malaria, which partially incapacitated him du.ring the months of 
July and Augusto5 
On July 31 the Kansas general, smarting under what he considered un-
justifiable attacks, blasted another of his arch foes~ This was Governor 
Carney of Kansas, whom he blistered in a letter to President Lineolno 
Similar in content to the one addressed to the Secretary of War, Blunt 
demanded that the President bring his assailants to bay. The indignant 
district commander portrayed himself as a general acting alone, command-
ing a force much smaller than his rank required, and fighting fer justice 
against all the forces or evilo He mentioned his precarious position and 
gave the distinct impression that he would fight the Conf'ederates, thcu.gh 
heavily outnumbered, and either aohieve a Federal victory or die de= 
fending the flank 0t the Union in the Indian Territor.ro6 
4Ibid., P• '.399. 
5strength Report, June JO, 1863, Curtis to March, July 22, 186'.3, 
Blunt to Schofield, July 30, 1863, Blunt to Curtis, August 19, 1863, ibido 9 
PP• 342, 392, 411, 46J. 
6Blunt to Lincoln, July :31, 186'.3, ibid.,, i, UII, PPo 56.S.,.5670 
92 
President Lineoln's reply to the acrimonious charges of Blunt is an 
outstanding example of a moderate and understanding Chief Executive at-
tempting to give the divergent factions of the Federal government di-
reoticm and stability. He acknowledged that Governor Carney had given 
him. some papers eonoerning Blunt6 s activities, but he had been unim-
pressed with them. He added that since he had planned no action he would 
not bother to look at them againo With the patience of a parent mildly 
reproaching a wayward ohild, President Lincoln cautioned the fiery 
general that he was too free with accusations concerning his persecutors 
and that this was not the proper attitude for a person vested with great 
responsibilityo In essence~ Lincoln told General Blunt to do the best he 
could with the foroes he had available and not to worry about vague com ... 
plaints and eharges from other peopleo7 
.After the initiation of the investigation of alleged supply irregu-
larities in Blunt's district, General Schofield did little further to 
antagonize his opponento Apparently he felt this was unnecessary since 
Blunt• s sharp responses would cause sufficient agitation to keep all ' 
civil and military officials properly appraisedo This aloofness was 
typical of the Missouri Department eomm.anderi for as a military officer 
who fil'!lll.y advocated a bearing of decorum and reserve, he did not want to 
indulge in undignified and name-calling activities which most politicians 
seemed to enjoy. 
General Schofield was cognizant of the attitude of officials in 
Washington oonoerning the war in the Westo He knew the border conflict 
between scattered bands of white and Indian soldiers was relatively in= 
significant to the nation9 s political and military pla.nnerso His role as 
7Lincoln to Blunt, August 18, 1863 9 ibido 9 Po 5670 
a department commander was to fight a holding aotion, and by keeping a 
maximum number of Con:t'ederate troops occupied with a minimum number of 
Federals, he would substantially advance the cause or his country. He 
93 
followed this policy with complete rigidity, and his efforts brought the 
8 praises of his friend and superior, General Halleeko 
General Blunt took an entirely different approaeho One reason for 
his attitude was his ambitiono Schofield could afford to be less ag ... 
gressive, for he had attained a positicn of importance, but Blunt, al-
th<i>ugh of equal rank, had been banished ta an ou:t.post whieh offered little 
opportunity for glory and advaneemento This was gallingj since only a 
few months before Blunt had been aoolaimed as the hero of Prairie Grove 
and was given the distinction of becoming the first major general frem 
Kansas. 9 
Another reason for General Blu.nt0 s insistence on initiating offen~ 
sive operations in the Indian Territory was his zealous desire to pre-
serve the Union and punish the Confederateso His belief in the abolition 
of slavery was also a motivating factor in his intense dislike for the 
South. The only way to eliminate this malignant praotioe, he believed, 
was by reducing the slaveholder to obedienee by the swordolO Closely 
related to all of these reasons was the condition of his mindo Although 
not insane, his mental processes took a much more erratic course than 
8Halleok to Schofield, July 7, 1863, ibido, 1, XXII 9 Pto 2, p. 355; 
Castel, ! Frontier State .!.'.!?. ~, .PPo 96-97. 
9 mtmt, •. "GeneraLBluntv s Accnnt or His Civil War. Experiences," 
Kansas Historieal Qua.rterll, r~ Po 221:n~ Castel 9 A Frontier state At 
!!!.!:, pp. 100-lOlo - -
lOHopkins, .. "James Go Blunt and the Civil Warll" po 128; Castel, ! 
Frontier State !.]. J!!t, ppo 82 ... 830 
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could have been expected had he been completely normal.11 
Since mid-May Colonel Phillips and his Indian Brigade had maintained 
their position at Fort Blunt against what appeared to be a steady build-
up of Confederate forces across the Arkansas River. Like most of the 
Federal comm.anders who had fought in the Indian country, the threat of 
Confederate attack, though serious, was not the major cause of alarmo 
Supplies and the tenuous link of wagons that traveled intermittently from 
Fort Scott to Fort Blunt provided the main source of oonoerno Phillips 
was a1so saddled with the additional burden of feeding a large number of 
Indian refugees who had returned to the Indian Territory confident they 
would receive proper care from the Federal foroes occupying the area.12 
General Blunt moved his headquarters to Fort Scott, some 124 miles 
southeast of Fort Leavenworth, during the third week of June. Dispatches 
from Colonel Phillips were waiting for him when he arrived at this 
forward depot. These reports announced in pointed terms the increase of 
enemy strength and the serious supply difficulties. The district com-
mander made an estimate of the situation, then decided Phillips was in-
deed in danger, and asked General Schofield for reinforcementso Blunt 
declared his intention to take personal control of the forces in the 
11:sy the early summer of 1863, Blunt was exhibiting symptoms of the 
mental disorder which ultimately resu.lted in his commitment to amenta+ 
institu.tion and his eventual deatho He was convinced that there was a 
conspiracy in the military establishment and in Kansas which, separately 
and in combination, was. seeking to disgrace him and bring about his re. 
moval from command. He could not endure opposition at an.y level, and he 
stnck out at anyone who disagreed with his plans and ideas. Castel, A 
Frontier State at War 11 p. 83; Hopkins, "James G. Blunt and the Civil war," 
p.127. --
12Phillips to Blunt, May 15, 31 and June 6, 1863, Official Records, 
i, XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 283-284, 298, 310-311; U.S., Congress, House, Report 
.!!.~ Seeretaiz of Interior g~ft~' 38th Cong., lst Sesso (Washington~ 
Government Printing Office, 1. ··· · ~ Executive Document Number l~ PPo 144~ 
14_5. Hereinafter cited as U.S. , Co.ngress, House~ Report .2!, ~ Secretary 
!!., Interior 1863. 
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district, but due to the steady increase of Confederate forces, he indi-
eated this wou.ld be hazardous without additional troops. Blunt also de-
sired additional units commensurate with his rank, for he had made a 
similar proposal for the return of several Kansas cavalry units in Maye 
Yet Blunt was concerned about the smallness of the force at Fort Blunt, 
and his repeated ass11rances of pending reinforcements to Colonel Phillips 
are ample testimony to this fact~l3 
One of the units which General Blunt had promised Colonel Phillips 
was the newly organized First ICansas Colored Infantry Regimento · Re-
er11i ted by Sena.tor Lane and outfitted at Fort Scott9 this unit was com-
posed of liberated slaves from Missouri, Arkansas, and the Indian Terri= 
to:ry. There had been considerable public resistance, even in Kansas, to 
the enlistment of Negroes to fight against white Southerners. Elsewhere 
in the Union, the disapproval or this idea was so strong that the Lincoln 
administration moved quite cautiously in this untried and unpopular under-
taking. This Kansas unit, which had white officers, was finally approved 
by the War Department, and the task of training and equipping these former 
slaves was oarl"ied out 'l'Ulder the supervision of General Blunt and other 
abolitionists who eagerly sought commissions in the u.nito After a 
period of several months, th~ regiment was moved to Baxter Springs, Kansas, 
' ' 
sixty miles south of Fert Scott .. Here it continued training and also 
acted as escort for supply trains returning to the Kansas depot from Fort 
Blunt.14 
Colonel Phillips showed a decided change of attitude after the Indian 
lJBl'l'lllt to Chipn.an, May 14, 186'.3 11 Bl.unt to Phillips, May 30, 1863, 
Phillips to Blu.nt, June 6, 1863, Blunt to Schofield, June 26, 1863, Of-
ficial Records, i, XXII, Pto 2, pp .. 279-280, 297-298, 311, 337-3380 ~ 
14castel, ! Frontier State !! l!-.!, pp., 90-940 
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Brigade was firmly entrenched at Fort Blunt. He had been extremely con-
fident of his ability to seize and control the Indian Territory. He had 
begged for permission to move into Cherokee country in order to eliminate 
Confederate factions from that area. Once he achieved this long sought-
after goal he became very pessimistic. The failure of supply trains to 
arrive and the reports of Confederate troop strength increases had a 
severe adverse effect on Phillips' normally optimistic attitude.15 
Colonel Phillips also had doubts as to the ability of higher com-
manders and supply facilities to provide proper support for the Fort 
Blunt garrison. This is apparent in his May messages which tell in a 
half-military and half-civilian vernacular of the plight of the Indian 
Brigade. In the May 31 report Phillips allowed himself the satisfaction 
of boastfulness,' although it was hedged with caution. He did not mind 
that the Confederates were massing near Fort Blunt, for this would make 
it easier to defeat them, but ''My position requires the utmost prudence 
and circumspection." In the final paragraph of his message, Phillips 
said, "Again I say that while I make no special appeal, I desire to add 
I ought to be re-enforced speedily. ~,16 
The skirmish at Greenleaf. Prairie on June 16 was the culmination, 
from a Federal point of view, of a ten day cavalry raid by a Confederate 
force. The unit, commanded by Creek Colonel D.N. Mcintosh, was composed 
of Texas and Indian mounted regiments who were to intercept and capture 
supplies coming to Fort Blunt from Kansas. This was the first major at-
tempt of troops under the command of Confederate General Steele to force 
l5Phillips to Blunt, May 9, 15, 31 and June 6, 1863, Official Records, 
i, XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 276-277, 283-284, 298, 310-311. 
16Phillips to Blunt, May 31, 1863, ibido, pp. 310-311. 
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the withdrawal of Federal units occupying the strategic post on the Ar* 
kansas River.17 
Colonel Phillips was aware that several hundred mounted Confederate 
soldiers had crossed the Illinois River on June 6 and had moved off in a 
northerly direction. Due to the poor condition of the horses in Federal 
cavalry units, Phillips did not give chase until he was relatively 
certain of the enemy's general destinationo He suspected an attack on his 
supply line, bat he mistakenly thought this Confederate .. force was joining 
another from Missouri for.a thrast against the Negro regiment at Baxter 
Springs& After dispatching messengers to aler.t this unitj he sent Major 
J.A. Foreman and a strong detachment from the Third Federal Indian Regi-
ment to follow the rapidly moving Confederateso Foreman~s instructions 
were to attack the Southerners if they were numerically equal or in-
ferior. If the enemy force was superior in strength, Foreman was to 
follow and engage them from the rear when they attacked the Negre unit 
at Baxter Springsol8 
At this point, the plans of the Federal and Confederate forces ran 
afoul of terrain conditions and the effect the grueling pace had on their 
under-nourished horseso The rivers in the area were flooded due to re-
oent heavy rains, and most of the aooessible fords were impassableo The 
Confederate force had separated shortly after crossing the Illinois River 
I 
with the intent of rejoining for the assault on the Federal supply column 
in the north.eastern part of the Cherokee Nationo Dile to the high water, 
the divided Confederate detachments were unable to concentrate for the 
coordinated attacko Colonel Mcintosh discovered that his position on 
17Genera.l Report, Brigadier General Willia,.111Steele, February 15i 
1864, ibid., Pt. 11, Po 320 
18phillips to Bluntj June 20 9 1863~ ibido, Po 3480 
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the Grand River near Spavinaw Creek was untenable, and promptly ordered 
his units to return to their base camp. They were to avoid all contact 
with Federal troops known to be in the vicinityol9 
Colonel Mcintosh had originally split his command in an attempt to 
disguise the size of the Confederate force and to facilitate movement 
through the hilly and thiakly ... wooded oountrysideo This separation of 
units was now a distinct disadvantage if either of the smaller elements 
were attacked by the pursuing Third .Federal Indian Regimento The Union 
and Southern forces played a game of hide-and~seek for more than a week. 
Major Forem.an°s command finally made contact with one of the Confederate 
detachments as it tried to ford the Arkansas River at Grand Salineo The 
Confederates withdrew from the eno011nter after suffering three casual-
ties and the loss of some of their provisions. 20 
On June 15 Colonel Phillips received confirmation that the raiders 
had dispersed into two groupso He immediately formed another foree com= 
posed of soldiers from the Second Federal Indian Regiment~ commanded by 
Colonel Stephen Ho Wattleso Its mission was to move rapidly to the east 
. ' 
and trap the withdrawing Confederates in conjunction with Foreman9 s de~ 
tachment& General Cooper saw the intent of this second force, and 
ordered a contingent of Texas and Choctaw soldiers from his base ea:mp to 
make a demonstration in front of Fort Blunt. He hoped this diversion 
would lessen the Federal pressure on those units attempting to get ba~k 
across the river, but the nse was unsuccessfulo Phillips was not de= 
ceived by the mock attack which was noisy but not eonvincingo21 
19Phillips to Blunt, June 20, 1863, General Report 9 Brigadier Gener= 
al William Steele, February 15, 1864, ibido 9 PPo '.3491) 33. 
20Britton, The Civil War on the Border,, IIo ""o 890 
___,.. ~ - --==:m:o -==-= ~ r 
21Phillips to Blunt, June 20 11 1863, Wattles to Phillipssi June L'igJ., 
1863, Official Records, 1, XXII, P'to lj PPo 349 11 3500 
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Colonel wattles did not make ~onta1;1t wi:th the Confederate forces on 
the night of June 15, although his unit passed very olose to one group of 
concealed Southernerso The fol.lowing morning he was informed of their 
location on Greenleaf Prairiej eighteen miles ea.st of Fort Blunto The 
unit immediately retraced its route for an attau::ik 9 and the initial as .. 
sault succeeded in dislodging the C«i»nfederates :from their pQsition along 
a tree lineo The eager Feder&l scldiers pressed thsir pursuitj) but the 
ha.rra.ssed followers of C'Oll@nel Mcintosh sudden.ly stopped 1;1.nd turned on 
their assailantso The Southern soldiers foroed the Federal. troops to 
withdraw to the proteotion of their artillery emplaeed near the Arkansa.s 
River~ twelve miles from Fort Blunto 22 
At this junGture the two Federal deta.ohments were still in a po"' 
sition to trap this Confederate force~ for Foremanis command was behind 
the Southern Indianso After ten days of exhaustive riding 9 and ignorant 
of Wattles 0 recent reversal~ Foreman disrl!l.pted plans by abandoning the 
ahaseo Colonel Phillips was moist unhappy at this premat'lllre disengage= 
ment, but he was determined to destroy the enemy f~rceo He therefore 
sent an addi ticmal 500""man detachment 9 m©urrted on anything they c@uld 
ride 9 to reinforce "Wa.ttles for one further &tta~k on the Conf'eder&teso 23 
Reports of Foreman° s return to Fort Blunt ~ai:used Colonel Wattles to 
become faintheartedo After a hurried ~onferen~e with his sub~rdinates 9 
he ordered his command to withdraw also to Fort Bluntj thus disobey:ing 
the implfoit instructi(ii)ns from Phillips to maintain his positi((D)no "Wrl.en 
Phillips discovered this willful insubordinatic,n he was irate and had the 
guilty colonel relieved on the spot9 but their prey had es~apedo The 
22Phillips to Blunt 9 June 20~ 1863 9 W&1ttle:s to Phillips 9 June L!<iJ~ 
1863, ibid"\} PPo 350~ 3.51.o 
23Britton~ ~ Civil ~ £E, .El_~ Bordeir9 IIj PPo 89=90o 
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Confederates eluded the pursuing Federals and finally re~rossed the Ar00 
kansas River at Webber~s Falls, fifteen miles south and east of Green= 
24 
leaf Prairieo 
Neither side could claim a vieto:ryj but the Federal forces, with 
help from the weather, had prevented the Confederate disruption of the 
allmimportant supply lineo Colonel Phillips acknowledged the loss of 
seven men killed, nine men wounded, and five men thought to be captured~ 
He would make no comment about Southern casualties, for there were con-
flicting reports as to their nu.m.berso 25 
.Fifteen days later Con.federate General Steele Qrdered a second at00 
tempt made to halt the flow of supplies and reinforcements to the Indian 
Brigade at Fort Bl.unto This second effort was to be a coordinated opera-
tion, and the commander of the Southern raiders was changedQ Colonel 
Watie was designated as the leader of the r~r~e c~ming fr~m the Elk 
Creek camp, and he was to join f'o:t>e.es with Brlgadie?' Genera1 William Lo 
Cabell who commanded a. brigade or mounted troops from Texas and Arkansaso 
The ohoioe of leaders was a partial improvement over the previous se-
lection, tor the Cherokee,, colonel had a reputation fwr being a skillful 
and aggressive tactioiano General Cabell, on t,he other hei.nd, was rela= 
tively unknown as to combat qualities, a:nd his brigade wei.s tilled with 
large numbers of conscript soldiers who were not ne't.ed fer their fighting 
abilityo 26 
The departure from For·t Scott of a ori tioally ... needed Federal supply 
24phillips to Bluntt June 20~ 1863, Wattles to Phillipsp June Lig]j) 
1863, Of':f.icial Records, ip mI, Pt. 1, pp. :349 ... 350~ 3.50 ... :351. 
25phillips to Blunt9 June 20 9 1863 9 ibido 9 Po 350. 
26General Report 9 Br.igadier General William Steele~ Febr'ttary 159 
1864, ibido, PPo 32-J3o 
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train had been announcedo Phillips, aware that the CG:nfedera.tes wou.ld 
make a maximum effort to intercept the column, sent 600 additional men 
' 
to Baxter Springs to augment the train°s esocrto The primary Federal 
unit or the esoort was the First Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment which 
was moving pe:rmanently to Fort Blunt to reirrl'oroe the Indian Brigadeo 
The co111Dl8.nder of the regim.ent 11 Colomel James Mo Williams, was in oharge 
or the slow-moving oolllllll.no 27 
Colonel Watie established his unit, the Second Cherokee Mounted 
Rifle Regimentt in a pcsit,ion astride the main road on the sO'lllth side ot 
Cabin Creek 9 fifty~tour miles nertheast er Fort Bl.unto The Ccnt"ederate 
plan oalled for the Chel"Clkee unit to ambush the Federal oolmn.n and hold 
it in pla&eo General .Cabelll'ls fGroe, with a sweeping flank attack, would 
destroy the esoort and capture the long line of 200 wagons loaded with 
food and ammunitiono The oonoept was basically soun.d!ol blt hinged @i:fi 
Cabell0 s force being able to ford the Grand River and join in ~a final 
assaulto Once again adverse tel"l"ain conditions prevented Confederate 
plans trom being carried m1to28 
The Cherokee Indians set up the blocking position, but General 
Cabell9s oommand did not participate in ·the enoounter since they could 
.not cross the rivero Apparently Colonel Watie was aware that the CIC ... 
ordinated ettort could not be acoom.;plishedp 'bttt he elected to attack the 
supply train with his unit alone. He obviously thought he eculd either 
win the engagement or prevent.the forward movement cf the Ciclumn to the 
~eleaguered forees at Fort Blunto29 
27Br.t tton, The Civil War ,!! ~ Border9 II9 PPo 92 9 95; Phillips te 
Blunt, J'Ul.y 7, 1'So3,. OffleW Records, i, XXII1,1 Pto lll Po 3780 
28aeneral Report, Brigadier General William Steele 9 FebruEU"Y' 1,5 p · 18649 
ibido, Po 331 Britton, The Civil War om the Border!,) III) PPo 95 .. 960 - .....-c=:i:=:i~--= 
29Ibido11 PPo 96 ... 97., 
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The choice of the ambush site was exGellento The steep banks of 
Cabin Creek were an cbstaole for the loaded wagons and also for any forqe 
attempting to cress the streamo The Cherckee regiment~ numbering 1600 
men, bit without artillery, dttg entrenohments on the south bank and 
waited :f'o:r the Federal oclumn to ar:dveo The supply train reaohed the 
creek on July 1 and was only pa:r'tially surprised by the Confederate at-
taoko Because of high wa.ter, the Federal for~es did not t:i!"Y tl!:ll ~ross 
until the fellowing dayo30 
Colonel Willimn.s used tr>oops ·• from. his Negro regi:mentiil the Third 
Indian Regiment~ and a battali~n cir the Secil!:ilnd Col~rado .Infantry Regiment 
in his first assault attempto Pll:'1.~r to the launching of the Federal at= 
tack, he had his three artillery pieces, looated on the :flan.ks and in the 
center of his line~ fire tor forty minutes on suspected enemy looationso 
This preparation with shot and ~ardster did not have the usual demorali~ 
zing effeot on the Confederate Indian soldiersi probably beoause they 
were in emplacements which ®ffered proteetion. fr·om the close .. range 
oanonading.31 
'When the Federal infantrymen and dismounted Indb.ns a·t,tempted to 
·,· 
onss the stZoeam they were met with w1 thering f'ire fNm the (ill@lnciealed 
Confederate positionso Before the advancing troops had made muoh progr~ss 9 
Major Foreman, who was directing the lead company cf Indians~ was sever$ly 
wounded., 'When his Indian stldiers d:h@~v~ired their leader w~s g®Jnei 9 they 
stopped their advancie and l"etl"eated tr0 theit> <Cllr:l\.ginal :p@si ti~no Cie>lcmel 
Williams replaced the Indian unit with a company from the Ninth Kansas 
'.31Phill.i ps to B111nt 9 July '7 9 186 3 9 Willi&m.s ~ Phillip~ 9 July f"'7 J <u 
1863, Official Reciicirds ~ :l\. 11 XXII)l Pto 1 9 PPo 379 9 J80o 
'.32 Cavalry Regiment and ordered the units to renew their a:t.ta~ko 
The seccmd assault proved w be more suc~essfltll.19 and the leading 
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elements of the Negro regiment established a tooth.old on the south bank 
of the creeko The cavalry compan;rS> which replaced the Indian u:n:it and 
assisted in the second assault, was ordered tci charge the @enter ef the 
Confederate positicno Wnen the dismounted oavalr,ymen ~a~lied eut their 
attack with vigcrll the Confederate soldiers faltered 9 and then br@lke and 
ran for their horses. They were fellowed by' three f'resh oompanies of 
Federal cavalry, but .the pllrsuit was net pushed for fear of jeopardizing 
the safety cf the ma.chGneeded su.pplieso33 
The Federal casualties for the engagement w~re one killed and twenty 
wounded. The estimate of Confederate lesses was fifty killedS) maey 
weunded, and nine prisoners. Colonel W'l.lliams and Colonel Phillips 
praised the treops involved in the aeticn, and Williams pointed out that 
while the to'tal strength of the Federal colmn was greater than the Cion ... 
federate force, only 900 men participated in the assault and pursuito 
Signitioantly, the encounter at Cabin Creek was the first ti.Me the Kansas 
Negro unit had been eomm.itted for a test of its fighting ability, and the 
ex-slaves behaved well under f1re.34 
The defeated Oonfederate roree withdrew in disorder tci>ward the safety 
of their camp o:n Elk Creek, and seme of the frightened Indians 9 attempting 
to f'ord the Grand River, were dro·W.l'led., Ccle:nel Phillips mentioned that 
the bodies of both men and horses were observed :f'loating downstream past 
33ws.lliams .to Phillips, July L-7J, 18631) Phillip!! t.o Blunt.9 July 7, 
186'.3, Official .. Reoords I) 1 9 XXII, pto 11) ppo 380-=,381 9 :3790 
34Wllliams to Phillips 11 July L-7J9 18639 . Phillips tClll BJ.unt, Jul.y 7,, 
1863, ibido9 PPo 3811) 3790 
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Fort Blunto The failure of Colonel Watie 0 s regiment to halt the supply 
train was serious 9 for the reinf'orClements and food which finally arrived 
at the Federal outpost n@t only imprC'lved the morale of the Indian Brigade, 
but it eliminated Confederate General Steele 0 s hopes t~ starve the de= 
fenders of Fort Blunt into retl!"e&tingo35 
General Blunt traveled from. Foit't Scott and arrived unexpe~tedly at 
the fort, named for himsi on July llo He ann~~ncied to his surprised sub= 
ordinates that he was present t(ii) lead a major opelr'ation against Con= 
federate forces stationed on the south side of the Arkansas Rivero He 
immediately implemented plans for the pending atta~k by ~rdering the 
construction of three large boats~ sinGe the river was at a high water 
marko36 
The Kansas general was cognizant of the vital role that supplies 
would play in any ope?'ation fl"@m. Cti>lonel Ph:illlps 0 basti(Q)n. 9 and he had 
left detailed instructions on ~pply matters with his adjutant~ Major 
H~Zo CUrtisf at Fort Scotto The supply t~ain$ which was atta~ked at 
Cabin Oreek9 arrived at Fort Blunt on July 2 and would be returned to the 
Kansas depot as soon as possibleo Upon arrival at Fort s~ottj it was to 
be rapidly reloaded with additional sup~lies and :iMished ba~k to the Indian 
Territory outposto Blunt also informed his adjutant that suffioient es= 
eort would be placed with the long ~ol'W!'m of supply wagons to insure their 
safetyo'J7 
Intelligence reports of Confederate trocp strength and disp~sitien 
. 
35Phillips to Blunti July 7j 1863~ ibido, Po 379i Brltt<11ml) ~ Civil 
li!!, !!l 2 ... Bo ... rd .... ,..... e.... r, II, Po lOOo 
36BI.unt to Curtis, July 13, 1863, Offi~isl Reoordsp i~ XXII~ pto 2~ 
6 er; ===;am;, et:::zr::: ' Po ) 7o 
37eurtis to Marsh, July 16~ 1863~ ibido~ Po 3790 
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indicated that the eombined forces ~r General Co~per and General Cabell 
would launoh an attack either on Fort Blunt or the supply line of the 
post on July l?o General Blunt9 fearful that ?jOOO Confederate soldiers 
would eventually gather at the Elk Creek oa.mpj decided that he had suf~ 
fioient strength with his 31>000 available men to attack ®ither of the 
converging Southern brigadesj b~~ 'the odds of defeating the Confederate 
units together were slimo He therefore ordered preparati~ns made for a 
rapid orossing of the Arkansas River and an equally ~apid attack on 
General Cooper's collllll8.nd of about 4 9000 befo~e it coiuld be reinforced by 
General Cabell and his tl"\O>ops friom northwest Arkansaso38 
The technique used in gaining a beachhead on the Confederate-
defended south bank of the river was amazingly simpleo On the evening 
of July 15 the Kansas general lead a battalion of the Sixth Kansas Caval= 
ry Regiment and one battery of artillery thirteen miles up the Arkansas 
River to a ford that was passablee After orossing~ this for©e moved 
rapidly down the south bank and oleared the area across from the Federal 
fort of Confederate picketso Late in the afternoon of July 16j the newly-
built boats began transporting the bulk of the command to the opposite 
shore)9 
The Federal command started its fo:t"W'ard movement southward toward 
the enemy camp at 10100 pom. the same evening and 9 after an. all-night 
maroh, arrived at advanced Confederate Q'Utposts si approixima:tely five miles 
from the main campo After a short skirmish whioh f~~~~d the withdrawal 
of the Southern defenders, the Federal soldiers~ still in a column 
38Deoo, ~. Road to Disappearance., po 1.55; Brl tt~n~ ~ Civil War on 
.:!?!.:!. Border, II, PPo .113:116.; .. Gener>al Rel)C?'tsi Brigadier Generai WoLoeabdls, 
December 7, 186'.;, Official Reciordsj) i; xm, Pto ls, Po 6040 
39Blunt to Schofield, July 26j 18631> ibido, Po 4470 
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formation, moved up to within a half mile of the m.ai~ C~nfederate battle 
' 
positiono. The Southern forces were entrenched in a timber line a.stride 
the Texas Road leading to Fort Blunto Since the Federal tr~ops were con~ 
cealed and pl"C!>teoted by a hill~ General Blunt halted the m~vemen~ of the 
column at this point and allowed his soldiers to rest and eato40 
Daring this two hour break, the Kansas general issued detailed 
orders for the impending atta.cko The Federal command was t«fil m.Olve in 
column for another quarter of a mile, and when the Confederate positions 
were visiblei the units were to execute flanking movements and-fem a 
line formation whi~h wo'Wl.d be roughly parallel to the C~nfederate de= 
f'ensive works., This series of f1anld..ng maneuvers was to be done quickly 
so that the Southern oomm.a.nder would be unable to determine the exact 
number of Federal troopso For simplicity of control, Blunt divided his 
units into two provisional brigades which contained both Indian and white 
unitsj and the first brigade also contained the Negr~ regim.ento41 
The order of march was suoh that white dismounted cavalry units 
would be located on the fianks ~ and the oen't,er of the :formation wuld be 
shared by the Indian regiments and the colored urdto Elunt0 s twelve 
artillery pieces, operating in four separate seetions, WG'llll.d be sit~ated 
at the flanks and in the center of the Federal lineo Orders were given 
to insure the continuous movement of the entire oe:mm.and onoe the units 
deployed off the Texas Roado Skirmishers wrould move quickly toward the 
enemy positions, and the first phase ef the general assau+,t would begin 
without a halto42 
40Brittont !h!, Civil~ 2!l ~ Borde?\, II, PPo 116=11'70 
41B111rit to Schofield, July 26, l863j) Offieiial Re(llO::tds 9 i 9 XXIIS> Pto 
1, PPo 1447 ... 4480 -- · '"" 
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While the troops were restingt General Blunt alse made a personal 
reco:nnaissanoe of the Confederate lineo He determined the exa~t l~= 
cation of the line ef Confederate rifle pits, but due to expert eam0tt= 
flaging, the pesition of the lone Confederate artillery battery could not 
be pinpointedo The cemmanding general et the Federal f'croes demonstrated 
his laok c,f' ooncsern f'or his own safety du.ring this time 11 fc,r he was se 
close to the Oontederate emplaoements that a sniper wounded a member ot 
his personal staff'o At lOsOO a.mo on July 17 Blunt ordered the forward 
movement or his oemmand 11 and thus epened the largest single engagement 
fought in the Indian Territory during the Civil Waro4:3 
After deploying oft the Texas Road, the Federal ·troops moved slowly 
through the underbrash in front or the Confederate positionso The line 
of advancing soldiers offered excellent targets fer the concealed 
Southernerso As soon as the Oenf'ederate battery revealed ite positiir,n 
by firing, the massed tire ct the twelve Federal cal!!lnCns tell Gn General 
Cooperffs tour guns, dismounted one or them from.its carriage, and 
silenced the remaining threeo 1'he battle had only begun9 and already 
44 Confederate firepower had been seriously ourtailedo 
Another calamity eccntr%9ed whiah hampered the ability· ot the CGn= 
federate forces to withstand the Federal attaoko southern gunpowder was 
of Mexican manutaot'IU"e and highly suseeptible to moisture absorpticno As 
it h,ad rained intermittently througho·ut the m@lrm.ng 9 Ccntederate soldiers 
tou.nd muoh ot their powder turned w pastel) a~ it wou.ld fire improperly 
or not at allo To make matters wcrse 11 oontu.ed.cn ClHJcurred in one ot the 
4'.3munt to Sc:thofield, July. 26, .186:,, Of:f'ioia.1. .. Reoords 9 :t, mI, Pto 
l, p. 447; Grant Foreman, Fort Gibson* A Brief m.stllll.z Ofc;man2 University 
of' Oklahoma Press, 1936), po 360 
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Confederate regiments, and this gave the Federal foroes an advantage that 
45 
proved to be decisiveo 
The 500-man.First Kansas Celored Infantry Regiment was the left 
flank unit of the first brigadeo During the second phase•o:t the Federal 
assault, some.members of' the Second Indian Regiment, which was on the 
right tlank of' the Negro unit, inadvertently get in fNnt et the 
colored troops. This occurred when the Federal and Confederate fGrces 
were only forty yards aparto The careless Indians.were obstructing the 
fire of the Kansas regiment, and its executive off'ieer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jo Bowles, called to the Indian soldiers to fall backo46 
The Twenty-ninth Texas Cavalry Regiment, which occupied a portion 
of the Co:nf'ederate line generally opposite from the Negro unit, thought 
the comm.a:nd was for the withdrawal of the ex-slaves .. The soldiers or the 
Texas regiment, thinking they had an advantage 9 climbed out ci>f their en= 
,, 
trenchments and charged toward the advancing Federal soldierso The 
colored unit did not £alter under the attaek and deliberately fired a de= 
vasts.ting volley into the o:nrashing Texanso The shook action et the heavy 
f'ire stopped the Oe:nf'ederate unit and forced it intc a hasty retreato 
Another volley tran the Kansas regiment ad~ed to the tell of the e:rlgi:nal 
and caused the center ef the Confederate line to buckle and collapseo 
The demoralised Texas troops moved rapidly to the rearo4? 
The withdrawing Texans were soon f'Gllowed by the remainder of' 
Cooper's eommand, and what might have been an orderly retreat turned into 
4Scooper to Steele!i) August 12, 1863, Off'ic;ial Records, i, mI, pto 
1, Po 458. · 
46Bri.ttan, l'h!. Civil~ .2a ~ Bc,rder, II, PPo 1189 1200 
. . 
47:sowles. to Judsen, July 20, 1893, Blunt to Sehofield9 July 26, 1863 11 
Official Records, i, XIII, pto l, pp .. 4.50~ 4480 
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a disorganized rnto The aetu.al battle lasted for approx:bnately two 
hours. The jubilant Federal soldiers, followed closely by their ar= 
tillery, continued to press their def'ea~ed foes over Elk Creek, past the 
main Confederate camp, and on intc the supply depot of Honey Springs, 
abeut three miles .south of the initial a.oiticmo An unwarr>anted oommit-
ment of reserves 9 prior to the Federal breakthrough 9 resulted in no Con-
federate u:ntts being available to aot. as rear guardo Little resistance 
was offered to the f'ast ... mcving soldiers of' Blunt9 s oommand~48 
The rapid pursuit of the defeated Confederates continued fer a mile 
south of the depot area where the Federal f'eircies wel"e halted and re= 
orgamzedo At 4sOO .Ponlo, two hours after the Federal forces were stopped, 
General Cabell arrived in the vicinity with '."hOOO fresh troops from north-
west Arkansaso The disorganized condition ct Cooper0 s comm.and was so 
severe that it was th~ught unwise to attempt a oounter~attack~ and durin, 
the night, all Con.federate forces continued the withdrawalo Cabell and 
his troops returned to Arkansas~ and the rems:ins of Cooper~s beaten com= 
49 mand mQved as rapidly as they could toward the safety ct the Red Rivero 
Casualties fer the battle were heavy in Gomparison to the usual 
lH ses su:f.'tered by uni ts fighting in the Indian. Terri·t.oey o Federal f'crces 
had thirteen men killed and sixty ... two men woundedo Confederate lesses 
were even heavier, tor General Cooper adm:1 tted that 137 ot ~I.is men were 
killed and torty-ni:m.e were taken as prisoners" A large per@entage of tht 
Confederate casualties were Gaused by the aocu.ra.te Federal artillery fireo 
48Bri tton, The Civil ,!2 .!! ~ Bordero> IIi ppo 121=122; S~haurte to 
.Acting Assistant Mjutant General 1> July 20 9 1863 9 . Blunt .. ~ s~hof:ield 1> July 
26, 1863, Cooper to Steele, August 12, 1863 9 Offi~ial Reaords 9 i~ XXII 9 
Pt. 1, PP• 451, 448, 4590 
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In facti the employment of Federal artillery was the major factor re= 
sponsible for the Confederate defeato50 
General Blunt, aware that his troGps were short of an:tnru1:nition9 de~ 
cided to remain in the battle area in case the Confederates ~ontinued the 
engagement the following dayo Blll.t the rapid retre~t of the f~r~es of 
Cooper and Cabell prevented further fighting~ and the Federal forces re= 
turned to the confines of Fort Blunt on July l8o5l 
General Cooper was again put in the unpleasant position of reporting 
another defeat, and again he managed t6 rationalize the loss to a mini= 
mumo His main excuse was the w~rthless Mexi~an powder whi~h he said was 
responsible for the Federal successo If the weapens of his soldiers had 
fired properly, his command would have been able to h()l)ld their position 
in spite ot the superior numbers ot their foes. He also gave oredit to 
Blunt's artillery for his defeat and exaggerated the nu:mber and .size of 
the Federal guns by saying that they were ten times superioro52 
It does not appear that General Blunt realized the significance of 
his victoryo He was pleased with the success of his eommani, but he 
made no serious attempt to follow the retiring Confederateso General 
Cooper, on the other hand 9 w:a.s keenly conscious ~f his inseeure position 
and mCJ>st anxious to withdraw from the seemingly invincible Bl'il.ll.nto 
General Cabell was et a similar frame of' mindo The ~ssibi,lity that ·the 
divided Southern f'oroes would lr>e a:t.taoked separately was disregarded by 
50McReynolds, The Sem.inoles 9 Po 30?~ Blunt to Schofield\) July 26 11 
1863, Cooper to Steele• August""l2~ 1863si Official Records~ ir. XXII~ Pto 
l, PP• 448, 460 .. 
5lschaurte to A.oting Assistant .Adjuta.n:t Genera.1 11 July 20j 186:'.39 · 
~bido9 P• 451; B:ritt0n 11 ~ Ci~il 1'!!,.2!!,~ Border!, II 9 Po 1240 
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the two Confederate generals as they sought to elude their more powerful 
adversaryo 
One reason for Ellunt@s laok of aggressiveness after the battle was 
his sudden illness. From his description of the malady which he called 
attacks of fever and physical weakness~ he was s1;d'f ering from. malaria o 
There were other equally plausible reasons f'or his lack of aotivityo 
The recent battle had used up a large quantity of ammu:rdtilQln, and this 
had to be replaced by way of the long impply rcu·t.e fnm Fort Scotto 
Rations for the 5,000 Indian refugees living inside Fort Blunt ceuld not 
be stookpiledj for food was consumed almost as rapidly as it was trans-
ported from Kansaso53 
The lag in coJllll'lU.nioation between Fort Blunt and higher headquarters 
provided still another reason for Blunt0 s hesitancy toward offensive 
operations against the valt"io~s elements cf General Steele0 s divided 
command. Blunt did not knew the exact mmiber er Confederates facing him 
south or the Arkansas River, and he wanted additional reintcr~ements from 
the inactive commands located in southern Missou.rio Requests for help 
wo11ld have to be sent to Saint Leu.is, and the total time involved in an 
exchange of messages would be two weeks er lengero 
General Blunt waited eight days befere he reported the battle at 
Elk Creeki, which he officially called Honey Springs after the location sf' 
Cooper0 s headquarters and s,upply depcto The Kansas general Wl'Ote a sub,.. 
dued account ot the .fight~ •nd he gave nc glewing descriptions cf the 
absolute victory his forces had achieved o He briefly and simply teld the 
5'.3Blunt to. Schofield, Jul,y 26, 18631> ilndo il Po 448; Calkins tG 
Curtis, -July 23, 18639 . munt to CUrtis, Augu.st._19, 18639 .. ibido.,. Pto 2~ 
pp .... ~93.394, 462~ UoS. 11 C(:)ngress!i.l House 9 Report or the Secretary ·of In= 
terior 1863, PPo 328-3290 -=-""""""' ................ 
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£aatso Several days later he revealed the condition of his command to 
General SohGtieldo Still firmly committed to the tactical ooncilept of 
effense, m.unt elaborated the st:r>e:mgth or the enemy and the weaknesses or 
his command in both men and ar>tilleryo The Kansas general said he could 
muster only 3,000 men, and this would leave Fort Bl:wat defended by con-
valesoents.. He ctJ:>ncluded with the ?"ema.rk, ''The odds against me are 
large, bu.t I shall endeavor to do the best I can with the.handful ot 
treops under my- command .. .,54 
Major HoZe Curtis, the adjutant left by Blunt at Fert Scott, added 
to the confusion with the ala?'ming reports he sent te Oene~al Schcfieldo 
Cu.rt11;1 had no knowledge or the Honey Springs battle, and he indicated te 
the department commander that General munt was not enly sick, bllt almost 
trapped inside t~e walls of his fort with a Confederate force or 13,000 
menacingly closeo This disturbing news should have torQed Soh~:tield into 
action, but it did noto The department oommanderp relying en the 
grasping character of his arch rival Blunt 11 made ttG effort. to actively 
assist him in the defense of the Indian Territoryo Schofield simply 
oautioned Blunt to use :restraint 1:n hi.s actiens and ta 'be pa:tiento 55 
When Blunt0 s pessimistic message te Schofield arrived in Saint Louis, 
it goaded him into limited aotiono He informed the district c0mmander in 
southwest Missouri, Brigadier General John McNeil, to move a torce into 
northwest Arkansas where they cwld assist Bli:mt0 s c@x1mund in case it was 
driven out of Fort. Blunt and forced to retreat towa.rd Fort Scotto He did 
not tell General.McNeil te send this force to be u.nder Blunt0s eommand, 
'. 
54m.unt to Schofield, Jul;r 26, 1863, Official ReC!lC>lr>ds!; 1 11 mI, P't.o 
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and when Schofield.intemed Major Curtis et his a.eti~nj he reiterated his 
decision net te rei:m.force the Kansas general with trcops which could be 
needed to defend the critical border area of Missouri and Arkansaso56 
The final results of Schofield0 s actions were entirely different 
from. what he had intendedo Whether er not his li1llrders were willh.lly dis= 
obeyed by Blunt or unintentionally altered by Adjutant CUrtis will never 
be determinedo General Blunt o~ntaeted the ble6king f@ree sent intG Ar= 
kansas by direct courier and erdered them to proceed immediately to his 
location on the Arkansas Rivero This 1500-man unitj the See.end Kansas 
to join their fellow Kansans in the Indian.Territoryo It moved into Fort 
Blunt on August 22057 
The same day Colonel Clou.d 0 s regiment arrived, General Blunt began 
the final phase ef his ~am.paign against the Conf:ederate f~r~es of General 
Steeleo The Kansas general intor.m.ed Sch@:tield of his future plans in 
strict military langu.ageo Th,e new r~intorced 49500 ... man Army of the 
Frontier would move across the Arkansas Ri:ver with the destructien et the 
Confederate oemmand and the capture et Fairt Smith 9 Arkansas, as its dual 
objectiveo Blunt mentioned that his poor health had prevented earlier 
operations, but he indicated he was sufficiently' recovered to again as= 
sum.e personal command 0 58 
Signifieantly, the opening paragraphs ef this message oentained 
General Blu.nt's attitude toward the Indian soldiers which eC!>lllpGSed the 
10, 
56schofiel.d ta McNeil 11 Au.gu.st lOt 186'.3, Schofield to CU>tis 11 .August 
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bulk of his command., General Schofield had written Blunt in early 
August concerning the removal or some Kansas Indians intG the Indian 
Territory., This change er residence was probably ca.used by agitation of 
Kansas politicians to get rid of unwanted tribes whieh had been assigned 
reservations on some of the best agriO'U:llltural lands in the stateo Gener-
al Schofield wanted to kn.Gw the feasibility of inducting these red men 
into add~tional Indian regiments., Militall!"Y' serviee would separate the 
Indian,men from their tamilie~ and ~d simplify control during rem.ova.lo 
As :members or the a.my, these men would be subject to military discipline~ 
and this wuld prevent unwanted violenee by Indian males reluetant w give 
up their homes., Since Blunt had originally supervised the Indian regi-
ments, and had additional experience w.ith the Indian Brigade, he was the 
best. authority available on the subject.}9 
General Blunt waited no words in dssol"ibing his feelings abwt 
Indian u:nits 9 £er he said flatly that r~d men :ms.de poor soldierso He 
continued by saying that even the best of the:mi the Oh.erokeesll proved tci, 
be unaatisf'aoteey troops onee they arrived 'baok in their ew ceu:ntryo 
Blunt felt the Kamas Indians were tar :interior to the best of' the Five 
Civilized Tribes, and would 'be utt.er,ly wrthless it reo!"llited inte the 
arm.,o He saggested that the best solution tor the Indian problem would 
I 
be resettlement as tal'!rlers on gove:rn:ment land with white troops nearby 
fer pNteotio:no He oenolu.dttda "I wuld not exchange one regiment et 
! 
59Ibido' p~ 46.5; Gener.al-.. Order, .. Departm.ent .. ef'. I{&nsl.S9 .. Ma,y_.Jh .1862, 
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The Confederate Indian Te~ritcry c~nd of General Steele was re= 
assembled in early Aug'llst near Briartown Gn the Canadian Rivero General 
Cabell once again moved his brigade into the Indian O@)Untryo General 
Coeper collected troops in the Oheotaw Nation, in@luding ene ocmpletely 
new regiment, and reluctantly rode ncrtho General Steele had ambitious 
plans tor a latemswnmer offensive t~ reeover Confederate l@sses, but 
after observing the men and their equipment in his eampl) he s@~n became 
convinced of the hopelessness ot the situationo6l 
The brigade of General Cooper had n~t re~~vered from the defeat it 
received at Honey Springs the previous m@lntho The sise ~r Cabell 0 s 
emmnand had been increased with additicl!Wl. ~ons~riptsl) bat :ntariy ot these 
men were Union sym.pathizerso The entire brigade was of .doubttul value 
even unde:r- the best"' circumstanoeso The Tens troopsil·reported for so 
long as being eri route 11 had not arrlvedo Steele was thus fal;iled with the 
prospect of fighting a Federal f~?"Ce equ.al. t~ Gr larger than bis own and 
far superior in equip:r1ent and artilleryo After the recent Federal 
victory, the morale of m.unt.0s c0lllllltmd was extremely- high while the morale 
of the Confederate soldiers was unusually lowo 62 
These adverse conditions brought Steele to the only ohoiee he had 
availableo Since it."i'10u;ld be suicidal to try tG conf'rent the advancing 
Federal forces, he would split his command and withdraw in h~pes the 
Federal commander wul.d u:tend h.1.msel:t t@ the pciint where. his lin$ G£ Gom ... 
nrdcatien to Kansas could be severedo The decision net te stand and 
620enera.J. Report, Brigadier Gene:r.oal William Steele, February 1.5 9 
1863, 0.fticial Records, 1 11 m~, Fto 1 9 PPo :32=33o 
116 
fight was the easy way out of the Confederate commander0 s predi~ament~ 
for Federal victories in the summer of 1863 c®>nvineed most of' his Indian 
soldiers that further active resistance was not ~:nly f~@lhardy but sense= 
lesso General Steele, in spite of his military baokground 9 had probably 
oome to the same oonolusieno 
For a seeond time in a month~ General Cabell was erdered to counter= 
march his brigade to At'kansas and def end F@rt Smi:tho The remainder or 
the Confederate oommand;i oom,0sed of dejected Indians and Texa~s 9 moved 
south and west toward Bcggy Depot in the Choctaw Nationo The pu.rsuing 
forces of General Blunt~ o~nfused by the la@k of fight in the C~nf'eder= 
ates;i hesitated slightly~ and then stiru<Clk south in an effort to eliminate 
the force of General Steele before continuing their advan(:le to Fort 
Smitho 63 
On the evening of August 26 the retreating C<Gn:f'ederates were over= 
taken by the lead element of the Federal C()))lum,n at Pel":eyvill® i:n the 
Choctaw oountryo This skil"ll!.ish between members or the Second Kansas 
Cavalry Regiment and a hastily-assembled band of Cenfederate Indians and 
Texans was over almost before it begano General Steele0 s troops were in 
the process of withdrawing from the town and offered only light resis= 
ta.nee when attacked by the Federal. cavalrymeno The Confederate oommandel" 
said he was able to remove all supplies before he aband~ned the depot~ 
but General Blunt stated Perryville was filled with er@mroissary stores 
which the Confederates were f0roed t~ burn toi prevent their eaptureo64 
After the act.ion at Pereyvillej) Gene?'a.l Bl.unt became ocnvinced that 
the Confederate forces.mud effer little or no resistan!Ole t0 his advancep 
63Cloud t0 McNeil, August 27~ 1863 9 ibida~ Po 5980 
64munt to Sohof'ield, Augu.st 27~ 186::,, Steele tt:ll Sneed~ A'a.gu.st 28, 
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and he dra.stioally altered his troGp dispositionso He sent a strong 
force from the Indian Brigade to garrison Webber0 s Falls and returned the 
balance of his old command to Fort Blunto He proceeded toward Fort Smith 
with only the Second Kansas Cavalry Regiment and his artillery" The re-
ports of the lack of fight in General Cabel1°s brigade were substantially 
correct, and after a smal1 engagement at Ba~kbone M~untain sixteen miles 
south of Fort Smith on September 1, the Confederate unit ~ompletely fell 
a.parto Those members who did not desert retreated ignominiously with 
their general southward into Arkansas" General Blunt9 aa~ompa.nied by his 
staff, bis personal b1Wdygu1ard o:f s,oildierslil and a new Federal unit~ the 
First Arkansas Infantry Regimentj toCllk Fort Smith w.H:.hGilut opposi tiono 
Since the Kansas general was still suffering from the illness that had 
troubled him since July, he delegated the supervision of mopping~up opera= 
tions to his subordinate9 Colonel Cloudo After informing General S~ho= 
field that the entire Indian TerritGry and western Arkansas were in his 
possession, Blunt went to bedo The long ~ampaign was overo65 
The :final Federal offensive operations against the crumbling Con~ 
federate :forces in the Indian Territory were anti=elimatiao The ragged 
and forlorn Southerners'# under.fed and armed with little c:.,r nothingil proved 
to be no match for the advancing Federal ~ommando The complete laGk of 
hope is clearly apparent in General Steele0 s report 9 written several 
months after the :fall of Fort Smithj when the C@nfederate gener&l had been 
relieved o:f his oommand at bis own requesto 
Steele presented a completely derogatory pieture Qf Confederate 
65munt to Sehofield 9 September '.3 9 18f>3j Cloud to Schofieldj) Septem= 
ber 8, 1863, ibid., PPo 601 .... 602 9 .598=.599; Blunt to $ch.Gfield 9 . September 
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affairs in the Indian Territory in 18630 Incei>mpetent offioiilr'S\) a supply 
system which eonsistently m.a.lfunctioned, and faulty Mexican gunpewder 
were listed as primary reasons tor the numereus Southern defeats in the 
Indian aot1.ntryo General Steelep like his Ner.thern. oeu.nterpart.si had little 
respect tor Indian seldiers~ who he felt were undisciplined and worthlesso 
He was also une.omplimentary about Indian officers, and he singled out 
Colonel Mcintosh as being slow, uninspiring and completely responsible 
for the un.suooess:f'ul April raid which ended with the defeat at Greenleaf 
Prairieo Steele ma.de an exception or Colonel Watie9 whem he cha:racterlzed 
66 as a capable a:nd rescurcef'lil military eommandero 
The Federal government in its slew and deliberate way had attained 
its purpose or reoonquering the Indian TerritC>eyo The planning had mot 
been outstanding, and the execution of those plans had been at times 
barely satisfactoryo The permanent oceupation of Fort Blunt by C0lonel 
Phillips had initiated the final Federal cffenseo These victories around 
that forward wtpost, and those at Ca.bin Creek and Honey Springs were 
complete from the standpoint cf achieving appropriate :military ~bjectiveso 
Even more important, these successes killed the will tc resist in all but 
the most rabid et Southern. sympathizerso It was obvious that the Con-
federacy weuld not ud cellld net supply the mi:nimum neee1Ssit.ies tor 
fighting a war .. The North had the men and material for winning battles, 
and this, more than broken. promises and defeatsp was what stifled the 
hopes of most or the Confederate Indians .. Nothing seemed qttite so futile 
as dying for a dream. that had ne chance f<r»r attainmento 
The Civil *.r in the Indian Territory had eighteen mGnths -w :run it,s 
660eneraLRepert, Brigadier· General:1dlliam. Steelep Febl"llaey 159 1864s, · 
Official Reco:rdss, i, XXII, pto 1 9 PPo 28 ... 360 
ll9 
ooursea The Confederate Indian Brigade of' General Ctilwllper ~wn{ll>inued to 
oarry out insignificant operati~ns in the Choctaw and Chiekasaw N&tiillins 9 
and Colenel Watie and his Cherokee regiment raided intem.ttentl.y &c:iross 
the Arkansas Rivero These were the onl.y bright moments for the Con .... 
federates during the oonCJl'U.ding months cf the wa:ro The dr>l!l~m illif' a Con ... 
federate Indian Ter:r:tt.ciry died wi.th the di:sin·tegratie:n cf' Geintiral 
Steels0s command itt July and A:ttgust of 18630 The eaptu,,e ~r For>·t Smith 
merely added more disillu.sioinmen't, for the advocates: @If the s~utho 
Federal ascendancy ever C~nf'ederate resistan~e in the Indian Territory 
was now virtuall.y oomplete~ and t.he ~'lltOIQ)me of the war in the Indian 
~ountry was no lGnge~ Gonje~tureo 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The ;years 1862~1863 in the Indian Tel'Tite!',Y' saw Federal military 
power inorease to the degree that the area was invaded 9 demi:natedS> and 
gene::rally paoit!ed. The spasmodio ettorts ot Northern :tield oe:,mmanders 
cannot be oensidered n.tstandi:ng examples ot hew to tight a secondary 
milita:1:7 campaign., 'but in the tinal analylissi they· acoen.plished their 
primary goal. The Indian Territoey was subjugated by and large by Sep-
tember ot 186:, when For,t Smith, Arkansas, wa1 ta.ken by' Federal teroeso 
In the Texas border regions1,1 a.:n.d al.so in the CheNkee Naticin tG th.e 
north, Otnfedera.te Indian '!!nits harassed thei~ adversaries with hite;8.nd ... 
run tactics until the war endedil but these opeira.tiens pesed ne basic 
threat w Umion control ot the e<m.nt270 
It was the ovel'Whel:ming superiority of men,, m.o:n.ey9 and :material Gt 
the Federal gevermnent that brought abGttt the ~~lipse ~£ the C0ntederacy 
in the Indian Territeeyo Wars are not won with hC!lpessi wt with s~ldiers 
who have sufficient know ... how and a.rm1JQ.nition to destNy their ene.m.ieso 
This was the case with the Northo On the other hands, the Seuth b.eped 
only that it ww.d be able t0 maintain its pHition in the Indian ~cun.tryo 
The Five Civilized Tribes were undoubtedly lulled into a false sense Gf 
security by the grandiose prGmises of Confederate Commissi~ner Pike at 
the outbreak .. of the cenflicto 
The hopes ef the Indians for a better and MCiill"e pr~spe:iN!IUS life with 
an indepe:m.dent Contedera@y·were dampened significantly after the~isast~us 
defeat at Pea Ridge in March, 18620 Their hGpes re~eived an even greater 
120 
121 
blow with the advent er the Federal Indian Expedition., It is deubtful 
that the tribes were really enceuraged by the sudden withdrawal or this 
imrasion torceo Even the most die,.,h.ard Scuthern sympathizer e~uld see 
the potential of the Federal goverment and its superl.crit.y to that 0f 
its Confederate opponent" 
The second il'IV'asie:n ct the Indian Temteey in 1863 cmn.:pl.etely dis ... 
heartened the Confederate Ind1ans 9 and they effered very little resis~ 
tanoe to the.Federal military machineo There were isolated e:x:oeptlens 
to this~ but the will to resist the United States Goveirnment died when 
Colonel Phillips moved his Federal Indian B?'igade back te F~rt Gibson in 
April, 18630 The battle Gf H'i)ney Springs and the capture or Fcrt Smith 
were antiolimatioo All hope f'or an eventual Southern triumph had been 
destroyed some months previeu.s to.these eventso 
The inhabitants ~f the Indian Te:r,:t"it@lry were viotimSJ of the war re ... 
ga.rdless er their allegian~eo The Indian f'@llowers ot Opotbleyahl!il)la. and 
Chief Ross who remained trtte to their treaty obligations with the United 
States su.tfered as mu.oh as those red men who eagerly sought the hand of 
Confederate friends'.hip from Ce:mmissic,mer P.i.keo The wealth @f the Indian 
oou.ntry was in its farms and cattle, and the stability r,f its people was 
intertwir1ed with personal pcssessiens and friendships,, These tw as~ 
pirations, wealth and friendship 9 were the fwndatiiln of' the new Indian 
civilization that was established in the territoeyo The war mned the 
land, destroyed the possessiens, killed countless innocent pe@ple9 and so 
thoroughly disillusicmed the Indian tribes that it took them many years 
to recover.. var, like removal to the Indian Terrl.~ry~ was a t?>a:Wllatic 
experience for these red memo Both events invdved assGcia.tic,;ns with the 
white race, and both were highly detrimental to trlbal growth and de<=> 
velopmento This was especially- true with tribes which divided their 
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loyal. ty between the North and the Sou tho These intratl"'lbal rl·valries !i 
begun with removal and reintensitied by the war!il were unusually slow in 
dyingo 
The Oonfedera.ey gained an advantage frooi initially holding the 
Indian Territory in spite cf' its event'Ul.il. less w the Federal arm.yo The 
fightl.ng 'WI.a confined t(J) the Indian c1111untr,y II and al though the deeit,rturM.en 
Gf :m.en a:nd pro:peirty wa.s severej it allorwed Texas w esoape the her·rors or 
waro The civilian pc!>pulatiGn of' Texas was spa.redj) and the Ul"ge a.gr! ... 
cultural prci>duotion cf' the st.ate was shipped east t@ buttress the ef'f@lrts 
of the DJ.(l)re pci~ns se~t.tons of the O~nf'ederaeyo The swth was fe?>oed 
to sacri:f'ice the hopes of her Indian allies in ~rder to gamble where there 
wa.s sae cha.Me @:t su.t2cesso It is dwbtM that any @f' the C0nf'ederate 
political or military leaders ever oensidered the Indian Territairy more 
than a bu.fier z@neo 
The Federal gevermnent w:as grav·eJ.y hindered in i'ts ef'fililrts to subdue 
the detected tl'ibes ~t the Indian Territory by the o~ntinual qua:f!'eling 
of its mili ta.ey leaders for pu.:rpo sea Clllf r.•epu ta t:io:n9 au tb®r;i ty 9 ~r weal tho 
The purely selfish mctives of the gener~ls and p~liti~ians who had juris= 
diotiC!)n over the Indian oiou.nt.ry a.ls@ caused addi·t:.i@nal hardships f'C!>r its 
inhabita:ntso Most of' this rivalry was on a persC>n=w.,,pers@n basis 11 but 
the efforts or Senator Lane of Kansas to contrcl the territ~ry were ex"' 
tremely br0ad, for Lane and his friends opposed any~ne wh®i threatened 
their metheds of ma.king dishonest profits from the W"al"o Appa.rentlysi 
Colonel Phillips was the ~nly high~ranld.:ng Federal officer wh~ se'.l'."Ved in 
the Indian Territory due tc his eon~ern for its i:riha.bitantso 
The meat controversial military figu?'e ©l:lL either side was Union 
General Bl.unto A typi<:1al ab@llitiGni.st f'a.na.ti@ of the Civil. War erai> 
Blunt was tinged with a psy~h~tio O@indi t.icmi> and this :menw a.bn®mali ty 
made him. more d@gmati.c and ra@mpulsi v~ thi!n, wi1ald have be®n expera'ibsd under 
peace cil'@umstanraesc His sl(Q)W mental d~teri©rati@n did n©t prevent him 
from understanding the role ©Jf an aggr'es51ive @@ffll'l'W.:nd®?' @(Q):m:rrdtted t© 
waging of'f."ensiv~ svatll.,@n tALiwa.r.d a dl!flf'hrl..te go11lo In :f'i&@tw B1L'i.mt wa.s one 
ef the :t"ew Union Amy generali!!! who '!mde:t>stilwo<d t1hQ$ 1e1~:l'l1((l)!!pts t1f uti(;i)de:i•in wru:o,,,, 
.faI•eo He was a t.h'!TL p!"Op1.j1ne1tl't l'@:J;' rr.t.!.ssed a:r•·t:lll@ry :f'ire and ustd thi,s 
techrdqae tQ great adv·arrt&ge i.n all lb)f hi,t ·v1.,ert,16J1°ies :in the Ind:li:u:1 Terri"" 
toryo He was als~ a erta"rml.'llh belie"1.rer i.n 'the primi1iple 1~f ef'fensr!l~ even 
though he l.a~ked a f'cmd. :mil.i'ta:ey edu~~;t:l~no Blunt ~lea.rly undcr81rst(Ol@d 
the ne~essi ty of <01ar:eyi.:ng the f'i.ght t.<® the ·elnc~mi:y :in orde»r tw @'btaln 
su,ooess on the 'battJ..efieldo 
The Xl'llOlli!l'C mal:i.gnrsd :1:ritdi:v:idu.d. tli'll eimeit."ge during t,he Fedl.'P1•al !Ol:f:'f'ensive 
operations of 1862=1863 in the Indian TerritGr,y was Colonel Weero vlhile 
oommanding the ill • .,,f'$J.tad I:ndb .. n E"Jtpecl'.&.ti@n9 Wei!!r w,u @l.Jt?:t'reilstr~d aiflld h:!t..l9 
:.t.b~es shamefully w:i.thdra:wn till! Kana:as when vlrat@:r.y lill!il.:S: @il.lm.lClS't w.1.tl:rl.?l r>~i@l.ielho 
The oirams·ta:n~es su:rreu:ndi:ng thirs: strange irii;:idient w~ft'1ei sh)t"©l115lded with 
seoreoy, bu't it seems C1e?11tain ·that Weer, desp:ite h&?'dsrd.ps ,~nd miserable 
m.ili·tary cicndi tions, was de'te:mi:ned tr® :m&i:11Jl't~.:i.n his fi;;))it'Wlil.:t>d ll©1si·i~i101n in 
the Indian cou:ntryo The saf.e·ty of ·chre~ Ch~1·,1'1lkr®e N~1:tiQJn was ~1;t stak~,) and 
even m0re i.mpo:r·t.arit9 Wee:lt" eiould se~ ·tha:t. ·the Cr(J)n:f'~d~t"'&<oly w@·uld be i1ooblis 
to oounter11u,t the invas:i.or1 of the t.e:ri''?'i.te:r;r by hi.~ @@>mmiinda The :f(l'llr,,ig~"' 
.ful exertion ~f p0wer Wl)Uld s011:ll.di.fy lr'i!llf::lr!!lnt, g.dns snd makl!il i't!\:t''~:h(ifllr' ertrlkres 
possibleo His succiess~:ri 11 C~lonel Sal©>ml@l!lli;, did ttrC»'t ha"11'1cl the :lnsigM:. to 
understand the :r>@le he had u.s'll:l°ped 9 a:nd he qui@kly 1@£'!:t the advantage 
gained by the toil and saorif:lL@e @f 6~000 Fede:iral swldieiri3io 
An analysis of all. ope:riati@n~ within the Indfa.n Tel"l''i t©JI,Y dllll:'ing ·the 
eighteen=mcmth pe:ri:iwd e11.nered by this: thesis de1ra@nstir'iil:teis tha1.t pir'@pel'l:y 
trained and pr®'p1!3:!'ly led Indian Sli!i'·ldiie:t>i:l we:t'e :rielfa.bleo Preijurdi@® agdn~t 
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Indians in general all@wed many military leaders f?'@m the N~~th and the 
S0uth to assume that the red man ~@Juld not adapt himself ti@ fighting a 
white man°s waro Often the role whiGh the Indian could perf~rm with 
great ability was net understo~do He ~i@tlld be an ex~ellent s~©ut, even 
when he had little Gr no equipmento This ree@lnna.issan~e tvi@le was ad~ 
mirably suited for the Indian~ and his ability to ride fr@?' great dis= 
ta.noes and to endure hardships ma.de him an ideal cH.wmp@n.e:nt @f' the long= 
range mounted patrolo He was equally goed as a guerl'illa f'ighter~ and 
the am.bash and the raid were adaptations of' a style @if fighti:ng knrciw.n t~ 
Indians f~r generationso 
It was·unfortuna.te that the m.ajer cswm.tandrers Clf the Northeir:n and 
Sauthern forces in the Indian Territory did n~t understand the military 
skills of the red man., B~th General Blunt and General. Steele tried t@ 
fit the Indian sGldie!° int@! the white pa:ttern @f warfare 9 and !Ol@nse"" · 
quently they ended the Clampa.ign e:f' 1863 with deroga.t@:ry repw?>·ts about the 
fitness and ability of the Indians under their eommandso Ccnfedeirate 
General Steele was biased against Indians for military p~iop~ses dtte to 
rivalry with his subordinate~ General CC'l(l)per~ wh0 liked tham si.s s<®ldierso 
Omcm Get1eral Blunt, as a rewl t of hi:s prejudioe and his mental 0C1n= 
di tion, was against the empleymertt flf Indians in :f.'uture mili tar.r ep11:r1.w 
tionso These two men played down the importance of the Indian in the 
fighting in the terri toey in 1862 ... 1863 a Only @ne Federal. (:;J(@Mm-!i.nde1r 9 
Cclenel Phillips, adequately appre~iated the Indian soildie:t' as a tigh·ting 
mano 
The difficulties of oo:mbating C®Jnfede:rate g11e:!frilla wrfax•e we!"® 
first realized in the Indian Territory and in o·ther b0rdel" areas @f the 
West during the Civil Waro This taeti!Cl @if atta~king isolated pliils:ts~ @f 
ambushing slow=moving supply e(!))lmnns 9 and @f destr@ying f@@dstuff's up~n 
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which armies depe~ded r~r su.rvival, is now a d~~trine @f m~dern ~@mbato 
During the Civil War these meth<i>ds were eonsidered ba:t>barleilsi and all f(i)ms 
of retaliation were used to @~mba.t themo These clandestine ~perati<i>ns, 
used often by Confederate Indimsj were ideally suited .for small and 
poorly e9.uipped units., TheY' :foroed the North to waste manpower and ma"' 
ter.lal. in an unusually futile eff er·t to pr~tect ill vulnerable p0int~ a 
This poer solution to the pr®blem did not prevent guerrilla bands fr@m 
striking, and the attacks were genera.lly' sucelessfulo The raiders did not 
attempt t0 h0ld their gains~ bl!t they oaptured materials f~r another at= 
taeki and then dest:rGyed the remaindero Burned buildings, slaughtered 
animals, and dead sentries served as gr~m reminders t~ frighte~ and Un= 
nerve the enemy,. This fear of the unknilwn was equally effeetive on the 
civilian populatic:m, and ccmma.mde.rs at all levels experienced trmeh 
fru.stration because er this pr@blemo 
Cenfederate gue~a fighters did :m.ueh to pr~l@ng the Federal ef-
fort to conquer the Indian Territory,, and similar g11e1'Tilla bands tb.Nlugh ... 
ou.t the West were resp«Dnsible for rash and inopportune de~isions by 
Federal aemm.anders who ow.ld nGt cope with these taotiHo Bu.t eventually 
the pressure of inadequate supplies and insuf'fioient manpower were the 
Confederates in the Indian Territory into e:x:hausti0no SUperier Federal 
resources gave the United States g~ve:rnment nomi:rllal @~ntl"f@l ~r the terri~ 
· tory by the middle of 1863 9 but Clf>nfederate guerrilla ,u~'tivity plagued 
the Onion garrisons at Fort Gibson and Fert Smith with raids 9 patr<r»ls a:nd 
am'bu.sheso This harassment frequently dis?"lll.pted 'the n@:t"ll'lal ~pe:rations @£ 
the Army er the FrCi>ntier until the olHe crPf the n:ro 
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during the Civil Wa.ro Brawnlee brings eut the parallel between the 
efforts of military leaders of beth the North and the South t0 oo ... 
ordinate their partisan aetivity with regular military operatie>ns, 
and modern oonoepts of waro The mebile ffle or oa.va.lr,y is given ex.. 
tensive treatmento 
lJO 
Castel, Alberte ! §.'rontier State at ~i Ka.ns~il ~=!§Q,io Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1958o · · 
This work presents Kansas as a pr~*Nerthern state which was 
filled with unprincipled politioianso The close eonneotion between 
the military and political leade~s in the state is brought wt with 
great olarityo Castel has ample dcoumentatiGn to prGve his ac ... 
cusations of :fraud and deoeptiGno 
Cunningham, Franko Confederate India~o San Antoni.cs The Na.yl.ar Ceo, 
19590 
This is a biased aceGunt of the activities ef Brigadier General 
Watie and his Confederate Cherokee regimen.to The num.er~us sld.rmishes 
and engagements in which Watie and his unit participated a.re pre ... 
sented in great detail 9 but the pr@=Southern point of view detracts 
from the overall value of the bo0ko 
Dale, F,dward Everett, and Iiitton9 Gasten, edsQ Cherokee Cavalierso 
Norman: University of Oklah©m.a Pr>ess, 19:390 
This volume contains the correspondence @:f the Ri.dge ... Wa.tie= 
Boudinot family of Cherokee Indians, the leaders of the treaty 
faction of the t:ribee Mest of the male members ef the large family 
played important roles in Chel"okee politics for wer fifty yearsQ 
The family was pro-Southern in allegiance and was instrumental in 
persuading the Cherokee Nation to join the Co:m.federacyo 
Debo, Angie. The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republico Norman: Uni ... 
versi ty ofOld.a.homa. Press, i93~ 
This is a well ... w.dtten history of the Ch0cta.w Indian tribe with 
emphasis on the eu.ltural, political, and s@cial oharaoterlstics of 
this distinctive grwp of peopleo The seoticn of the book ~n the 
Civil War el.early shews the reasons fer the Southern loyalty ef the 
tribeo 
__ _..o The Road te Disappearanceo Noman: University of Okla.hem.a 
Press ';'"'T94:L · · 
This is the best hiswry available on the Creek Indian Nati.4:m, 
and the documentation is exoellentQ The portion of the book dealing 
with the Civil War is most conoiseo 
Dunoan, Robert Lipscomb., Reluctant Genera.lo New Yerk: EoP. Datton and 
Co., l96lo 
This is an excellent biography of Brigadier General Pikeo The 
conneeti.Ciln between the Five Civilized Tribes and the rcrt:.und 
Southerner can be seen mest clearly in the early chapters of the 
book, for Pike spent considerable time in the Indian Territory prior 
to the Civil Waro The boOJ>k :i.s biased in favor of the misundersto~d 
general, and it attempts to pr'ove that his actions in 1862 were 
metivated by good intentions toward his .Indian f:riendso 
Foreman, Granto A Rist.cry of Oklahomao Nomani University et Oklahoma. 
Press, 19'.340-' - -
This is an excellent general hist.Gey of the state Gf Oklahema~ 
Foreman gives a balanced and finely written presentati@n of the de= 
velopment of the Sooner Stateo This beok is net dcrioumentedil but due 
to Foreman's extensive background in Oklahoma history, it can be con-
sidered very aoourateo 
131 
o Fort Gibsono Noman: University of Oldah(lj)Jma Press,, 1936,, 
--- This is a brief histoiey of the army post ©n the A::rkansias Rivero 
Foreman presented ®nly the highlights of its ciilillorful histoeylil but 
there is no real loss of continuityo The activities in and around 
the fort during the Civil War are cov-e:red in some detailo 
---" Indian Rem.ova.lo Normani University of Oklahoma Pressj 19320 
This study provides a 'detailed acoount of the emigration 0f the 
Five Civilized Tribes from the s~uthern sect:,ions @f the United States 
to the Indian Territory during the first half of 'the nineteenth 
oenturyQ This resume is a.:n exie:ellent book for source material cm 
Indian removalo 
Malone, James Ho I!?!., Chiekasaw Natieno Louisvillei John Po Morton and 
Coo, 1922Q 
Written by a missionary to the Chickasaw Indian tribe, this 
book has some excellent personal accounts ®f events and a~tiv:ities 
which occurred in this Indlan nati(!ln before and after rem.ova.lo It 
is sooiewhat limited by its la~k of thorough doifJlmrJ.entatiOlno 
Mo Reynolds, Edwin Co Oklahoma. o Norman i University of Ok:lah@ma Press, 
1954. 
This is anQ!ther well~wri·t:t:.en and well~cl@)Cumented histery of the 
state of Oklahoma~ MoReynolds 0 style of writing makes reading this 
book a pleasure<> 
The SeminGles o Normans University ef Oklahoma Press 9 195'7 o 
This is the best work to date ~n the mest primitive of the Five 
Civilized Tribeso This volume is also well~documented and has an 
excellent bi.bliography o 
Monaghan, Jayo Civil War .!ll. ~ Western Border 18,54,..,1865,o Bosten: Littlell 
Brown and Co .. , 1955. 
Monaghan does not have his book doeumentedj and this detracts 
from the value of the mrko The writing style is journalistioj and 
faet and personal opinion are diffieult to separateo The book has 
interest and is valuable when cross referenGed with other material. 
Oates, Stephen B. Confederate Cavalry West of the Rivero Austin8 Univer= 
sity of Texas Pressi 195i'o - - -
This is a recent history of the cavalry units of Texas, New 
Mexieo, Arkansas, and the Indian Territaryo This W'®rk is based on 
general assumptions which Oates proves with extensive do!:Jiumentati@no 
Its br0ad and high level appr@aeh to cavalry ta~tiGs limits the b~@k 
to those with backgrounds Qf military history and military s<:llieneeo 
Richardson, James D.,, compo ! Compilation 2.!. !h! Messages ap.d Papers !!, 
the C<:>nfederaeyo 2 volso~ Nashville~ United States Pablishing Coo, 
!905e 
These two volumes provide source material for Pike 0 s treaties 
and his extensive negotiations with the Indian TerTitory tribes in 
l~o ' 
Soh0tield, John Mo F<>:t>ty"".§!! Years ~~Arm.yo New Yerkg The Century 
Co., 1897Q 
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This long uninteresting work was written after General Sohef'ield 
had retired from active duty.. It i.s highly biased and void of docu-
mentation, but it cari be most helpful in understanding the oompl.i ... 
cated political developments which were so significant in the Indian 
Territory during the Civil War .. 
Thoburn, Joseph B .. , and .Wright, Muri&µ Ho Oklah0wu ! H:1.storz ,!! !b!. .. 
State and Its Peopleo 4 volso, New York: Lewis Historical Publish-
ing co-:;-l.'§29. 
This is the definitive work on Oklahoma. historyo Volumes I and 
II were •sed extensively to provide background for this thesis, and 
the 'bibl.iog~apby :f'wnd in these volumes proved w be invaluable as 
a basis tor detailed research .. 
Wardell, Morris L. A Political History !£. the Cherokee Natien 1a,a ... 1907 o 
Nonn.ans Universrty et Oklahoma Press, l938o . 
This i,r .. one ot the 'best Indian tribal histaries published by 
the University of Oklahoma. Presso Wardell is an obvins expert o:n · 
Cherokee political institutions, and his treatment of the oft.en c11 ... 
vided Indian tribe provides candid insights into the efforts of 
variws leaders to achieve oa.plete independence f'r0m their white 
neighbors. 
Woodrut:t', W.E. With the Light~ ,!e ~-!.22.· Little Reeks Central 
Printing Co 090). · · 
This is a typi,eal Civil war soldier memoir, and it is limited 
in scope since the author made no effort tG document his wrko The 
descriptions ot lite at Fol"t McCulloch in 1862 are the most important 
contribution ot the booko · 
Woodward, Graoe Steele.. The Cherokeeso Neman: Urd·versity of Oklahoma 
Press, 196'.3. -
This is a new histoey of the Cherokee Indian tribe written trm 
a woman's pci,int of viewo The social and political trends ~:f' the 
most advanced ot the Five Civilimed Tribes are given detailed em,.. 
~sis. 
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l., FORT WASHITA 
2. NORT'H !,'ORK TOWN 
3. TULSEY TOWN 
M;~~o, .. i 
A~.: ... s 
Ii • • 11'. 
•.ao . 
4. ROUND MOUNTAIN, or TWIN MOUNDS 
5 0 CHUSTENAHLAH 
6. FORT DAVIS, or CANTONMENT DAVIS 
7. FORT McCULLOCH 
8 0 BAXTER SPRINGS, KANSAS 
9. COWSKIN PRAIRIE 
10 0 LOCUST GROVE 
11. FORT GIBSON, or FORT BLUNT 
12 0 TAHLEQUAH 
13. PARK HILL 
14. MAYSVILLE, ARKANSAS 
15. FORT WAYNE 
16. FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS 
17. WEBBER'S FALLS 
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